


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**FEASIBILITY OF AN 18 MONTH TOUR:  
FOR SINGLE/UNACCOMPANIED  
FIRST TERM SOLDIERS  
IN LONG TOUR AREAS**

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**A STUDY BY:  
THE TOUR LENGTH TASK FORCE**

**MARCH 1979**

**HQDA, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF  
OF STAFF, PERSONNEL**

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UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
6 4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Feasibility of An 18 Month Tour: For Single/ Unaccompanied First Term Soldiers in Long Tour Areas		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final 5 Dec 78 - 9 Mar 79
10 9. AUTHOR(s) BG John D. Granger USN Task Force Director		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Tour Length Task Force (TLTF) HQ DA, ODCSPER, (DAPE-MPE-DRS) Arlington, VA 20310		7. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Department of the Army (DAPE-MP) Washington, D.C. 20310		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 12 279p.
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 11 Mar 79
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 263
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release: distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Active Army; personnel; deployment; net assessment		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study is an analysis of the effects of reducing long tour lengths for un- accompanied first term enlistees. Basic elements of this analysis include con- siderations associated with various tour lengths; evaluation of impact on com- bat readiness with emphasis on turbulence, training, indiscipline, time in service, time in command, remaining service at final assignment; evaluation of costs (dollars, PCS moves & Individuals Account), and other nonquantifiable considerations, i.e., morale, job satisfaction, etc.		

## PREFACE

The 24/36 month tour length in Europe for first-term unaccompanied/single soldiers has been a matter of increasing concern. The contention has been that the tour length in Europe is excessively long and impacts adversely on morale of soldiers in this category. Both CINCUSAREUR and his predecessor have advocated strongly that tour lengths for these personnel be shortened.

Changes in tour lengths for sizable numbers of soldiers impact directly or indirectly on most personnel functions--costs, turbulence, readiness, morale, force structure, attrition, discipline and reenlistments. Accordingly, a comprehensive analysis of the proposal to shorten overseas tours in Europe and Japan was conducted to determine costs and benefits of a number of different tour length options.

The group established to undertake this evaluation, the Tour Length Task Force, met on 5 December 1978 and concluded its work on 9 March 1979. The study which follows is the result of the group's thorough investigation. Except where otherwise noted, planning factors, cost data and concerns are those which were current while the study was being conducted.

The findings contained in this report should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation.

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## REPORT SUMMARY

### PURPOSE

The purpose of the Tour Length Task Force (TLTF) is to develop a recommended Army position concerning an 18-month overseas tour for all first-term 1/ enlisted personnel who serve in a long tour area and who are single or do not have command sponsored dependents accompanying them. If the 18-month tour is infeasible, the TLTF is to develop alternative tour length options.

### METHODOLOGY

Many considerations such as manpower, cost, turbulence, readiness, morale, and quality of life are involved in reaching a decision to change tour lengths for single and unaccompanied first-term soldiers in long tour areas. The Tour Length Task Force evaluated these considerations and others for various tour lengths between 18 and 24 months.

Many of the considerations used in evaluating tour length options are quantifiable, and a computer model (Appendix B) was developed to assist in analyzing them. These quantifiable considerations are in

1/"First-term enlisted personnel" and "personnel on their first enlistment" are used interchangeably. Quantitative evaluations use "soldiers on their first enlistment," regardless of time in service.

a separate section of this report summary. Some considerations are partially quantifiable while others are strictly subjective. These considerations are also in a separate section of this report summary. For this section, considerable care was exercised to seek out the most credible professional opinions. In some cases, informed but conflicting opinions were intentionally solicited.

All overseas long tour areas were considered in the study. FORSCOM and overseas commanders in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama prefer to maintain present tour length policies for Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama for reasons contained in Appendix F. Japan which experiences similar problems related to cost of living as Europe (but which is authorized less than 1000 soldiers in grades E3-E4) desires to have an 18-month tour for unaccompanied first-termers. Europe, specifically USAREUR, has the vast majority of first-term personnel overseas.

In conducting the study, the TLTF was directed to assume that Junior Enlisted Travel (JET), the 2-year enlistment option, and the 24-month tour for 4-year first-term bachelors would be continued. The TLTF assumed that an increase in Army accessions to accommodate an 18-month tour would be infeasible. A reduced tour length would have to be accommodated within total Army end-strength projections with no increased assignment burden placed upon the career force. The TLTF also assumed that Army end-strength projections would be met and that strength adjustments already underway in some FORSCOM units would be achieved. If recruitment falls substantially behind projections over

a prolonged period of time, the assessment of sustainability contained in this report might require review and revision, as would many Army policies. The TLTF assumed a continued flow of replacements at current levels to Korea and all other overseas areas for the purpose of analysis.

#### BACKGROUND

Based on DOD assignment policy, the following Army overseas tour lengths for Europe and Japan were in effect through the end of FY 1978:

Married accompanied careerists	36 months
Married unaccompanied careerists	24 months
Careerists without dependents	36 months
Three-year first-term personnel	30 months*
Four-year first-term personnel	
Without dependents	36-42 months**
Married unaccompanied	24 months

\*36 months less initial training time.

\*\*Individuals within 6 months of ETS are involuntarily extended until ETS.

These are the usual assigned tour lengths, but many individuals are serving shorter actual tours. For example, approximately 20% of all European three-year first-termers have had a previous CONUS assignment of 12 months or longer and thus serve only 12-18 months in Europe prior to ETS.

Implementation of three new programs in FY 1979--24 month tours for bachelor first-term, 4-year enlistees; Junior Enlisted Travel (JET); and the two-year enlistment option--resulted in the following FY 1979 tour lengths for Europe and Japan:

Married accompanied careerists	36 months
Married unaccompanied careerists	24 months
Careerists without dependents	36 months
Married accompanied first-termers (JET)	36 months*
Four-year first-term personnel	24 months
Three-year first-term personnel	30 months**
Two-year first-term personnel	20 months***

\* Required to extend enlistment to complete full 36-month tour.

\*\* 36 months less initial training time.

\*\*\* 24 months less initial training time.

#### WHAT HAS CHANGED

Until the end of the draft (1973) and the 2-year enlistment (1975), the Army had an 18-month tour for many first-term soldiers in Europe and other overseas, long tour areas. As 3- and 4-year enlistments became the standard, a 36-month overseas tour for unmarried first-term soldiers seemed a reasonable tradeoff for reduced turbulence and PCS costs. However, changes in soldiers, the Army, and in the socio-economic environment in the intervening years have brought that tradeoff into question. This section examines some of those changes.

#### The Army

The Army has incorporated some of the characteristics of an "occupational" model within an institutional heritage. The inability of soldiers to resign, strike, or negotiate working conditions contrasts with a modern industrial society in which employees enjoy at least some institutional voice in the determination of appropriate salaries and working conditions. The Army has maintained that labor unions are not needed. General Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR states: "Not long ago, the leadership of the Army rejected the formation of labor unions for soldiers. We maintained at that time that unions were not needed because commanders look to the soldiers' interests. In effect, the Army undertook the role of assuring that our soldiers are afforded reasonable conditions of employment, and our soldiers expect no less of the Army leadership."



This Army commitment to the human dimension is highlighted in the "PEOPLE" goal outlined by General Rogers, Chief of Staff, US Army. Part of that goal is to provide improved quality of life support for soldiers and their families.

Curtis Tarr, Chairman, Defense Manpower Commission, has also addressed the human element:<sup>2/</sup> "In the AVF, human considerations eventually will help to determine what weapons we can employ and where we can employ them. As options increase for young people in a growing economy, military personnel will have less interest in unaccompanied tours, isolated posts, demanding hours, and harsh conditions of life and service. By this I do not imply that the youth of America will not accept the challenge of the difficult, the unusual, the dangerous.... But the services cannot assume dedication to a professional life that involves too much drudgery or misery, or too many lonely hours plagued by concern for loved ones. Thus, human considerations must be assessed in the determination of what the nation should undertake and how it should do so."

<sup>2/</sup> "Managing the Human Resources of the Total Force," Air University Review. Vol. 28: pp 2-11, JAN-FEB '77.

### The Individual

The soldier has changed. The "average" first-term soldier in Europe today has less college than his predecessors and is more likely to be black and married. Males entering the Army with some college (18.8% in 1970-Defense Manpower Commission; 5.1% in 1977-DA DCSPER) have reduced the numbers of first-term soldiers who were more comfortable in challenging the "unknowns" of a foreign culture, who set a quasi-tourist tone on the casern, and who served as a beacon for those less sure of their ability to cope with a strange culture and people.

Minority soldiers now make up a higher proportion of young first-termers. In 1964, blacks accounted for 13% of total NPS active duty enlisted accessions. In FY 1978, blacks accounted for 34%. The young black soldier experiences greater difficulty in interacting within societies where blacks are often the subject of curiosity and sometimes, discrimination.

Between 1971 and 1977, the proportion of E4s with dependents increased by over sixty percent. One-third of 4-year enlistees and one-fifth of 3-year enlistees are married; forty-one percent of E4s are married. If their spouses are in Europe, they find it difficult to survive economically. If their spouses are in CONUS, a two-year family separation is required. Junior Enlisted Travel (JET), while reducing inequity, will not completely solve the problems faced by young marrieds. JET eligibility requires commitment to a full three-year tour regardless of the enlistment obligations of the soldier, which

makes it an attractive option mainly for the four-year enlistee assigned overseas directly from training (5.6 percent of all first-term replacements).

The volunteer soldier has different needs and values than his predecessor of only several years ago. Today's soldier is apparently more passive and dependent. He does not cope as well with language barriers and alien customs. He is more likely to identify with teenage life back in the United States. Faced with these difficulties, many soldiers withdraw to their barracks--bored, frustrated, and homesick. Dr. Moskos (a sociologist who has conducted extensive studies of soldiers, the Army, and USAREUR in particular in the past several years), in admittedly over-generalized terms, has noted contrasts in the attitudes of the typical draftee of the late 1950's and early 1960's and the typical volunteer of the late 1970's.

COMPARISON OF THE PEACETIME DRAFTEE

WITH TODAY'S VOLUNTEER 3/

PEACETIME DRAFTEE

NEW VOLUNTEER

Entered military reluctantly and thereby not subject to profound disillusionment after service entry; accepted military service on its own terms.

Enters military as an alternative to limited options in civilian life; regards military in instrumental terms of "what can it do for me?", e.g., skills, training, education; subject to post-entry disillusionment if expectations are not met.

Highly valued clean record and good discharge.

If disillusioned, wants out regardless of type of discharge (though may later regret lack of good discharge).

Willing to put up with petty harassment.

More concerned with self-dignity; quicker to take exception to harassment.

Regards overseas assignment as potentially enriching.

Regards overseas assignment as an imposition.

3/ Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "It's A New Ball Game: Changing Expectations of Military Service", First-Term Enlisted Attrition, Volume I: Papers (June 1977), p.1.

### The Environment

The environment--living standards overseas--has also changed. As the European economy improved, the standard of living rose, particularly within Germany. The value of the dollar in Europe has steadily declined. One need not recall the favorable rate of four DM to one dollar (pre-1968) to make the case. Only two years ago, the exchange rate was DM 2.56. One year ago the exchange rate was DM 2.36. Today it is DM 1.84. To the soldier, the good news is that he can now find a McDonalds or Burger King in Europe. The bad news is that a "Big Mac" is \$1.95, large fries are \$1.00, and a milkshake is \$1.45 compared to \$.90, \$.53, and \$.55 respectively in the US. Although Cost of Living Allowances (COLA) and Station Housing Allowances (SHA) compensate for this to some extent, they are presently available only to married personnel or those authorized to live off-post. The current budget proposed by the President to Congress contains a provision for payment of limited COLA to single soldiers living in barracks which should provide some relief to this group if approved.

### Summary of Change

The Army, the individual, and the environment have changed. The leadership has made a commitment to improve the quality of life for soldiers. The thrust is toward seeking innovative ways to make happen those things perceived to be the best interest of the institution and

the volunteer constituency. Traditional arguments against reduced tour lengths (cost, turbulence, Individuals Account) bear reexamination in view of Army, individual, and environmental change to determine if reduced tours are within the resource capability of the Army--men, money, and management--to achieve.

## QUANTIFIABLE CONSIDERATIONS

### Introduction

This section contains those considerations amenable to quantitative description or projection. The impact of an 18-month tour is specifically examined, and summary tables display data for other tour lengths.

### Manpower

The man-years now contributed by first-termers in Europe and Japan will continue to be provided by first-term personnel. Thus, requirements for career personnel remain fixed. In FY 1978, the Army assigned a maximum number of first-term personnel overseas directly from training, consistent with enlistment options and overall Army requirements. The increased number of replacements caused by a reduced tour would come partly from AIT and partly from the sustaining base. Rather than the current DOD goal of 95% of all overseas first-term

requirements to be met from AIT, overseas AIT and SEPOS (Selected Enlisted Personnel for Overseas Service) assignments would be apportioned to maintain in so far as possible the current balance between overseas and CONUS in terms of average grade, average time-in-service, and average experience. CONUS units will continue to receive soldiers directly from the training base under each option. These soldiers would serve an initial 12-16 month tour with a CONUS unit and then be eligible for assignment overseas.

An 18-month tour length would increase the number of soldiers currently being assigned to Europe from CONUS. However, these soldiers would be replaced by an increased number of soldiers returning from an overseas tour. An 18-month tour is expected to add 1650 first-term monthly replacements to the 4920 monthly replacements expected under the FY79 tour length policy. A summary of annual replacements for all tour lengths evaluated is presented below:

Annual First-Term Enlisted Replacements					
(in thousands)					
	Present	18-Month	19-Month	21-Month	24 Month
Replacements to Europe and Japan <u>4/</u>	59.0	78.8	76.6	70.9	62.7
Increased Replacements to Europe and Japan From Present Rates	NA	19.8	17.6	11.9	3.7

4/Sum of soldiers assigned immediately after training and those SEPOS.

An 18-month tour length policy will also increase the Individuals Account by 2,800 spaces--a 2.6 percent increase over the FY 79 level (106,000 manyears).

Increased Manyears in Individuals Account

	<u>18-Month</u>	<u>19-Month</u>	<u>21-Month</u>	<u>24-Month</u>
Increase in Individuals Account	2,800	2,600	2,000	800
% Increase over FY 79 (106,000 Manyears)	2.6%	2.4%	1.8%	.8%

Costs

Without increased accessions, no increased recruiting and training costs associated with a shorter tour are incurred. Since a reduced tour will increase the number of replacements from the sustaining base, the most significant cost associated with shorter tours is within the PCS travel portion of the Military Personnel Appropriation. An 18-month tour for unaccompanied first-term soldiers is expected to increase annual PCS travel costs by \$33,300,000 which is a 5.8 percent increase from the total Army FY 79 PCS level (\$581.1 Million). Administrative costs for additional POR and in-and-out processing of various types will also be incurred and are estimated at \$1,400,000 annually. Since this task force assumed that it is infeasible to increase accessions to accommodate the reduced tour, a "hidden cost" equal to the increase in the Individuals Account must be accommodated by Force Structure reductions or a reduction in operating strength or some combination of both.



### Annual First-Term Movement Costs

(In Millions of Dollars)

	<u>18-Month</u>	<u>19-Month</u>	<u>21-Month</u>	<u>24-Month</u>
Increase in PCS (FY79 \$581.1 million)	33.3	30.6	22.9	9.2
Increase in Administrative Costs	1.4	1.2	.8	.3

### Turnover

An increase of 1650 overseas monthly assignments (1540 in USAREUR) as a result of an 18-month tour will increase quarterly unit turnover (defined in AR 220-1 as the number of personnel reassigned from a unit during a three month period as a percentage of operating strength) in the aggregate by 1.6 percent in the CONUS sustaining base and 2.5 percent in USAREUR.

### Increase in Quarterly Turnover

	<u>CONUS (Base=14%)</u>		<u>USAREUR (Base=10%)</u>	
	<u>E1-E9</u>	<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>E1-E9</u>	<u>E1-E4</u>
18-month tour	+1.6%	+2.7%	+2.7%	+4.2%
19-month tour	+1.4%	+2.3%	+2.4%	+3.8%
21-month tour	+1.0%	+1.6%	+1.6%	+2.5%
24-month tour	+ .3%	+ .5%	+ .5%	+ .8%

### Increase in Annual Turnover

	<u>CONUS (Base=56%)</u>		<u>USAREUR (Base=40%)</u>	
	<u>E1-E9</u>	<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>E1-E9</u>	<u>E1-E4</u>
18-month tour	+6.4%	+10.8%	+10.8%	+16.8%
19-month tour	+5.6%	+9.2%	+9.6%	+15.2%
21-month tour	+4.0%	+6.4%	+6.4%	+10.0%
24-month tour	+1.2%	+2.0%	+2.0%	+3.2%

### Indiscipline

DA Staff analyses conclude that:

-- Drug Usage

- o Is primarily a problem of first-termers (DA).
- o Abuse of the hallucinogens (LSD, PCP, etc.) is higher in Europe than in CONUS (DA).
- o Current heroin abuse rates of soldiers in USAREUR is double the rate of soldiers in CONUS and is several times as high as the rate of young civilians (DA).
- o The USAREUR environment is more conducive to hard drug abuse than the CONUS or civilian environment (greater availability, less expensive, fewer alternative forms of recreation, etc.) (DA).

- o Reduction of the first-terminer tour in Europe will reduce the rate of hard drug abuse in Europe without necessarily a concomitant increase in that of CONUS Army elements. Thus, there may be an overall reduction in Army-wide hard drug abuse rates (DA).

-- Crime

FY78 crime rates are shown below:

- o USAREUR has a higher rate of crimes of violence and "other drugs"; equivalent rates of marijuana offenses; and lower rates for crimes against property as compared to CONUS (DA).


Comparative Crime Rates

(FY78, Rates per 1000)

	<u>Violence</u>	<u>Property</u>	<u>Marijuana</u>	<u>Other Drugs</u>
USAREUR	8.7	67	27	9.6
CONUS	5.0	77	28	3.0
Total Army	6.0	75	28	5.1

- o Criminal activity for soldiers under age 21 against time served on current tour is shown on the following figure (DA) and analyzed on the next page:

Incidence of Crime Vs Time on Tour  
4th Qtr CY 78, 1828 Cases



o Criminal activity in CONUS peaks from 7-12 months and declines rapidly thereafter (DA).

o Criminal activity in USAREUR does not peak until 19-24 months and continues at a high rate through the 36th month (DA).

o The young soldier in CONUS is about as likely to commit a serious crime at his 19th through 36th month in command as he would have been during his first 6 months. By contrast, the young soldier in Europe is 35% more likely to commit a serious crime during the 19th through 36th month than he would have been during his first 6 months in Europe (DA).

o AWOL and desertion rates are much lower in USAREUR than in CONUS (DA).

(Annual rate per 1000)

	<u>AWOL</u>	<u>Desertion</u>
USAREUR	19.9	4.0
CONUS	61.1	16.8
Total Army	48.7	12.9

### Army Capability to Support

Under steady state analysis if the manpower program end strengths are achieved and authorizations are stable, DA MILPERCEN has the capability to support an 18-month tour for single and unaccompanied first-termers overseas with minimum adverse impact on the CONUS sustaining base, either in strength or by MOS. As tour lengths are reduced, satisfying authorizations overseas becomes increasingly difficult since overseas requirements increase.


Steady state capability to meet various replacement requirements is shown below. These numbers assume that the force structure (requirements in CONUS and overseas) remains relatively constant; that recruiting objectives are reasonably set to fill CONUS and overseas MOS authorizations and are met by USAREC; and that overseas AIT and SEPOS (Selected Enlisted Personnel for Overseas Service) assignments are apportioned to maintain in so far as possible the current balance between overseas and CONUS in terms of average grade, average time-in-service, and average experience. (The DOD "95%" goal for first-term overseas AIT assignments could not be met). Annual first-term replacement availability is depicted on the next page.

# Annual Replacements to Europe and Japan

(in thousands)

	<u>Present</u>	<u>18-Month</u>	<u>19-Month</u>	<u>21-Month</u>	<u>24-Month</u>
Total required	59.0	78.8	76.6	70.9	62.7
Fill from AIT	41.3	55.2	53.6	49.6	43.9
Fill from SEPOS	17.7	23.6	23.0	21.3	18.8
Annual Available from SEPOS	55.4	45.8	47.2	49.9	53.7
Available but not required	29.4	13.9	15.9	20.3	26.6

A simplified graphical portrayal of annual first-term replacement flows for an 18-month tour is depicted below:





As is currently the case, all MOS cannot be supported at 100 percent of authorization overseas when CONUS requirements and the individual are considered. An 18-month tour may increase the number of MOS not supportable at the 100% level to some extent. EPMD, MILPERCEN will continue to take particular management actions to address particular MOS problems. These MOS problems are expected to be with space imbalance MOS (high proportion of authorizations overseas) or those nearly so (discussed later). No one MOS by itself makes the 18-month tour infeasible; nor does the aggregate of these problem MOS. However, the 18-month tour may further aggravate these MOS. In general, shorter overseas tours increase the risks associated with accurately filling MOS requirements overseas and in CONUS.

The flow of replacements will be subject to seasonality of recruiting. Short-fuze force structure changes will continue to create fill problems. If Army end strengths are not achieved because of significant recruiting shortfalls, the ability to meet strength and MOS flows for that particular year would have to be re-examined. If the Army does not attain its authorized end-strength for any particular year, a detailed MOS analysis by MILPERCEN would be needed to determine supportability and feasibility of continuing an 18-month tour if implemented.

#### Space Imbalance MOS (SIMOS)

SIMOS are a problem overseas now and will continue to be regardless of a tour length reduction. However, greater SIMOS impact is with the career rather than the first-term force. There are currently 44 three-character

MOS in the SIMOS Program, but these MOS account for less than 10% of the first-term force in Europe. <sup>4a/</sup> Surveys of SIMOS soldiers clearly indicate their receptiveness to an incentive package in exchange for overseas extensions. Flexibility in personnel management policies such as unit repositioning, secondary MOS utilization, eliminating short tours for those who have served long tours, MOS immaterial positions, and monetary incentives will be necessary for this group. A reduced tour length may require an incentive package (such as that proposed by MILPERGEN) to off-set any negative impact of a shorter tour if other initiatives do not solve the problem.

#### Other Problem MOS

Individuals (approximately 1200 first-termers overseas) with intelligence related MOS and individuals in MOS requiring long training times will have to be managed under special procedures that may obviate an 18-month tour for them. Individuals required to serve longer tours by virtue of specific MOS requirements should be provided incentives.

#### NON-QUANTIFIABLE CONSIDERATIONS

##### Introduction

Some of the issues relating to tour length changes such as turbulence, attrition, and reenlistment may be discussed in partially quantifiable terms; others such as the overseas environment, morale, and combat

<sup>4a/</sup> MILPERGEN Survey Control No. DAPC-MSF-S RCS MILPG-(OT)-(62), Space Imbalance MOS, 10 Jul 78.

effectiveness are not quantifiable--but no less important. This section incorporates assessments of both the partially quantifiable and non-quantifiable considerations.

Changes in the nature of volunteer soldiers and how they relate to a changing overseas environment, morale, and combat effectiveness are examples of issues which are difficult to reduce to statistical arrays for purposes of cost-effectiveness comparisons. In addressing these issues, numerous opinions were obtained from personnel ranging in duty position from Platoon Sergeant through Battalion, Brigade and Division Commanders to CINCUSAREUR. While the assertions in this section of the report may not be provable, they reflect a consensus of mature, professional judgment of leaders with recent experience in Europe.

#### Training and Turbulence

Almost all previous studies of shorter tour lengths for Europe have cited increased "turbulence" as a major reason for not shortening tour lengths: "The shorter the tour, the more the turbulence, the lower the readiness." While this statement is partially true, it is deceptive. Tour lengths have far less impact on turbulence than do Army and local personnel policies and actions. The Total Tank Systems Study concluded that 57 percent of turbulence is generated at battalion level or below while 33 percent of turbulence is the result of actions at platoon level. An Army Research Institute study of turbulence on tank crew gunnery performance (ARI Technical Paper 350, September 1978) concluded that stability and experience of the tank commander is the most important factor in crew

performance. An 18-month first-term unaccompanied tour length will not increase turbulence for careerists. Thus, stability in leadership positions in large part overcomes problems caused by increased rotations among first-term personnel.

Turbulence in itself is detrimental; however, personnel turnover is not the major cause of turbulence. The impact of turbulence should not be understated; but often in the past, the impact has been overstated in analyzing tour length. Improved morale, attitude, motivation, and personal readiness of individuals serving a reduced tour would offset the impact of increased turbulence from turnover through reductions in AWOL, drug use, EDP and courts martial, sick calls, and malingering. USAREUR commanders feel strongly that improvement in these factors will serve to minimize turbulence, increase stability, improve overall readiness, and increase training effectiveness.

First-term soldiers who are trained in a CONUS unit for a year or more before rotating to Europe will not degrade USAREUR unit effectiveness. For many MOS, CONUS training area location and availability are more conducive to skill development than in Europe. USAREUR has limited, overcrowded local and major training areas which are infrequently available and costly to use. Available training time is being reduced in USAREUR as restrictions (environmental, noise, damage, maneuver rights) are placed on training area use.

With the annual training cycle currently followed in USAREUR, each soldier would participate in at least one complete iteration of training and evaluation in both the collective and individual areas during an 18-month tour. CONUS units with NATO missions will benefit from an influx of USAREUR trained soldiers who are familiar with the European environment. Overall, more soldiers in their first enlistment would be exposed to the European theater.

No data exist to prove that the overall impact of reduced tours will be favorable or unfavorable to the ability to train. An 18-month tour is 50 percent longer than the previous Vietnam tour or the Korean tour, yet the 2d Infantry Division in Korea maintains a high state of training and combat readiness. CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR and subordinate commanders' assess that overall readiness will increase as a result of the shorter tour.

#### Attrition

Attrition rates vary substantially for accession groups having different demographic characteristics. Analysis of Army attrition data shows that the four individual characteristics at entry best correlated with attrition are education, sex, mental category, and age. Sufficient data are not available to draw a definite conclusion, but, on balance, USAREUR attrition rates appear no higher than those of FORSCOM. If the individual characteristics of the entry force drive attrition and if attrition in CONUS and overseas areas are comparable, then reduced tours will not significantly change overall Army attrition.

However, attrition can be viewed as a function of the Army "system" as well as of individual characteristics. Removing dissatisfiers could lead to a reduction in attrition. A long tour itself might be a significant contributor to unprogrammed losses. For whatever reason (lack of experience, immaturity, frustrations engendered by post-entry disillusionment, homesickness, language barriers, family separation, culture shock), some individuals are unable to cope. To the young soldier on a long tour, there is no light at the end of the tunnel. After the first annual cycle of training and "newness," for some soldiers attractive alternatives are to "quit" (become an expeditious discharge) or to get into trouble (drugs, alcohol, court martial, Article 15's). In discussing recruiting practices, the Beard Report states: "Many individuals were led to believe that they would only serve in Germany for 16 months. When they discovered that they will serve out their terms (an average of 32 months) in Germany, a major morale problem is created." With a reduced tour, when interest wanes after being relatively high for approximately one year, the individual will only be faced with six months until DEROS and is more likely to persevere. Current USAREUR losses from all sources other than ETS or DEROS are estimated to average approximately 870 monthly. Any reduced attrition in USAREUR would reduce the need for rotation and thus reduce PCS cost and turbulence. The relationship between reduced tours and attrition has not been quantified, but European commanders including CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR

believe that shorter tours will lead to reduced attrition. On balance, a modest improvement in attrition might be expected from a reduced tour but not to the extent where this is a significant consideration in a tour length decision.

#### Reenlistment

Under current policy, most first-term soldiers who go directly to Europe from the training base will end their term of enlistment in Europe, often bitter and disillusioned. Many do adapt to the Army while in Europe and will reenlist. However, potential reenlistments are in the large group who are not satisfied with that portion of the Army that they have experienced overseas. The Beard Report notes that "soldiers in Europe appear more dissatisfied than those surveyed in the Continental United States." An 18-month tour provides soldiers enough time remaining on their initial enlistment to serve a productive tour in CONUS after returning from overseas. This gives an additional perspective of Army life in a CONUS environment with family and "normal" recreational opportunities and is more likely to increase the number of first-termers desiring to reenlist rather than ending their military service after an overseas tour.

However, many of those soldiers who now spend an entire first-term in CONUS and reenlist might not do so after being assigned to the European theater for the last part of their initial enlistment. An 18-month tour

will expose more people to overseas tours than currently. This factor could have a deleterious effect on reenlistment. However, extensive surveys by Dr. Moskos<sup>5/</sup> indicate most soldiers do not object to serving some time in Europe. They object to the amount of time currently required of them.

Both FORSCOM and USAREUR believe that the propensity to reenlist would increase as a result of reduced overseas tours. If the career percentage of the force becomes sufficiently high that rates of reenlistment must be "managed down", the quality of the career force can be improved by increasing quality standards for reenlistment.

#### Voluntary Extensions Overseas

Many first-termers who adjust to the overseas environment extend either for their current duty or for a different job overseas. No data exists as to why an individual extends, but morale, job satisfaction, and promotion opportunity appear reasonable as major contributors. An 18-month tour gives a choice to all individuals, will not reduce the number of voluntary extensions, and has the potential to increase extensions in the overseas areas. Provisions for voluntary extensions in overseas areas must be continued, and the thrust of personnel management policy should be to make voluntary extensions easier as a means of reducing the impact of increased

<sup>5/</sup>Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "US Soldiers in Germany - 1977", unpublished manuscript.



rotations. Some benefit is derived from the soldier feeling that he can exercise some control over his future. A soldier who extends voluntarily is more likely to have higher morale than one who is extended involuntarily.

#### Indiscipline

While no research has been conducted to prove that a shortened tour length would reduce indiscipline, CINCUSAREUR stated on 19 Jan 79, "I would expect all indicators to improve for USAREUR rates of crimes of violence, crimes against property, marijuana use, other drug use, confinement, AWOL, desertion, but I cannot project the expected magnitude of change."

#### Morale

The attitude of the soldier toward the Army and toward life in general is a key consideration in readiness and combat effectiveness but has never been quantified. The inability to precisely measure morale in terms of dollars should not imply insignificance for this factor by itself or in relation to other issues such as attrition, reenlistment, and extensions. A survey<sup>6/</sup> of job satisfaction revealed that first-term soldiers in Europe expressed lower unit morale than those in CONUS.

A shorter tour in Europe will improve morale of several groups overseas. Reduced tours will raise the morale of all first-termers. The weaker soldier, prone to resort to drug or alcohol abuse, lethargy, and

<sup>6/</sup>Sample Survey of Military Personnel, 31 Oct 77.

crime, would be assisted by a reduced tour and its light at the end of the tunnel impact. The stronger soldier will also have an improved attitude. Currently the soldier that does not attrit is the one who must bear the overseas hardships for the longer period. And improved morale for first-term soldiers will also make life more satisfying for the NCO. However, the morale of the career force--enlisted and officer--could be negatively affected. The young bachelor E5 careerist and the young 2LT might be particularly discouraged by shorter first-term tours.

Attitudes toward the unit mission and toward unit training should improve in garrison and the field as a result of the reduced tour length. Increased morale is a positive influence in the readiness arena and a catalyst for efforts to eliminate or reduce training distractors.

### Recruiting

Reduced tour lengths in Europe and Japan and the increased precision and understanding associated with a guaranteed maximum tour may increase the attractiveness of enlistment for an overseas area. By the same token, a reduced tour would increase the likelihood of overseas assignment for SM who enlist under other options. These SM will have a greater chance of going overseas to a long tour area, but, if they do go, they will serve not more than 18-months before returning to CONUS. Careful examination of options and minimum changes (including reduction of station of choice stabilization commitment) could ease the problem faced by MILPERCEN in identifying the additional SM required monthly to meet overseas manpower requirements.

On balance, ODCSPER staff members involved with recruitment consider the impact of a shorter tour as a fairly even tradeoff.

#### Overseas Environment and the First Term 7/

CINCUSAREUR emphasizes the unique problems a USAREUR soldier faces and the need for a reduced tour length. The supportive reasons for a shorter tour tend to cluster around psychological, environmental, economic, educational, duty-related, and recreational needs of young soldiers. Under each of these headings is an array of details that argue that the tour in Europe is too long for the unaccompanied first-term soldier.

#### Psychological

The psychological needs center on the limited choice available for USAREUR soldiers in their selection of almost every life-support activity. Other than limited and austere military facilities, there are few choices available to young soldiers with regard to where they eat, where they bank, or where they find entertainment. This lack of choice highlights the very large differences between a tour in Europe and a tour in CONUS. Before the young soldiers are long in Europe, they begin to feel entrapped by their lack of apparent alternatives. They suffer from peer pressure imposed by the young soldiers around them who have already experienced the same feelings and who have turned to less savory forms of "entertainment" as alternatives to frustration. The absence of familiar lifestyle aggravates

7/This section has been provided by HQS, USAREUR.

the feeling of alienation. If they are black, there are no black-culture outlets to which they can turn. But, no matter what their race, they all experience an inability to be a private person in the barracks and the inability to shed their military identity when they leave the casern. The 17-or 18-year old enlisted person's perception of time is considerably different. To them, a year is an eternity. Young soldiers talk about a tour in USAREUR as if they were discussing a decade. It is that perception that aggravates the other psychological factors and makes life in USAREUR appear unbearable to the young soldier.

#### Environmental

There are also strong environmental arguments for a shorter tour. Young soldiers in Europe are separated from their family, frequently for the first time in their lives, and their means of immediate communication with loved ones is a foreign telephone system that is expensive and inconvenient for them to use. More often than not, USAREUR soldiers are further isolated by the remote location of their caserns and by the nature of their duties. They are living in renovated pre-World War II German barracks and, because their mobility is severely restricted, they spend most of their time in those quarters. All in all, they are living and working in an alien environment that is not at all supportive of their emotional health. The effect of this environment is further aggravated by lack of familiar American goods and services and the variety of goods and services to which

most are accustomed. USAREUR life support facilities are inadequate by CONUS standards, and CINCUSAREUR states that it would take 4 billion dollars to make the living and working environment comparable to CONUS.

#### Economic

The economic view of life in Europe for a young enlisted person is just as depressing and becoming more so all the time. The overall cost of living in Europe, due largely to the devaluation of the dollar, has made buying on the economy prohibitive for the young enlisted soldier. With their pay worth less and less on the economy, the enlisted person is forced to use the AAFES facilities almost exclusively, and there they are faced with a limited choice of goods. The expense of buying and maintaining a car in Europe and paying the insurance is so high that most young enlisted personnel find it impossible to bear the cost, which cuts down the mobility of the soldier and adds to the "barracks rat syndrome" since reliable mass transportation is frequently not convenient to the post and is expensive. In general, the difficult economic situation in Europe points up yet another inequity in tour length policy when compared to CONUS. What remains can certainly no longer be termed a "desirable" tour.

#### Education

Educational opportunities form a significant feature of today's Army. The Army tries to provide civilian educational opportunities for soldiers on each and every casern, but in most cases the variety of courses available at

each of the 168 posts serviced by an education facility is severely limited when compared to many CONUS installations and their surrounding educational institutions. Even the military educational system available to the young USAREUR soldier cannot match that which is available for young soldiers in CONUS. Frequent readiness exercises, training exercises, and trips to major training areas interrupt the educational opportunities that are available because soldiers may be absent repetitively from their home station for 30 to 60 days at a stretch. Many soldiers are deprived of the very educational opportunities that in many cases were a strong motivation for enlisting in the first place.

#### Duty Requirements

Duty requirements in Europe place a generally heavier burden on the soldier in USAREUR than on the soldier in CONUS. In USAREUR, extended field duty is common and appears to be of much longer duration than the average experienced in CONUS. There is a continual drive to obtain and maintain top combat readiness in USAREUR. This drive is ultimately sustained by the junior enlisted personnel who do the work. These factors combine to form a general lack of personal freedom for the young soldier in which it is difficult for him to make and carry through on personal plans.

#### Recreation

Many of these problems could be compensated for if an off-duty atmosphere could be provided for young soldiers that gave them their accustomed mode of entertainment. Unfortunately, there is very little

off-post entertainment available to them that they find attractive or affordable. They are thus restricted to the entertainment that is provided to them by the military community, which is limited in variety and quality. Television in Europe is limited to one English language station whose programs consist of largely outdated shows. Live programs from home are rare and are often shown late at night or early in the morning due to time differences and technical problems. The radio is also limited to one station, which must try to please all tastes. Travel in Europe is extremely expensive, and, even when affordable, it is difficult to schedule leave because of frequent readiness exercises and training requirements.

## CONCLUSION

### Findings

After weighing the quantifiable and non-quantifiable considerations, the TLTF assesses that an 18-month tour has the following advantages and disadvantages:

#### -- Disadvantages

- o Increases PCS travel costs by 5.8 percent (\$33.3 million).
- o Increases annual rotations to Europe and Japan by 19,800 (supportable in steady-state).
- o Increases the Individuals Account by 2.8 percent (2800 spaces).
- o Increases administrative costs by \$1.4 million.
- o Increases quarterly turnover by 1.6 percent in CONUS and 2.5 percent in USAREUR (neutral impact on ability to train).
- o Has a possible negative impact on career force (enlisted and officer).
- o Is inconsistent with DOD policies of 1 PCS assignment for a 3-year enlistee and 95% of overseas first-term assignments from training base.

#### -- Advantages

- o Improves morale in USAREUR (no significant adverse impact on CONUS).
- o Reduces indiscipline in USAREUR (no adverse impact on CONUS).
- o Reduces hard drug use in USAREUR (no comparable increase in CONUS).



- o. Increases propensity to reenlist in both CONUS and USAREUR.
- o. More equitably shares burden of overseas duty among all first-termers.
- o. Responds to problems of volunteer soldiers in Europe and Japan.
- o. Enhances overall combat readiness in USAREUR without degrading CONUS readiness.

#### Discussion of Options

The TLTF was tasked to determine the feasibility of an 18-month overseas long tour for single unaccompanied first-term soldiers. ASA (M&RA) verbally requested that other tour lengths be examined.

An 18-month tour is feasible in steady-state and can be supported by the Army. Funds to accommodate increased PCS and administrative costs will have to be reprogrammed if the 18-month tour is implemented (FY80) in advance of the regular FY81 budget cycle. Force structure levels or levels of manning will have to be modified (end-strength increases are assumed infeasible) to accommodate the increase in the Individuals Account. The modification should be shared between the sustaining base and overseas areas.

Other tour length options are also feasible. A range of options would include:

<u>Option</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81 or 82</u>
1	No Change	No Change
2	No Change	24-Month
3	No Change	18-Month
4	24-Month	18-Month
5	18-Month	18-Month

From the standpoint solely of PCS cost, turbulence, and the Individuals Account, Option 1 is preferable. For the greatest benefit to overseas commanders and their soldiers, Option 5 is preferable.

While a 24-month tour is feasible, it is probably least preferred to individuals and CONUS commanders. Under a 24-month tour, the major category of personnel assigned overseas (3-year first-termers direct from AIT) would serve 30 months overseas (if initial training time is greater than 6 months) or 24 months overseas and only 6 to 8 months in CONUS before ETS (if initial training time is less than 6 months). This assumes that individuals within 6 months of ETS would continue to be involuntarily extended overseas. The net effect of the 24-month tour is status quo (a 30 month tour) for 3-year first-termers who took a long training course, "short time" in a CONUS unit for 3-year first-termers who took a short training course, and no change for anyone else.

Any tour length between 18 and 24 months is also feasible. As tour length is reduced toward 18 months, costs (PCS, Individuals Account, turbulence) increase and the desirability of the option to individuals and to commanders both overseas and in CONUS (more time in a CONUS unit after overseas service) also increases. Tour lengths in excess of 20 months but short of 24 months become less preferable to individuals and undesirable to overseas and CONUS commanders (too long overseas; too short in CONUS) but lead to lower costs. Possible options range between no change in tour length and implementation of an 18-, 19-, or 20-month tour. Tour lengths overseas would be:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Expected Months Served</u>	
	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Reduced Tour</u>
Married Accompanied Careerists	36	36
Married Unaccompanied Careerists	24	24
Careerists without Dependents	36	36
Married Accompanied First-termers(JET)	36	36
Four-year First-term Personnel	24	18, 19, 20
Three-year First-term Personnel	30	18, 19, 20
Two-year First-term Personnel	20	20

Instead of identical tour lengths for all 3- and 4-year first-termers, a more practical approach to the tour length problem would be to relate tour length to enlistment options. For the 2-year enlistee, a 20-month tour (24 months less training time) is warranted. For the 4-year enlistee, a 24-month tour is practical. In general, 4-year enlistees represent long training times or critical skills, and 24 months overseas allows utilization both overseas and in CONUS without significant adverse impact on morale. For the 3-year enlistee, 18 months overseas is a balance between individual morale and overseas and CONUS unit utilization. Under this tour length option, the following tour rules would exist:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Expected Tour Length</u>
Married Accompanied Careerists	36 months
Married Unaccompanied Careerists	24 months
Careerists without Dependents	36 months
Married Accompanied First-termers(JET)	36 months
Four-year First-term Personnel	24 months
Three-year First-term Personnel	18 months
Two-year First-term Personnel	20 months

This option:

- is based on a simple, rational, explainable rule
  - o full term of enlistment spent overseas (less training) for 2-year first-termers.
  - o 50 percent of term of enlistment spent overseas for 3- and 4-year first-termers.
- substantially meets desires of overseas commanders.
- substantially obtains benefits of reduced tours for individuals.
- is most efficient and cost-effective in terms of 2- and 4- year enlistees.
- increases flexibility of MILPERCEN to manage.
- maintains DOD comparability in Europe by term of enlistment
  - o USAF has 4-year enlistments and 24-month tours
  - o USA has 3-year enlistments
- costs less (PCS, turbulence, Individuals Account) than an 18-, 19-, or 20-month tour for all first-termers.
- represents change for only one category, 3-year first-termers
  - o 2-year enlistee already has 20-month tour
  - o 4-year enlistee already has 24-month tour

A summary of decision considerations as assessed by the TLTF for various tour length options is contained in the table on the following page.

SUMMARY OF DECISION CONSIDERATIONS							
DECISION CONSIDERATIONS		PRESENT RULES	18-MONTH TOUR	18-MONTH TOUR	21-MONTH TOUR	30/36 RULE	24-MONTH TOUR
MANPOWER	NUMBER OF ACCESSIONS	152K	152K	152K	152K	152K	152K
	INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT MANYEAR CHANGE	0	+2.8K	+2.6K	+2.0K	+2.3K	+ .8K
	ROTATION MOVE CHANGE	0	+39.7K	+37.3K	+29.7K	+34.4K	+13.5K
	REPLACEMENTS TO EUROPE CHANGE	0	+19.8K	+17.6K	+11.9K	+14.9K	+ 3.7K
	RECRUITING ABILITY CHANGE	0	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
COST	ROTATION MOVE CHANGE	0	+ 33.3M	+ 30.6M	+ 22.9M	+ 27.3M	+ 9.2M
	FOR IN-OUT PROCESSING CHANGE	0	+ 1.4M	+ 1.2M	+ .8	+ 1.0M	+ .3M
	TOTAL CHANGE	0	+ 34.7M	+ 31.8M	+ 23.7M	+ 28.3M	+ 9.5M
UNIT EFFECTIVENESS	AVE EUROPEAN TOUR LENGTH SERVED (MONTHS)	22.2	16.6	17.1	18.4	17.7	20.9
	SOLDIERS REASSIGNED TO CONUS WITH LESS THAN 18 MONTHS UNTIL ETS	3.0K	1.0K	1.0K	20.7K	1.0K	12.8K
	SENIORITY OF FORCE	EUROPE	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	MOB MATCH CHANGE	EUROPE	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	QUARTERLY UNIT TURNOVER	EUROPE	10%	+2.7%	+2.4%	+1.6%	+2.0%
		CONUS	14%	+1.6%	+1.4%	+1.0%	+1.2%
	TRAINING READINESS	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	+
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	TURBULENCE IMPACT	EUROPE	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS	CRIME RATE	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	DRUG USAGE	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	ATTENTION	EUROPE	NA	+	+	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	MORALE	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	+
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
ARMY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT	RECRUITMENT QUALITY	NA	+	+	+	+	NC
	ABILITY TO PROVIDE REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
	SPACE IMBALANCES MOB AND THOSE HAVING LONG TRAINING	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
	JUNIOR ENLISTED TRAVEL (JET)	NA	REDUCE	REDUCE	REDUCE	REDUCE	NC
	INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVES (IRR)	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC

NA = NOT APPLICABLE

NC = NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE

⊕ = IMPROVEMENT POSSIBLE, BUT SIZE UNKNOWN

⊖ = WORSENING POSSIBLE, BUT SIZE UNKNOWN

### Conclusion

Times and circumstances have changed dramatically over the past decade. The economic and social conditions which prevailed when Europe was categorized as "Desirable" (long tour) and Korea as "Undesirable" (short tour) no longer pertain. Life for many young soldiers in Europe is grim, and three years to a teenage soldier separated from wife/girl friend and family seem like eternity.

An 18-month tour will cost \$33,300,000 in PCS costs; quarterly turnover will increase 1.6% in FORSCOM and 2.5% in USAREUR; the Individuals Account will increase by 2800 spaces; and MILPERCEN's problems will become more difficult. The tradeoffs are believed to be higher morale in Europe, more equitable sharing among first-termers of undesirable overseas assignments, slightly less attrition, fewer drug problems, less indiscipline, increased reenlistment interest, and improved combat readiness for USAREUR.

All the traditional issues and almost every indicator which can be quantified argue against a shortened tour length in Europe. In fact, a statistical argument could be developed to show that it would be more cost effective to increase overseas tour lengths to six years. From a monetary point of view, PCS savings alone could justify doubling current tour lengths.

Currently, reenlistment rates in USAREUR are good, indiscipline rates compare favorably with other MACOM, attrition rates are high but not out of line with Army loss rates, and combat readiness indicators are satisfactory.

If a case is to be made for an 18-month tour, it must be made in "human" terms--all of which are impossible to quantify and assign dollar values.

The voice of the soldier must be heard as well as cost effectiveness arguments. Clearly a reduced tour length will improve morale. But how much will improved morale:

- reduce attrition?
- increase reenlistment intent?
- facilitate recruiting?
- encourage extensions?
- improve discipline?
- decrease drug usage?
- enhance combat effectiveness?

The issues supporting a reduced tour are very subtle--but very real. How long will young men and women continue to volunteer for the Army once they clearly understand that they are likely to be sent to Europe on a 36-month tour?

The Army has more married first-termers than it has had in any period in recent times. How many married men and women would volunteer for the Army if they understood beforehand the emotional pressures of trying to maintain a new marriage through a 24-month separation--or maintain a marriage in poverty and cultural alienation for 36-months in Europe? During the last two wars, when the Army was manned by the draft, soldiers were separated from their wives for only one year. What is the rationale that dictates a volunteer soldier should be separated for two years?



The TLTF does not have the answers to these questions. Any attempts to put a cost estimate on higher morale would be too contentious and weaken credibility. Experienced and professional judgment must evaluate the cost of a shorter tour in association with the human considerations and the commitment of the Army leadership to soldiers and their quality of life.

US Commanders in Europe are without equivocation and ambiguity when they make this judgment. In August 1978, CINCEUR stated that "absent an effective solution to this problem, we can expect an increasing erosion in our efforts to improve combat readiness in USAREUR." CINCEUR represents the beliefs of most US Commanders in Europe when he concludes that:

A reduction in the first-term unaccompanied soldier's tour of duty in Germany to 18 months, with provisions for voluntary extension on an individual basis, is the single most effective step we can take to effect an immediate increase in the morale and combat readiness of this command.

An 18-month tour for single/unaccompanied first-term soldiers in USAREUR will not be a cure-all for the many problems associated with young soldiers in Europe. However, commanders in Europe today have practical limits on what they can realistically be expected to do in coping with problems of cultural alienation, boredom, poverty, and homesickness. This is not USAREUR's problem; this is the Army's problem.

Recommendation

Assign tour lengths based upon term of enlistment:

- Two-year enlistees go directly to Europe/Japan after AIT and complete their enlistment overseas. Returning 2-year enlistees to CONUS after 18 months with 2 months remaining on enlistment is unreasonable. (No change from present rules).
- Four-year enlistees would serve 24-month tours in Europe and Japan. (No change from present policy).
- Three-year enlistees would serve 18-month tours in Europe and Japan.

SUPPORTING ANALYSIS

## SECTION 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### PURPOSE

The purpose of the Tour Length Task Force (TLTF) is to develop a recommended Army position concerning an 18-month overseas tour for all first-term 1/ enlisted personnel who serve in a long tour area and who do not have command sponsored dependents accompanying them. If the 18-month tour is infeasible, the TLTF is to develop alternative tour length options.

1/"First-term enlisted personnel" and "personnel on their first enlistment" are used interchangeably. Quantitative evaluations use "soldiers on their first enlistment," regardless of time in service.

## METHODOLOGY

Many considerations such as manpower, cost, turbulence, readiness, morale, and quality of life are involved in reaching a decision to change tour lengths for single and unaccompanied first-term soldiers in long tour areas. The Tour Length Task Force evaluated these considerations and others for various tour lengths between 18 and 24 months.

Many of the considerations used in evaluating tour length options are quantifiable, and a computer model (appendix B) was developed to assist in analyzing them. Some considerations are partially quantifiable while others are strictly subjective. For these considerations, considerable care was exercised to seek out the most credible professional opinions. In some cases, informed but conflicting opinions were intentionally solicited.

All overseas long tour areas were considered in the study. FORSCOM and overseas commanders in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama prefer to maintain present tour length policies for Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama for reasons contained in Appendix F. Japan, which experiences similar problems relative to cost of living as Europe (but which is authorized less than 1000 soldiers in grades E3-E4), desires to have an 18-month tour for unaccompanied first-termers. Europe, specifically USAREUR, has the vast majority of first-term personnel overseas.

In conducting the study, the TLTF was directed to assume that

Junior Enlisted Travel (JET), the 2-year enlistment option, and the 24-month tour for 4-year first-term bachelors would be continued. The TLTF assumed that an increase in Army accessions to accommodate an 18-month tour would be infeasible. A reduced tour length would have to be accommodated within total Army end-strength projections with no increased assignment burden placed upon the career force. The TLTF also assumed that Army end-strength projections would be met and that strength adjustments already underway in some FORSCOM units would be achieved. If recruitment falls substantially behind projections over a prolonged period of time, the assessments of sustainability contained in this report might require review and revision, as would many Army policies. The TLTF assumed continued flow of replacements at current levels to Korea and all other overseas areas for the purpose of analysis.

## BACKGROUND

### Introduction

With the end of the draft (1973) and the two-year enlistment option (1975), individuals overseas served increasingly longer tours on average. The present CINCEUR and the present CINCUSAREUR and his predecessor have insisted that the tour length in Europe is excessively long and should be shortened. Recent Congressional speeches and reports, such as that by Congressman Glenn English, indicates that some members of Congress are increasingly interested in a shortened tour length in Europe.

Current DOD assignment policies for first-term personnel are different for 3 and 4-year enlistees: First-term members serving for 3 years or less are to be given no more than one assignment following initial basic and skill training unless required to serve in a short-tour area, in which case, such members will be given no more than two assignments. First-term personnel serving for 4 or more years are to be given no more than two assignments following initial basic and skill training, regardless of tour length.

These assignment policies led to the following assigned tour lengths for Europe and Japan that were in effect through the end of FY 1978:

Table 1-1

FY 78 EUROPEAN TOUR LENGTHS

Married accompanied careerists	36 months
Married unaccompanied careerists	24 months
Careerists without dependents	36 months
Three-year first-term personnel	30 months*
Four-year first-term personnel	
Without dependents	36-45 months**
Married unaccompanied	24 months

\* 36 months less training time

\*\*Individuals within 6 months of ETS are involuntarily extended until ETS.

These are the usual assigned tour lengths, but many individuals are already serving shorter actual tours. For example, approximately 20% of all European three-year first-termers have had a previous CONUS assignment of 12 months or longer and thus serve only 12-18 months in Europe prior to ETS.



## Discussion

In a 20 August 1973 letter, CINCUSAREUR concluded that the length of the tour in Europe adversely affected morale, behavior, and duty performance and recommended reduction of the tour length in Europe for all first-term enlisted personnel, married and single, to 18 months. This proposal was studied, and it was determined that although a reduced tour would be desirable from a morale and discipline point of view, the costs in terms of dollars, increased turbulence, reduced spaces in the force structure, and increased replacements dictated against adoption of a reduced tour.

In April 1974, the AD HOC Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee stated its belief that reducing the tour for single enlisted personnel stationed in Europe to 18 months would greatly improve morale and requested the Army to study the feasibility of such a change. This study made two conclusions:

- (1) A reduction of the tour for single enlisted personnel in Europe would be desirable from a morale point of view but a reduction to 18 months was not feasible because of additional replacements required; increased PCS costs; requirement for increased transient spaces; increased turnover rate (turbulence); and inequity with unaccompanied tours and other overseas areas.

(2) A reduction of the tour for first-term enlisted personnel would be desirable and that restricting the reduction to these personnel would significantly reduce the impact and still benefit the individuals who feel the effect of the long tour the most. "Although a reduced tour to 18 or 24 months is not feasible at this time, it is planned to reduce the tour for these personnel when feasible within the constraints imposed by the Congress and the budget".

Following his review of the study, The Secretary of the Army observed: "I am disappointed with the study. It is a restatement of the same arguments we tend to automatically dredge up when we are challenged with this proposal." ... "Can we name one responsible official who has recently visited Army units in Europe and returned with the impression that tour length is not a problem for the first-term, unaccompanied single soldier? I have not met such a person..."

During both the 1973 and 1974 studies, proposals were advanced that sought equity for particular groups of first-term soldiers. Reduction of tours to 24 months for first-term bachelors (comparable to the Air Force) and extensions of travel and transportation entitlements were specifically addressed. In July 1974 the Secretary of the Army approved a plan to reduce the tour length for first-term enlisted personnel in Europe to 24 months effective 1 January 1975. The

advantages cited were increased morale and esprit in Europe; decreased drug abuse, crime and unauthorized absences in Europe; increased first-term reenlistment rates in Europe and hence decreased accession needs; increased attractiveness of the travel option for Europe; increased overall popularity of serving in Europe. The costs were approximately 13,900 additional PCS moves; an increase in PCS funds by \$4.9 million (1%); an estimated 6950 additional replacements; an estimated increase of 800 spaces in the transient account; and increased turbulence. In October 1974, the SA acknowledged that the 24-month tour could not then be implemented because of a shortfall in FY75 PCS funds.

In October 1977, HQDA DCSPER informed CINCUSAREUR that a reduction of bachelor, first-term, four-year enlistee tour length to 24 months would be implemented in FY 1979. Congress approved Junior Enlisted Travel (JET) for implementation at the same time. Congress also requested a test of a two-year enlistment option, and the Army began this test in January 1979.

Implementation of these three new programs--24 month tours for bachelor first-term, 4-year enlistees; JET; and the two-year enlistment option--resulted in the following FY 1979 assigned European tour lengths:

Table 1-2

FY79 ASSIGNED EUROPEAN TOUR LENGTHS

Married accompanied careerists	36 months
Married unaccompanied careerists	24 months
Careerists without dependents	36 months
Married accompanied first-termers (JET)	36 months*
Four-year first-term personnel	24 months
Three-year first-term personnel	30 months**
Two-year first-term personnel	20 months***

\*Required to extend enlistment to complete full 36 month tour.

\*\*36 months less initial training time.

\*\*\*24 months less initial training time.

On 10 August 1978, CINCEUR in a message to the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Chief of Staff, Army reiterated his concern that the long length of tours in Germany for the Army's first-term soldiers had a harmful impact on combat readiness. He stated that every indication pointed to the inescapable conclusion that tours of duty in excess of 18 months contributed significantly to negative attitudes that led soldiers to dissatisfaction and drugs, disciplinary problems, and other distractors that adversely impacted on readiness and that this fundamental problem was exacerbated by the pervasive effects of the declining value of the dollar; reduction of

the support base to the bare bones level; and growing criticism of soldier effectiveness. CINCEUR stated that reducing the tour of duty in Germany to 2 years for Army 4-year enlistees was a useful step in solving this problem but clearly insufficient. "In sum, a reduction in the first-term unaccompanied soldier's tour of duty in Germany to 18 months, with provisions for voluntary extensions on an individual basis, is the single most effective step we can take to effect an immediate increase in the morale and combat readiness of this command."

On 11 October 1978, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs requested that an analysis be undertaken to determine the implications of changing the tour length in Europe. On 4 December 1978, HQDA Letter 10-78-9 established the Tour Length Task Force (Appendix A). In conducting the study, the TLTF was directed to assume that JET, the 2-year enlistment option, and the 24 month tour for 4-year first-term bachelors had been implemented. It is from these FY79 tour rules, displayed in Table 1-2, that the analysis will proceed.

### Summary

Almost five years to the day from the 1973 CINCUSAREUR request, CINCEUR requested an 18-month tour for Army first-termers. In the intervening years, reduced tours have not been implemented--usually on the basis of cost, turbulence, and the Individuals Account. A 1974 study recommended that a reduction in first-term overseas tours be made when feasible, and the Secretary of the Army had approved a 24-month tour which was not implemented because of a shortage of PCS funds. Both the 24-month tour for bachelor first-term 4-year enlistees and extension of travel and transportation benefits to junior enlisted, viewed as interim measures, have been implemented in FY79. This tour length study assesses the feasibility of the 18-month tour for the FY 1980 and beyond environment.

## WHAT HAS CHANGED

### Introduction

Until the end of the draft (1973) and the 2-year enlistment, (1975), the Army had an 18-month tour for many first-term soldiers in Europe and other overseas, long tour areas. As 3- and 4-year enlistments became the standard, a 36-month overseas tour for unmarried first-term soldiers seemed a reasonable tradeoff for reduced turbulence and PCS costs. However, changes in soldiers, the Army, and in the socio-economic environment in the intervening years have brought that trade-off into question. This section examines some of those changes.

### The Individual

For one thing, the individual himself has changed. The "average" new soldier in Europe today has less college than his predecessor and is more likely to be black and married. These changes lead to a far different enlisted culture than existed previously and impact on service life in general and overseas in particular. As these changes were taking place, shorter overseas long tours were being eliminated as the Army moved from the draft (1973) and two-year enlistments (1975) to a preponderance of 3- and 4-year enlistments. Tours became longer at a time when individuals were less equipped to cope with them.

Nearly 19% of 1970 male NPS accessions (Defense Manpower Commission) had at least some college compared to 5.1% of FY 77 male enlistees (DA DCSPER). This decreased proportion of college youth entering the Army has reduced the numbers of first-term soldiers who were more comfortable in challenging the "unknowns" of living and working in a foreign culture, who set a quasi-tourist tone on the casern, and who served as a beacon for those less sure of their ability to cope with a strange culture and people.

Minority soldiers now make up a higher proportion of young first-termers. In 1964, blacks accounted for 13% of total NPS active duty enlisted accessions. In FY 78, blacks accounted for 34%. In USAREUR, blacks and hispanics now account for greater than 35% of the E1 to E4 population. The USAREUR soldier, in general, faces unique



problems with regard to mixing in the surrounding culture. The young black soldier experiences greater difficulty in interacting within societies where blacks are often the subject of curiosity and sometimes, discrimination.

Between 1971 and 1977, the proportion of E4s with dependents increased by over sixty percent. 2/ One-third of 4-year enlistees and one-fifth of 3-year enlistees are married; forty-one percent of E4s are married. If their spouses are in Europe they find it difficult to survive economically and socially. If their spouses are in CONUS, a two-year family separation is required. Junior Enlisted Travel (JET), while reducing inequity, will not completely solve the problems faced by young married enlisted soldiers. JET eligibility requires commitment to a full three-year tour, regardless of the enlistment obligations of the soldier, which makes it an attractive option mainly for the four-year enlistee assigned directly from training--less than six percent of all first-term replacements.

The volunteer soldier has different needs and values than his predecessor of only several years ago. Today's soldier is apparently more passive and dependent. He does not cope as well with the language barrier and alien customs. Today's soldier is more likely to identify with teenage life back in the United States. Faced with these difficulties, many soldiers withdraw to their barracks--bored,

2/America's Volunteers: A Report on the AVF, December 31, 1978.

frustrated, and homesick. Dr. Charles Moskos (a sociologist who has conducted extensive studies of soldiers, the Army, and USAREUR in particular in the past several years), in admittedly over-generalized terms, has noted contrasts in the attitudes of the typical draftee of the late 1950's and early 1960's and the typical volunteer of the late 1970's.

Table 1-3

COMPARISON OF THE PEACETIME DRAFTEE  
WITH TODAY'S VOLUNTEER 3/

<u>PEACETIME DRAFTEE</u>	<u>NEW VOLUNTEER</u>
Entered military reluctantly and thereby not subject to profound disillusionment after service entry; accepted military service on its own terms.	Enters military as an alternative to limited options in civilian life; regards military in instrumental terms of "what can it do for me?" e.g., skill training, education; subject to post-entry disillusionment if expectations are not met.
Highly valued clean record and good discharge.	If disillusioned, wants out regardless of type of discharge (though may later regret lack of good discharge).
Willing to put up with petty harassment.	More concerned with self-dignity; quicker to take exception to harassment.
Regards overseas assignment as potentially enriching.	Regards overseas assignment as an imposition.

3/Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "It's a New Ball Game: Changing Expectations of Military Service", First-Term Enlisted Attrition, Volume I: Papers (June 1977), p. 1.

## The Army

The Army has also changed by incorporating some of the characteristics of an "occupational" model within an institutional heritage. The inability of soldiers to resign, strike, or negotiate working conditions contrasts with a modern industrial society in which employees at least enjoy some institutional voice in the determination of appropriate salaries and working conditions. The Army has maintained that labor unions are not needed. General Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR states: "Not long ago, the leadership of the Army rejected the formation of labor unions for soldiers. We maintained at that time that unions were not needed because commanders look to the soldier's interest. In effect, the Army undertook the role of assuring that our soldiers are afforded reasonable conditions of employment, and our soldiers expect no less of the Army leadership."

This Army commitment to the human dimension is highlighted in the "PEOPLE" goal for the Army outlined by General Rogers, Chief of Staff, US Army. Part of that goal is to provide improved quality of life support for soldiers and their families.

Curtis Tarr, Chairman, Defense Manpower Commission, has also addressed the human element: 4/ "In the AVF, human considerations eventually will help to determine what weapons we can employ and where we can employ them. As options increase for young people in a growing

4/"Managing the Human Resources of the Total Force," Air University Review, VOL 28: pp. 2-11, Jan-Feb 77.

economy, military personnel will have less interest in unaccompanied tours, isolated posts, demanding hours, and harsh conditions of life and service. By this I do not imply that the youth of America will not accept the challenge of the difficult, the unusual, the dangerous....But the services cannot assume dedication to a professional life that involves too much drudgery or misery, or too many lonely hours plagued by concern for loved ones. Thus, human considerations must be addressed in the determination of what the nation should undertake and how it should do so."

## The Environment


The environment--living standards overseas--has also changed. As the European economy improved, the standard of living rose, particularly within Germany. The value of the dollar in Europe steadily declined. One need not recall the favorable rate of four DM to one dollar (pre-1968) to make the case. Only two years ago the exchange rate was DM 2.56. One year ago the exchange rate was DM 2.36. Today it is DM 1.84 (Figure 1-1). To the soldier, the good news is that he can now find a McDonalds or Burger King in Europe. The bad news is that a "Big Mac" is \$1.95, large fries are \$1.00, and a milkshake is \$1.45 compared to \$.90, \$.53, and \$.55 respectively in the US. The current budget proposed by the President to Congress contains a provision for payment of limited COLA to single soldiers living in barracks which should provide some relief to this group if approved (Details are in Appendix E).

The financial status of all USAREUR service members has been impacted, in varying degrees, by the weakness of the US dollar on foreign currency exchange markets. As the dollar depreciates in value, purchases of goods and services on the foreign economy becomes more expensive.

Nearly one-half of USAREUR's soldiers are unaccompanied first-termers, and the unfavorable currency exchange rates particularly

FIGURE I-1

DM VS DOLLAR (1968-1978)




affect this group. The most direct impact is felt through economy purchases of goods and services on the local economy for personal consumption (Figure 1-2). A survey 5/ of unaccompanied E1 to E5 personnel showed that, on average, thirty-two percent of their disposable salaries were converted to Deutschmarks (DM). Forty percent of this money goes for recreation and nineteen percent for food. As of June 1978, the average soldier living in the barracks in Germany was spending 290 DM a month on the economy. In 1976 the soldier could buy these DM for \$113.28; in 1979 they would cost \$157.61--an increase of thirty-nine percent.

Ninety percent of those surveyed believed their current standard of living was worse than it had been in the US just before they left. In addition, certain purchases, paid for in dollars at US facilities, are also impacted by changes in currency exchange rates. Dollar prices in the PX go up as the exchange passes along the higher cost of paying German employees or buying German goods.

This decline in purchasing power is compounded by many other aspects of an overseas assignment--limited private transportation (POV) and forced reliance on public transportation; limited affordable recreation; limited goods and services in AAFES; change in buying patterns compared to CONUS (different goods and services, lack of seasonal sales/discounts, language barrier); limited opportunity for

5/Sample Survey of Single USAREUR Service Members, June, 1978.

FIGURE 1-2  
**SINGLE SM EXPENDITURES**





dependent employment.

The key point to be made is that a European assignment in 1979 is far different than one in 1968 or even 1975 because Europe itself has changed markedly.

#### Summary of Change

The individual, the Army, and the environment have changed. The leadership has made a commitment to improve the quality of life for soldiers. The thrust is toward seeking innovative ways to make happen those things perceived to be in the best interest of the institution and the volunteer constituency. Traditional arguments against reduced tour lengths (cost, turbulence, Individuals Account) bear reexamination in view of Army, individual, and environmental change to determine if reduced tours are within the resource capability of the Army--men, money, and management--to achieve.

## SECTION 2

### MANPOWER AND COST

#### INTRODUCTION

Changes made to assigned overseas tour lengths for single or unaccompanied soldiers on their first enlistment impact the number of rotations, the size of the Individuals Account attributable to rotations, the seniority of the force, cost and numerous other manpower related factors. This section examines the impacts of five different tour lengths--present rules, an 18-month tour, a 19-month tour, a 21-month tour, and a 24-month tour--on these factors.

The results presented apply to the steady-state only. Those changes and unusual demands experienced during transition between tour length options were beyond the capability of the TLTF during the allowed time frame but certainly must be investigated prior to implementing a change.

To insure comparability between the options, each was projected to the 1982 time frame and each assumes the same numbers and types of accessions. Likewise, the same number of soldiers assigned to Europe and Japan directly from training, the many years overseas, attrition patterns, soldiers electing JET, cost of moving personnel and training time have been used for all options.

The first portion of this section examines the size and composition of the force to be used in evaluating all options. The rotations

portion provides comparisons of the options not only from the standpoint of moves but also attrition, time in service, and time-in-command distribution of the resulting forces. The Individuals Account portion examines in some detail the size and reasons behind the increase in the Individuals Account experienced for each option. The cost portion details both movement and POR costs incurred.

#### FORCE SIZE AND COMPOSITION

The quantity of first-term accessions used by the TLTF was obtained from the Army Manpower Program for the FY80 President's Budget (ELIM-COMPLIP Alternative D8280, 28 December 1978). The average of the annual FY79 through FY84 non-prior service accessions was used (152,000) since this period approximates steady-state during the out years. The largest number of annual accessions during this time frame is 156,000 while the smallest is 148,000.

The 152,000 annual first-term accessions is further divided into two, three and four years obligors. The two year enlistment option was assumed to still be offered at the 1979 figure of 12,500. 11,500 of these soldiers were identified specifically for European tours with the remaining 1,000 assigned to CONUS. The two-year obligor group continues to be high school diploma graduates, in mental categories I-IIIa, and almost exclusively male. The three and four year obligors, constituting the remainder of the 152,000 accessions, are assumed, for this analysis, to be present in the same proportions as in recent past--71.6

percent and 28.4 percent respectively. The three and four year obligors will demonstrate the following educational and mental characteristics.

--Male High School Diploma Graduates	54.7%
--Male Non-High School Diploma Graduates (Mental Categories I-IIIa)	13.6%
--Male Non-High School Diploma Graduates (Mental Categories IIIB-VI)	15.9%
--Female High School Diploma Graduates	15.8%

Married rates at mid-term for European three and four-year enlistees, necessary for considering the twenty-four month "all others" tour, are nineteen and twenty-eight percent respectively.

Under the tour rules in effect during and prior to 1978 an average of 42,500 soldiers were assigned to Europe and Japan immediately after training. MILPERCEN has indicated that this size group was the largest practical within present world-wide requirements and the existing enlistment options. As tour lengths are shortened the increased overseas demand allows additional soldiers to be assigned overseas directly from training. The actual increase could not be predicted by MILPERCEN during the time frame of the study since it involves complex relationships between recruiting seasonality, overseas demand seasonality, and MOS distribution. The number of soldiers on their

first enlistment assigned to Europe and Japan directly from training for each of the options considered, including the present rules, has therefore been limited to the two-year enlistees identified for Europe plus the same percentage of the remaining three and four year enlistees previously so assigned. This results in 49,700 assigned to Europe and Japan immediately after training.

The impact of increasing the number of soldiers assigned overseas directly from training was examined for the 18-month tour and is presented later in this section. Due to minimal impact on the shortest tour length considered, other options were not studied in this manner.

#### ROTATIONS

Each of the tour options investigated had numerous characteristics that were held constant in order to provide comparability. In addition to the size and characteristics of the input force and the personnel assigned to Europe or Japan after training discussed above, the following were fixed:

- The total manyear contribution of soldiers on their first enlistment assigned to Europe and Japan.
- Attrition rates projected to FY82.
- Training time (four months).

--Soldiers electing Junior Enlisted Travel (JET) at 2000 per year for Europe (1500 FT4, 500 FT3).

--Movement costs for each type of move.

--Contribution of the Individuals Account for each type of move.

--Reenlistment rates.

--Percentage of soldiers who reenlist for present duty assignment.

--Percentage of soldiers married, by enlistment options.

Each tour length investigated is discussed below individually.

Comparative statistics for each are presented in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1  
Manpower Comparison of Different Tour Lengths

	PRESENT	18-Month	19-Month	21-Month	24-Month
Total Moves*	461.8K	501.5K	499.1K	491.5K	475.3K
Accession Moves*	152.0K	152.0K	152.0K	152.0K	152.0K
Rotation Moves*	178.2K	217.9K	215.5K	207.9K	191.7K
Separation Moves*	131.6K	131.6K	131.6K	131.6K	131.6K
Number of Replacements to Europe and Japan	59.0K	78.8K	76.6K	79.0K	62.7K
Number of Replacements SEPOS to Europe and Japan	9.2K	29.1K	26.8K	21.1K	12.9K
Number of Soldiers Returning for Duty in CONUS after Europe or Japan tour.	10.1K	29.9K	29.7K	28.0K	19.9K
Number Attrited from Europe and Japan	11.2K	11.3K	11.3K	11.3K	11.4K
Total Number Attrited	47.5K	47.5K	47.5K	47.5K	47.5K
Length of Average European tour (months)	22.2	16.6	17.1	18.4	20.9

\*Moves do not reflect overseas moves other than Europe and Japan.

### Present Rules

The present tour length rules are different in three major respects from those in effect during and prior to 1978:

- Four-year enlistees, regardless of their marital status are required to serve only a twenty-four month Europe or Japan tour.
- 12,500 two-year enlistees are being recruited. 11,500 are to be assigned to Europe.
- Married junior soldiers are allowed movement of dependents overseas at government expense and command sponsorship (under JET) in return for a full thirty-six month overseas tour.

Under present rules, the four-year enlistee assigned to Europe or Japan after an initial CONUS assignment (SEPOS-Selected Enlisted Personnel for Overseas Service) has accrued an average of twenty-four months time in service. The three-year enlistee SEPOS to Europe or Japan has accrued an average of twenty months service.

The time in service distribution for European soldiers on their first enlistment is shown in Figure 2-1. The effect of both attrition and scheduled rotations can be seen. The average time in service is 19.6 months. The Europe time in command distribution by month is shown in Figure 2-2. The average time in command is 13.5 months. Table 2-2 depicts the time, in months, until ETS for those soldiers reassigned to



Figure 2-1  
Time-in-Service Distribution  
for European Soldiers on their  
First Enlistment  
Present Rules





Figure 2-2  
Time-in-Command Distribution  
for European Soldiers on their  
First Enlistment  
Present Rules



CONUS, at the time of reassignment, after successfully completing a Europe or Japan tour. The average time until ETS of soldiers returning to CONUS for duty is 16.5 months.


## 18 MONTH TOUR


Under the 18-month tour, unmarried and married three and four year soldiers on their first enlistment are assigned an 18-month overseas tour in Europe or Japan unless they elect for government sponsorship of dependents under JET. Those electing JET sponsorship are obligated for the same tour length (thirty-six months) as now. A soldier who is assigned overseas and reenlists will continue to serve the original 18-month tour. The two year enlisted soldier assigned overseas will continue to serve his/her entire enlistment, less training, overseas.

Under the 18-month tour option the four year obligor assigned to Europe or Japan after an initial CONUS assignment has accrued an average of thirty months time in service. The three year enlistee SEPOS to Europe or Japan has accrued an average of eighteen months service.

The time-in-service distribution by month for European soldiers on their first enlistment is shown in Figure 2-3. The average time in service is 20.1 months. Figure 2-4 shows the European time-in-command distribution with the average being 9.9 months. Table 2-2 depicts the time, in months, until ETS for those soldiers reassigned to CONUS, at time of reassignment, after successfully completing a Europe or Japan tour. The average time until ETS of soldiers returning to CONUS for duty is 16.8 months.

Figure 2-3  
Time-in-Service Distribution  
for European Soldiers on their  
First Enlistment  
18-Month Tour






### 19-MONTH TOUR

The 19-month tour uses the same tour length policies as the 18-month tour with the exception of it being one month longer. This case was developed to determine the cost, rotation, and Individuals Account savings associated with an increase of one month.


For this tour length, the four year obligor SEPOS to Europe or Japan has twenty-nine months service, following successful completion of a twenty-four month CONUS tour after training, upon reassignment overseas. The three year obligor has eighteen.

Time-in-service and time-in-command distributions are shown in Figures 2-5 and 2-6 respectively. The average time in service for the European soldier is 19.9 months while his/her average time in command is 10.2 months. Table 2-2 depicts the time, in months, until ETS for soldiers reassigned for duty in CONUS following an overseas tour. The average time until ETS of soldiers returning to CONUS for duty is 15.8 months.

Figure 2-5  
Time-in-Service Distribution  
for European Soldiers on their  
First Enlistment  
19-Month Tour








### 21-MONTH TOUR


Under the 21-month tour, unmarried and married three and four year soldiers on their first enlistment are assigned a 21-month overseas tour in Europe or Japan unless they elect JET. The two year enlisted soldier assigned overseas continues to serve his/her entire enlistment, less training, overseas.

Under the 21-month tour option the four year obligor assigned to Europe or Japan after an initial CONUS assignment has accrued an average of twenty-seven months time in service. The three year enlistee SEPOS to Europe or Japan has accrued an average of eighteen months service.

The time-in-service distribution by month for European soldiers on their first enlistment is shown in Figure 2-7. The average time in service is 19.6 months. Figure 2-8 shows the European time-in-command distribution with the average being 11.0 months. Table 2-2 depicts the time, in months, until FTS for those soldiers reassigned to CONUS, at time of reassignment, after successfully completing a Europe or Japan tour. The average time until ETS of soldiers returning to CONUS for duty is 14.3 months.

Figure 2-7  
Time-in-Service Distribution  
for European Soldiers on their  
First Enlistment  
21-Month Tour






### 24-MONTH TOUR

The 24-month tour is an extension of the present tour length policy with three year obligors assigned overseas after training serving the same European tour as four year obligors. An obvious disadvantage of this policy is the large number of three year soldiers, assigned to Europe or Japan immediately after training, who would return to CONUS for duty with little time until ETS.

The four year obligor, under this tour length option would again have twenty-four months service upon assignment overseas. The three year enlistee on the other hand, would average eighteen months at SEPOS. The requirement to allow a soldier a minimum of twelve months in CONUS, after initial assignment there from training, prevents the realization of a full overseas tour for three year SEPOS obligors.

Time-in-service and time-in-command distributions for European soldiers under a twenty-four month tour are shown in figures 2-9 and 2-10. The average European or Japanese time in service is 19.4 months while the average time in command is 12.6 months. The time until ETS, at time of reassignment, for soldiers returning to CONUS for duty after an overseas tour is shown in Table 2-2. The average time until ETS for this group is 12.3 months.

Figure 2-9  
Time-in-Service Distribution  
for European Soldiers on their  
First Enlistment  
24-Month Tour



	25	7,400	4 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
21-Month	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	11	19,700	3 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
	24	7,300	4 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
24-Month	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	8	11,800	3 year obligors assigned to Europe directly from training
	20	7,100	4 year obligors assigned to Europe directly from training

Table 2-2

Time Until ETS for Soldiers  
Returning for Duty in CONUS after a  
Europe or Japan Tour

TOUR LENGTH	NUMBER OF MONTHS UNTIL ETS UPON REASSIGNMENT TO CONUS	NUMBER OF SOLDIERS REASSIGNED TO CONUS	CATEGORY OF RETURNEE
Present	8	2,000	Married, non-command sponsored, 3 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	20	7,100	4 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
18-Month	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	14	21,500	3 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
	26	7,400	4 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
19-Month	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	13	21,400	3 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training



	25	7,400	4 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
21-Month	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	11	19,700	3 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
	24	7,300	4 year obligor assigned to Europe directly from training
24-Month	8	1,000	4 year obligor, electing JET, assigned to Europe directly from training
	8	11,800	3 year obligors assigned to Europe directly from training
	20	7,100	4 year obligors assigned to Europe directly from training

## IMPACT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS ASSIGNED

### OVERSEAS DIRECTLY FROM TRAINING

Each of the tour lengths previously discussed assumes that 49,700 soldiers are assigned to Europe directly from training. This number represents those expected to be assigned under present rules and, although an increase is expected if a shorter tour is adopted, the size of this increase is unknown.

Table 2-3 presents the changes expected if 5,000 and 10,000 additional soldiers are assigned overseas under the 18-month tour. The most significant impacts are the three percent and six percent cost increases. Although the average time-in-command is not expected to change the average age (time-in-service) of the force will be slightly reduced.

Table 2-3

Impact of Increasing the Number of Soldiers Assigned Overseas Directly from Training.

	18-Month Tour with 49.7K Assigned Directly from Training	Change for 18-Month Tour with 5,000 Additional from Training	Change for 18-Month Tour with 10,000 Additional from Training
Rotation Moves *	217.9K	-940	1890
Number of Replacements to Europe and Japan	78.8K	-16**	-28**
Number of Replacements SEPOS to Europe and Japan	29.1K	-5020	-10,030
Number Returning for Duty in CONUS after Overseas Tour	29.9K	+3.1K	+7.2K
Number Attrited from Europe and Japan	11.3K	+450	+910
Average Length Tour (Months)	16.6	0	0
Average Time in Service (Months)	20.1	-1.1	-2.3
Average Time in Command (Months)	9.9	0	0
Manyears individuals Account	12.4K	-80	-160
Cost	\$34.7M	+\$1.1M	+\$2.2M

\*Moves do not reflect overseas moves other than Europe and Japan.

\*\*Magnitude of change not significant.

## Individuals Account

Increased manyears in the Individuals Account, resulting from more frequent rotation of personnel on their first enlistment, cause an equivalent number of manyears in structure spaces to be unfilled. This section examines these increases from the standpoints of source and magnitude.

Appendix B of the report describes the model and identifies and pictorally shows the contribution to the Individuals Account for soldiers on their first enlistment caused by attrition, discharge at ETS, or rotation. These are the only categories the model analyzes since the bulk of any Individual Account change for these soldiers, relative to a change in overseas tour length, is adequately described by them.

The Individuals Account contributions addressed by the model are those due to:

- Separation of soldiers attrited during training.
- Rotation of soldiers to Europe or Japan after successfully completing training.
- Rotation of soldiers to other than Europe or Japan after successfully completing training.
- Separation of soldiers attrited during a tour in Europe or Japan.

- Separation of soldiers attrited during a tour other than Europe or Japan.
- Rotation of soldiers from Europe or Japan to CONUS for duty after successfully completing an overseas tour.
- SEPOS of soldiers to Europe or Japan after successfully completing a tour of duty.
- Rotation of soldiers from Europe or Japan to CONUS for discharge at the end of their enlistment obligation.

Table 2-4 summarizes the changes to the Individuals Account, in manyears, for the tour lengths analyzed.

Table 2-4

Changes to the Individuals Account,  
in Manyears,  
for Tour Length Options Analyzed.

	18-Month Tour	19-Month Tour	21-Month Tour	24-Month Tour
Training Attrition	0	0	0	0
Rotation from training to First Duty Assignment	0	0	0	0
Europe and Japan attrition	0	0	0	0
Rotation from Europe or Japan for PCS or ETS	+1.4K	+1.3K	+1.0K	+1.5K
Attrition during duty other than Europe or Japan	0	0	0	0
Rotation from other than Europe or Japan for PCS or ETS.	+1.4K	+1.3K	+1.9K	+1.3K
Total Increase from Present.	+2.8K	2.6K	1.9K	.8K

No increases are realized from attrition during training since both the number and quality of accessions, as well as attrition rates, were held constant across the options. No increase was realized from the rotations of those successfully completing training since the number of soldiers completing training and assigned to Europe and Japan was also held constant. Although the Europe and Japan attrition difference, as well as that during duty in other than Europe and Japan, are shown as zero this is not strictly true. Small increases, less than five manyears in all cases, were found for Europe and Japan depending on the option and corresponding small decreases for other than Europe or Japan were indicated. Although it is reasonable to expect these small changes in the direction they occurred, they were not reflected on the table since they are well below the precision of the model. The major increases in the Individuals Account are the result of a larger number of soldiers SEPOS to Europe or Japan and a larger number of soldiers returning from overseas for duty in CONUS.

## COST

### Accession and Training Costs 1/

Assuming that USAREUR's requirement for first-termers under an 18-month tour could be satisfied through SEPOS or assigning additional soldiers directly from training, rather than additional accessions, there would be no increase in accession or training costs. (An exception might have to be made for selected Space Imbalanced MOS, for which sufficient replacements cannot be made available from CONUS. See discussion of SIMOS at Appendix D).

### Movement 2/

The major cost impact of an 18-month tour will be associated with rotational moves to and from Europe and Japan. The TLTF estimate of 1650 additional replacements per month will incur an annual increase of \$34,700,000 in PCS funds over 1979 costs (including increased POR costs). These estimates include USAREUR, Europe other than USAREUR, and Japan.

1/Although not addressed in the model accession, training, and administrative costs are provided in Appendix E.

2/Relative costs are explained in detail in Inclosure 1 to Appendix B.



### JET Impact 1/

USAREUR estimates that approximately 2,000 first-termers will elect the JET option annually. This could vary significantly depending on the relative merit first-termers place on having their families with them and serving 36 months in Europe versus leaving their dependents in CONUS (or taking them to Europe at their own expense) while the spouse serves 18 months in Europe. There is virtually no experience from which to make an estimate. In any event, most JET monies will be necessary to pay for moves of dependents overseas or to a designated location in CONUS.

### Cost Comparison

The estimated costs of 18, 19, 21, and 24-month tour lengths, compared to current costs, are:

Table 2-5

#### Changes in Cost For Tour Length Options Analyzed

	FY 79	18 Mo	19 Mo	21 Mo	24 Mo
Rotations	0	+39.7K	+37.3K	+29.7K	+13.5K
Movement Cost	0	+\$34.7M	+\$31.8M	+\$23.7M	+\$9.5M

1/Although not addressed in the model accession, training, and administrative costs are provided in Appendix E.

### SUMMARY

The manpower analysis conducted by the TLTF was a steady-state analysis, using a computer model, projected to the 1982 time frame. To insure comparability of results under the different tour length options the following were held constant across the options:

- Number of type of accessions.
- Attrition.
- Many years in Europe and Japan
- Number of soldiers electing JET.
- Training time.
- Number of soldiers assigned to Europe and Japan from Training.
- Contribution to Individuals Account for each type move.
- Reenlistment rates and options.
- Marriage rates..

Five tour length options were evaluated:

- Present rules.
- 18-month tour.
- 19-month tour.
- 21-month tour.
- 24-month tour.

The analysis assumed 152.0K non-prior-service accessions annually.

This figure was obtained by averaging the FY79 through FY84 accessions projected in the FY80 President's Budget Manpower Program. The two year enlistment option was assumed until present with 12.5K accessions--11.5K identified for European tours. The educational and mental composition of these enlistees was assumed to be the same as now. The remainder of the annual accessions are three and four year obligors, obtained in the same proportion as now, and having the same demographic characteristics projected by ODCSPER and MILPERCEN.

A projection of the number of rotations, SEPOS requirements, average tour lengths, average European times in command and service, and "short timers" returning for duty in CONUS was made for each option.

Table 2-6

## Comparison of the Tour Rotation Statistics

	Present Tour Length	18- Months	19- Months	21- Months	24- Months
Number Rotation Moves	178.2K	217.9K	215.5K	207.9K	191.7K
Number SEPOS Replacements	9.2K	29.1K	26.8K	21.1K	12.9K
Average European Tour Length (months)	22.2	16.6	17.1	18.4	20.9
Average European Time in Service (months)	19.6	20.1	19.9	19.6	19.4
Average European Time in Command (months)	13.5	9.9	10.2	11.0	12.6
Number Returning to CONUS for duty with less than 12 Months to ETS	3.0K	1.0K	1.0K	20.7K	12.8K

Increased manyears in the Individuals Account caused by reducing the overseas tour length are almost exclusively the result of more rotation moves as a consequence of increased SEPOS replacements overseas and increased numbers of soldiers returning for duty in CONUS from overseas. The increase in manyears resulting from a change from present rules to reduced tour lengths are:

Table 2-7

## Comparison of Tour Length Changes to Individuals Account

	Increase in Individuals Account Manyears
18-Month tour	2.8K
19-Month tour	2.6K
21-Month tour	2.0K
24-Month tour	.8K

The cost increase of the different tour lengths investigated is expected to be:

Table 2-8

## Comparison of Tour Length Changes to Cost

	Increase in Cost
18-Month tour	\$34.7M
19-Month tour	\$31.8M
21-Month tour	\$23.7M
24-Month tour	\$9.5M

These cost increases are due to movement and POR processing alone. No increased accession or training costs are included since accessions have been held constant during the analysis.

## SECTION 3

### UNIT EFFECTIVENESS

#### UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS

Unit status reports (AR 220-1) are reports of selected indicators of unit readiness that assist in the assessment of total force readiness, but are not designed to contain all information necessary for a comprehensive evaluation of the broader concepts of readiness. The measurable aspects of unit personnel status, which are only one aspect of the broader concept of combat readiness, are assessed in this section.

The indicators of unit personnel status (AR 220-1) are strength, MOS, and senior grade. Reduced tour lengths result in an increased demand for overseas replacements. This demand can be numerically satisfied (see Army Capability to Support), and under the assumptions of this study, unit strength measurements in CONUS and overseas will not be affected by an 18-month tour.

For MOS, the Army can support an 18-month tour policy for most required replacements (see Army Capability to Support). As is currently the case, some MOS cannot be supported at 100 percent of authorization and will continue to cause particular problems. MOS shortages are the result of a variety of causes (i.e. over or under training in an MOS, force structure changes that increase or decrease the authorization for an MOS, recruiting shortfall, or inability to move soldiers as needed because of stabilizations or PCS restrictions).

A portion of MOS shortage (and resulting mismatch) is offset by utilization of soldiers in their secondary or substitute MOS. A comparison of USAREUR /FORSCOM and Army-wide aggregate MOS inventory follows:

Table 3-1

MOS Inventory Comparison

<u>USAREUR</u>				
<u>Fill PCT</u>	<u># MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>%</u>
0-95%	83	18,432	13,726	74
96-105%	105	116,238	117,156	101
106+	<u>118</u>	<u>43,859</u>	<u>51,196</u>	<u>117</u>
Total	306	178,529	182,078	101.9
<u>FORSCOM</u>				
<u>Fill PCT</u>	<u># MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>%</u>
0-95%	159	118,976	99,971	84
96-105%	45	53,723	54,372	101
106+	<u>100</u>	<u>66,312</u>	<u>75,656</u>	<u>115</u>
Total	304	239,001	229,999	96

Source: (COPD - 45, ME Nov 78)

<u>ARMY-WIDE</u>				
<u>Fill PCT</u>	<u># MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>%</u>
0-95%	148	153,276	130,483	85
96-105%	90	275,332	276,134	100
106+	<u>92</u>	<u>151,141</u>	<u>171,403</u>	<u>114</u>
Total	330	579,749	578,020	99.7

A shorter tour for first-termers in USAREUR would have no effect on MOS which are overstrength or understrength Army-wide and would probably not measurably affect the relative balance of MOS between USAREUR and FORSCOM. While a shorter tour provides the opportunity for more MOS mismatch to occur, it also provides the means for faster remedial action to correct mismatches. Overall, significant changes in the MOS indicator will not occur, but small units with a high density of problem MOS will experience the same difficulties as they do now.

Senior grade measurement should not be affected by a reduced tour as it is primarily a career issue in that it measures strength of E5 and above. Since the average TIS for promotion to E5 is currently 3.5 years, only a small portion of first-termers can reasonably be expected to be serving as E5's. NCO requirements would continue to be filled primarily by careerists. A shorter tour in USAREUR will have no significant impact on grade imbalance. While it is not directly measured under AR 220-1, a grade-related issue is the "experience" level of first-term soldiers as a result of an 18-month tour. The



average time in service for soldiers serving in Europe under each tour length option is presented below. The 18- and 19-month tours result in a slightly more senior force while the 24-month tour reduces the seniority slightly.

Table 3-2

Average Months Time in Service of the First-Term European Force

	Present	18-Month	19-Month	21-Month	24-Month
Average	19.6	20.1	19.9	19.6	19.4
Change to Average	NA	+.5	+.3	0	-.2

Many of the additional replacements needed to support an 18-month tour would come from SEPOS of soldiers who had completed training and served at least one year in the sustaining base. These soldiers would replace individuals of roughly equal experience and would serve until the end of their enlistments, under ideal circumstances. (Four year enlistees would, ideally, be selected for a tour in USAREUR near their 30th month of service). These SEPOS soldiers would fill the experience gap created by the return to CONUS of soldiers who served an 18-month tour directly after AIT.

Tour sequencing, an optimum balance of AIT and SEPOS assignments, must be stressed to achieve an equitable mix of experienced junior soldiers in both CONUS units and Europe. If the additional rotations 3-4 are from the CONUS unit base, an experienced USAREUR soldier will be

rotated with an experienced CONUS soldier. This interchange, if 12 months or more service remain, is perceived as a plus by both FORSCOM and USAREUR. In fact, rotations of this nature provide cement to strengthen the bond between Europe and CONUS units.

#### TURNOVER

A tour reduction will increase turnover and turbulence in both CONUS and USAREUR. Personnel turnover and turbulence are not synonymous. Turnover is the number of personnel reassigned or discharged from a unit divided by the operating strength (AR 220-1). Turbulence is all changes in duty positions within units. Turbulence will be discussed later in this section of this report. An increase of 1650 overseas monthly assignments (1540 in USAREUR) as a result of an 18-month tour will increase quarterly unit turnover in the aggregate by 1.6 percent in the CONUS sustaining base and 2.5 percent in USAREUR. Quarterly and annual expected turnover for various tour lengths is as follows (1978 base levels provided by DA DCSPER):

Table 3-3

#### Increase in Quarterly Turnover

	<u>CONUS (Base=14%)</u>		<u>USAREUR (Base=10%)</u>	
	E1-E9	E1-E4	E1-E9	E1-E4
18-month tour	+1.6%	+2.7%	+2.7%	+4.2%
19-month tour	+1.4%	+2.3%	+2.4%	+3.8%
21-month tour	+1.0%	+1.6%	+1.6%	+2.5%
24-month tour	+ .3%	+ .5%	+ .5%	+ .8%

Table 3-4

Increase in Annual Turnover

	<u>CONUS (Base=56%)</u>		<u>USAREUR (Base=40%)</u>	
	E1-E9	E1-E4	E1-E9	E1-E4
18-month tour	+6.4%	+10.8%	+10.8%	+16.8%
19-month tour	+5.6%	+ 9.2%	+ 9.6%	+15.2%
21-month tour	+4.0%	+ 6.4%	+ 6.4%	+10.0%
24-month tour	+1.2%	+ 2.0%	+ 2.0%	+ 3.2%

## TRAINING AND TURBULENCE

Introduction

Almost all previous studies of shorter tour lengths for Europe have cited increased "turbulence" as a major reason for not shortening tour lengths: "The shorter the tour, the more the turbulence, the lower the readiness". While this statement is partially true, it is deceptive. Turbulence in itself is detrimental; however, personnel turnover is not the major cause of turbulence. Tour lengths have far less impact upon turbulence than do Army and local personnel policies and actions. The impact of turbulence should not be understated; but often in the past, the impact has been overstated in analyzing tour length. Improved morale, attitude, motivation, and personal readiness of individuals serving a reduced tour would offset the impact of increased turbulence from turnover through reductions in AWOL, drug use, EDP, courts martial, sick calls and malingering.

Since USAREUR will experience the greater turnover and turbulence, attention will be focused on the impact on USAREUR of the tour reduction. Actions already initiated by the Army and other actions which could be taken might offset the impact of increased turbulence. The following paragraphs discuss the current state of turbulence in Europe, the projected impact of an increase in turnover, and what is being done and can be done to offset the impact of turbulence.

#### Discussion

Personnel turnover in USAREUR battalions is approximately 10% per quarter. Personnel turnover is only one aspect of turbulence. In assessing the impact of turbulence, the TLTF will focus on the armor force as the most recent analyses of turbulence have been done in this area. The Total Tank Systems Study (T2S2) identified 24 discrete causes of turbulence in tank crews and ascertained the amount attributed to each. The table below identifies the percent of turbulence caused by each factor:

Table 3-5

Causes of Turbulence in Tank Crews

<u>Cause</u>	<u>CONUS</u>	<u>Europe</u>
Completion of AIT	28.1	28.1
Normal Rotation	12.3	19.3
Promotion	4.9	7.1
OJT in another MOS	1.8	2.4
Personal Request	7.1	10.0
Shortage Elsewhere	22.8	12.9
Shortage in same crew	10.0	.2
*Miscellaneous	13.0	20.0

Source - Total Tank Systems Study (T2S2)

\*Includes disciplinary reasons, special duty assignments, reenlistments, etc.

The T2S2 assessment is that only 43% of turbulence is generated by actions, policies, and events occurring above battalion level. The majority of turbulence is generated at battalion level and below with the greatest (33%) being generated at platoon level. Personnel turnover contributes a little less than half towards overall turbulence. Using a generally accepted rule of thumb that turnover accounts for about 1/2 of turbulence, an increase in turnover of 2 1/2% would increase quarterly turbulence 5%. Thus, USAREUR which is now

experiencing 20% quarterly turbulence would see this increase to about 25%.

While the T2S2 could not statistically prove that turbulence is bad, it is generally accepted that the disruptive impact on training is not good. Subjective opinions of Armor Officers, NCOs, and crewmen indicate that a reduction in the level of turbulence will result in improved efficiency. However, the impact of an approximate 5% quarterly increase in turbulence due to an 18-month tour may not be significant when placed in the following perspectives:

- The average tank crewman changes jobs approximately every 9 months (T2S2).
- Prior to tank gunnery, crews are formed and trained intensively for short periods of time (an average of 1-2 months).
- Changes in tank crews range from 53% - 93% over 4-6 <sup>1/</sup> months.
- Stability and experience of the tank commander is the <sup>1/</sup> most important factor in crew performance.
- Position familiarity of tank commanders and gunners has <sup>1/</sup> a small but positive correlation with performance.
- The length of time the tank commander and gunner have been assigned together has a positive correlation with <sup>1/</sup> performance.

<sup>1/</sup> ARI Technical Paper 350 Sep 78 (Conducted by ARI field unit, Ft. Knox, KY, covering M60A1 gunnery of 211 crews in USAREUR)

There are a number of ongoing actions and other actions that could be taken to reduce current turbulence and attempt to offset the expected increase from a reduced tour.

- The flexible grade structure for Armor crewmen allows promotion to E-5 in the gunner, loader, and driver positions. Turbulence within crews is not necessitated by promotions.
- Tank commanders (careerist) are not subject to the reduced tour, therefore, stability is possible in this highly important position.
- If the 5th tank crewman test is successful and becomes policy, the extra crewman should result in a higher percentage of the crew being present for training. (ARTS has concluded that percentage present for training is a major parameter when measuring training effectiveness and resources required to train a unit).
- Increased emphasis and movement toward standardization of training will produce better CONUS-USAREUR interface.
- A proposal to focus AIT on USAREUR conditions is being studied.
- Recent and planned development of additional subcaliber and simulation devices will improve individual proficiency at the crewman and tank commander level.

Other factors that could offset the impact of increased turbulence are anticipated reductions in drug usage, EDP and court martials and the improved morale, attitude, motivation, and personal readiness of individuals serving a shortened tour. USAREUR commanders feel strongly that these factors will serve to reduce turbulence, increase stability and improve overall readiness. Present for training percentages should go up. Some who are now receiving EDP will have a better chance of finishing their tour. The effectiveness of training should improve due to better attitude, morale, and motivation.

Overall, training could be improved by shorter tours. First-term soldiers who are trained in a CONUS unit for a year or more before rotating to Europe will not degrade USAREUR unit effectiveness. For many MOS, training area location and availability in CONUS are more conducive to skill development than in Europe. USAREUR has limited, overcrowded local and major training areas which are infrequently available and costly to use. Available training time is being reduced in USAREUR as restrictions (environmental, noise, damage, maneuver rights) are placed on training area use.

With the annual training cycle currently followed in USAREUR, each soldier would participate in at least one complete iteration of training and evaluation in both the collective and individual areas during an 18-month tour. CONUS units with NATO missions will benefit from an influx of USAREUR trained soldiers who are familiar with the



European environment. Overall, more soldiers in their first enlistment would be exposed to the European theater.

#### Summary

There is little question that turbulence in itself is detrimental to training and readiness; however, personnel turnover is not the major cause of turbulence and many factors might offset this increased turbulence. Change in local practices and policies can be initiated to further offset the impact of turbulence. No attempt is being made to understate the impact of turbulence, but often in the past, this impact has been overstated in analyzing tour length.

No data exist to prove that the overall impact of reduced tours will be favorable or unfavorable to the ability to train. An 18-month tour is 50 percent longer than the previous Vietnam tour or the Korean tour. Yet, the 2d Infantry Division in Korea maintains a high state of training and combat readiness even though most NCO and officer leaders are replaced each year. The reduction of tour for first-termers will not change the stability of the leadership (careerists) in Europe. CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR and subordinate commanders' assess that overall readiness will increase as a result of the shorter tour.

## Section 4

### INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS

#### INDISCIPLINE


With the advent of the Volunteer Army in 1973, AWOL, desertion, and courts martial rates have declined significantly. Yet, major differences exist in these indicators and other criminal activity rates between CONUS and USAREUR.


#### Crime Rates

USAREUR, CONUS and Total Army crime rates (rates per 1000) for FY78 are shown below. Source DAPE-HRE

Figure 4-1

#### Rates of Crime





To determine whether a relationship exists between criminal incidents and time on present tour of duty for first-term soldiers, an analysis was conducted on a sample of MP/CID Reports from 1 October 1978 through 31 December 1978. A total of 3179 SM under age 21 were identified from Crime Records Center (CRC) documents. Of these SM, 1828 (837 in CONUS and 991 in USAREUR) were still assigned to the same command as of 30 January 1979. The length of time in command was determined by comparing the date of arrival in command as recorded on the Enlisted Master File with the date of the incident. The Enlisted Master File was also used to identify and total the "first-term" population in each command by 6 month increments of service on current tour. From this comparison an "analytical crime rate" was constructed to compare USAREUR and CONUS criminal activity levels as a function of time on current tour. The resulting comparison is shown at Figure 4-2.

Initially a sample of criminal incidents during the period 1 Oct 77 - 30 Sep 78 was gathered for analysis. Unfortunately, 66% of the

sample could not be tied to a tour interval because the SM involved had been either discharged from the service or reassigned elsewhere in the 15 1/3 months since the beginning of the sample period (1 Oct 77) and the date the data was compiled (9 Jan 79). To partially overcome this phenomena a three month sample (1 Oct 78-31 Dec 78) was compiled for analysis on 30 January 1979. In this sample (100% sample of all SM under age 21) 43% of the subjects still could not be tied to a specific tour interval. A series of samples taken over shorter periods might overcome most of this problem, however within the time available, this was not possible.

In comparing trends over time, the initial crime rates for USAREUR and CONUS at the 0-6 month time interval were equated to 1.00. (See Column E Table 4-1) From this base point, changes in behavior are plotted and the analysis proceeds. Details of calculations are at Table 4-1.

Figure 4-2

Incidence of Crime Vs Time on Tour  
4th Qtr CY78 (1828) Cases

USAREUR Rate (%) Less Than or More Than CONUS




Table 4-1

CALCULATION OF ANALYTICAL CRIME RATES

				TREND from	
<u>TOUR INTERVAL:</u>	<u>% of CRIME</u>	<u>÷ % of POPULATION</u>	<u>= RATE</u>	vrs	<u>base point</u>
A	B	C	D	E	F
CONUS					
0-6	38.4	43.9	.87 x 1.149 =	1.00	
7-12	24.5	17.7	1.38 x 1.149 =	1.58	
13-18	18.0	17.0	1.05 x 1.149 =	1.21	
19-24	10.6	11.2	.94 x 1.149 =	1.08	
25-30	6.7	7.9	.85 x 1.149 =	.98	
31-36	1.9	2.3	.83 x 1.149 =	.95	
EUROPE					
0-6	18.4	24.0	.77 x 1.30 =	1.00	
7-12	21.4	18.9	1.13 x 1.30 =	1.47	
13-18	22.7	20.8	1.09 x 1.30 =	1.42	
19-24	16.9	14.5	1.17 x 1.30 =	1.52	
25-30	17.2	18.3	.99 x 1.30 =	1.29	
31-36	3.5	3.4	1.03 x 1.30 =	1.34	

This sample demonstrates that for soldiers under age 21:


- Crime rate is highest in CONUS during the 7-12 month interval.  
Crime rate is highest in Europe during the 19-24 month interval.
- Crime rate remains relatively constant in Europe through the 24th month interval whereas it rapidly declines in CONUS after the 7-12 month interval.
- The potential for a first-term soldier to commit a serious crime is 30-40% higher in Europe than in CONUS for the entire period from 19-36 months.

The timing of criminal activity as shown above is generally consistent with the timing of GCM and BCD Special C-M convictions. Data depicted below were extracted from 1300 GCM and BCD Special Conviction Records of Trial which were received by US Army Legal Services Agency during FY 1978. They represent all personnel, not just those under age 21. To roughly compare time on active Federal Service with time on current tour a presumed time in command is shown. For purposes of comparison, training & travel were assumed to be about 6 months.

Figure 4-3

Time in Service at Conviction  
GCM and BCD Cases Received  
at USALSA in FY 1978 n=1332

% of cases received from each command  
by time intervals



\*Presumed time in command (six months training & travel subtracted from Active Federal Service)




### AWOL and Desertion

From 1971 to 1978 the Army wide desertion rate declined from 73.6 per 1000 to about 13 per 1000, roughly the pre-Viet Nam rate. The FY78 AWOL and desertion rates for USAREUR, CONUS & total Army are as shown (annual rate per 1000).

Figure 4-4

#### AWOL/Desertion Rates (FY 78)



- The USAREUR AWOL rate is 1/3 that of CONUS.
- The USAREUR desertion rate is 1/4 that of CONUS.
- These rates appear to be artificially depressed by the isolation of soldiers in USAREUR from American culture.
  - o A soldier in CONUS may go AWOL or desert into a hospitable culture where he can be assured of low visibility.
  - o In Europe, the AWOL or deserter is culturally isolated and is therefore highly visible and vulnerable to apprehension and return to US military control.

--A reduced tour might result in a reduction of both AWOL & desertion rates in USAREUR.

- o "I can do anything for 18 months"
- o Reduced incidence and duration of personal frustration and family disruption by a shorter tour.

--It is also possible that the increased number of SM ordered from CONUS units to USAREUR will cause an increase in the AWOL and desertion rates in CONUS because the tour in USAREUR will be shared among a larger number of first-term personnel than is presently the case.

#### CONCLUSION

- o If the USAREUR tour length is reduced to 18 months, the potential for criminal involvement is reduced and the crime rate in Europe is expected to decrease.

- o Reduction in tour length for first-term unaccompanied soldiers will not materially reduce USAREUR AWOL & Desertion rates. It is possible that CONUS rates will be increased due to sharing of the European tour among 14% more of those who finish AIT.

## DRUG ABUSE

### Introduction

Continuing high level concern and negative publicity relating to Europe's drug problem is characterized by the following statements:

The committee feels that the Army is ready to go to war but that drug abuse affects that state of readiness to undetermined degree.

Report of Joint House Senate  
Committee trip to USAREUR, late 1978

Language differences, reduction of the value of the dollar, cultural differences, as well as the high cost of entertainment on the economy, all contribute to the soldier turning to drugs as the cheapest form of entertainment.

English Committee, following  
visit to USAREUR 10-22 November 1978

There is tremendous peer pressure for soldiers (in Europe) to use drugs. A soldier who doesn't at least smoke hash is marked as a Narc.

Representative English (D-Oklahoma)  
January 1979

Every indication we have points to the inescapable conclusion that tours of duty in excess of 18 months contribute significantly to negative attitudes that lead our soldiers to dissatisfaction, drugs, disciplinary problems and other detractors that adversely impact on readiness.

General Haig, USCINCEUR 1 Dec 1978

(If shorter tour is implemented) I would expect all indicators to improve for USAREUR rates of...marijuana abuse, other drug use...but I cannot project the expected magnitude of the change.

General Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR  
19 January 1979

### Discussion

Recent analyses by the Army Staff, the Army Research Institute, and a comparison of data from a nationwide survey by the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) and similar Army data (See Table 4-2) indicate:

- Young soldiers (Age 18-25) are much more likely to be current abusers of heroin than young civilians. The October 1978 current abuse rate in Europe is 4.8%, in CONUS 2.4%, and among young civilians is less than .5% (DA)
- About 25% of young soldiers are current abusers of marijuana (In both CONUS and USAREUR). This is slightly less than the rate for young civilians. (DA)
- About 6% of young soldiers in CONUS and about 7% of young soldiers in USAREUR are current abusers of hallucinogens (LSD, PCP, etc.). CONUS and USAREUR rates are roughly triple the rates for young civilians. (DA)
- About 4% of young soldiers in CONUS and USAREUR are current abusers of cocaine. These rates are roughly the same as for young civilians. (DA)
- Environment (levels of stress, dissatisfaction, and disenchantment) and ready availability of low cost drugs are significant predictors of hard drug abuse. The adverse nature of the environment faced by young soldiers in USAREUR is more acute than in CONUS. (DA)

Table 4-2

PREVALENCE OF DRUG ABUSE: SOCIETY (ACTUAL) ARMY (ACTUAL)  
(PERCENT)

YOUNG ADULTS AGE 18-25	PAST MONTH (CURRENT USER)		PAST YEAR NOT PAST MONTH		USED, BUT NOT PAST YEAR		EVER USED		NEVER USED	
	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY	SOCIETY ARMY
MARIJUANA	27.2	24.4 25.1	10.9	12.2 10.8	21.5	19.5 20.9	60.1	52.1 56.8	39.9	43.8 43.1
HALLOCINOGENS	2.0	5.7 7.1	4.4	7.7 8.3	13.5	8.7 10.8	19.8	22.1 26.2	80.1	77.9 73.8
COCAINE	3.7	3.9 4.1	6.5	7.6 9.8	9.0	8.4 11.0	19.1	19.9 24.9	80.9	80.0 75.1
HEROIN	*	2.4 4.8	.9	3.7 6.0	2.4	5.6 4.4	3.6	11.7 15.2	96.4	88.2 84.7

SOURCES: SOCIETY - National Survey on Drug Abuse: 1977 (NIDA) page 13  
ARMY - Aug 78 Quarterly Sample Survey of Military Personnel (HQDA) as of October 1978

\* less than .5 percent

--Drug usage in USAREUR increases with tour length. Trends are shown in TABLE 4-3. This does not imply that a similar phenomena does not occur elsewhere. It merely reports experience documented in Europe (ARI).

--Reduction of the first-term tour length in Europe will reduce the rate of hard drug abuse in Europe without necessarily a concomitant increase in that of CONUS Army elements. Thus, there should be an overall reduction in Army-wide hard drug abuse rates. (DA)

In 1978 approximately 2000 personnel were discharged from USAREUR for drug related reasons. These and other drug abusers who were not discharged contributed to low morale, poor duty performance and increased turbulence.

On 1 December 1978 General Haig, CINCEUR stated "In my view, drug abuse alone is sufficient justification to reduce the tour of unaccompanied soldiers to 18 months." While no research studies are available to demonstrate that a reduced tour length will reduce the drug problem, the TLTF believes that it will.

Table 4-3

REPORTED MARIJUANA AND HASH USE, HARD DRUG USE, ALCOHOL USE  
AND LENGTH OF TIME IN USAREUR (N=4783)  
TIME IN USAREUR IN MONTHS, 1978

Frequency of use	1-6	13-18	% change from 6-18 mo	> 24	% change from 6->24 mo
---------------------	-----	-------	-----------------------------	------	------------------------------

## MARIJUANA AND HASH USE

			<u>change</u>		<u>change</u>
Never used	43%	37%	(-14%)	33%	(-23%)
Experimented with, use less than once a month	34%	33%	( <sup>+</sup> 0%)	33%	( <sup>+</sup> 0%)
Use once a month to daily	23%	30%	(+30%)	34%	(+48%)

## HARD DRUG USE

Never used	64%	57%	(-11%)	51%	(-20%)
Experimented with, use less than once a month	28%	32%	(+14%)	35%	(+25%)
Use once a month to daily	9%	12%	(+33%)	14%	(+55%)

Source: ARI 1978

## MORALE

The attitude of the soldier toward the Army and toward life in general is a key consideration in readiness and combat effectiveness but has never been quantified. The inability to precisely measure morale in terms of dollars should not imply insignificance for this factor by itself or in relation to other issues such as reenlistment and extensions.

Survey of job satisfaction revealed that first-term soldiers in Europe expressed lower unit morale and reenlistment intent than those in CONUS. While the lower perceptions of unit morale in Europe appeared to be partially related to pay-grade composition (CONUS has proportionally more E1 and E2 who tend to express more positive views), this difference did not entirely account for the lower perceptions of unit morale in Europe. The survey report concluded that the remaining difference could not be attributed to any of the items measured in the survey and might be due to some factor or factors intrinsic to service in Europe.

One should not infer that morale in Europe is bad but only that could be made more positive. In a May 1974 memorandum, the Secretary of the Army stated that "the units in Europe have made giant strides forward in combat readiness, and troop morale and unit esprit have improved significantly since my last visit there last June. The troops and officers I saw and spoke with are highly motivated..." The



Secretary also states in the same memorandum "the tour for the first-term enlistee is too long. Every commander, every noncommissioned officer, and every soldier I spoke with in Europe supported the idea of an 18-month tour for the first-term enlistee."

A shorter tour in Europe will improve morale of several groups overseas. Reduced tours will raise the morale of all first-termers. The weaker soldier who may be prone to resort to drug or alcohol abuse, lethargy, and crime, would be tremendously assisted by a reduced tour and its "light at the end of the tunnel" impact. The stronger soldier will also have an improved attitude--currently the soldier that does not attrit is the one who must bear the overseas hardships for the longer period. And improved morale for first-term soldiers will also make life more satisfying for the NCO. However, the morale of the career force--enlisted and officer--could be negatively affected. The young bachelor E5 careerist and the young 2LT might be particularly discouraged by shorter first-term tours for only first-term enlistees.

Inadequate facilities in Europe have an impact on morale. CINCUSAREUR states that "life in Europe is different for our soldiers than it is for their CONUS counterparts. The USAREUR soldier faces unique problems with regard...to unsatisfactory living and working facilities. Our soldiers must confront the resulting lack of comparability with their CONUS counterparts--or even with their USAFE counterparts, who already serve only a two year tour on a modern fixed USAFE installation--for their entire tour. They are reminded of the

disparities every day."

USAREUR has begun a Quality of Life Program to improve the living and working environment based on the recognition that morale and readiness are inseparably linked. This commitment to enhanced morale through improved quality of life is a long term proposition.

CINCUSAREUR states that:

"It would take 4 billion dollars right now to provide our soldier with a quality of life that is comparable to what is available in CONUS...The only way to achieve comparability in the near term therefore, is to reduce the first-term unaccompanied soldier's exposure to these personal hardships and the dangerous drug environment to the minimum that the Army can afford."

Attitudes toward the unit mission and toward unit training should improve in garrison and in the field as a result of the reduced tour length. This factor could be a positive influence in the readiness arena and could also be the catalyst for efforts to eliminate or reduce training distractors.

## ATTRITION

### General

Attrition of first-term enlisted personnel imposes severe dollar and readiness penalties on the Army. This is in addition to the impact on the lives of individual soldiers released prior to contract fulfillment.

First-term enlisted attrition has generated considerable Congressional, OSD, and public interest. Because it is inextricably connected to programing and budgeting activities, to the Army's accession quality standards, and the cost of the All-Volunteer Force--particularly in a period of declining 18-23 year-old population--and to various social-justice issues, this interest should remain high for the foreseeable future.

For the Active Army, general guidance on separations policy is provided by DOD Directive 1332.14 which outlines broad areas and reasons for administrative separations. The Tour Length Task Force used the definition offered in this directive which refers to attrition as "separation prior to completion of the contractual active-duty obligation" in its analysis. Early separation resulting from an Army release program, separation for the purpose of immediate reenlistment, or release upon reaching ETS are not counted as attrition losses.

### Characterization of Attrition


A substantial body of data has been collected by the Army to

analyze and predict attrition. Figure 4-5 depicts the aggregate first-term Regular Army enlisted attrition rate by fiscal year since 1974 by male, female, and total. Figure 4-6 identifies the programs under or reason for this attrition. Both of these figures represent attrition as a percent of the entire enlisted population.



A more illustrative method of portraying attrition is achieved by displaying the attrition experienced by entry cohort groups during their terms of enlistment. An entry cohort, for this purpose, is defined as the total accessions to the Army during a given month. Figures 4-7 and 4-8 depict the monthly cohort attrition rates experienced for males and females respectively along with the reasons for loss. Figures 4-9 and 4-10 use the monthly rates portrayed in the previous two figures to show the total attrition by time for these groups.

From the preceding figures we can see that most attrition occurs early in a soldier's enlistment, with physical disqualification and the Trainee Discharge Program (TDP) accounting for the heavy losses during training and the Expeditious Discharge Program (EDP) accounting for the majority of early unit losses. Marriage, pregnancy, parenthood, and dependent losses account for an increasingly larger percentage of female losses in units as time in service increases. Fifty percent of all male first-term attrition occurs within approximately the first 9 months of service. Likewise, fifty percent of all female attrition occurs within approximately the first 11 months of service.

FIGURE 4-5  
 AGGREGATE (ALL CONTRIBUTING COHORTS)  
 FIRST TERM REGULAR ARMY  
 ENLISTED ATTRITION RATE BY FISCAL YEAR  
 ENLISTED ATTRITION RATE (AS A PER CENT OF THE ENLISTED POPULATION)  
 -- MALE, FEMALE AND TOTAL --



**FIGURE 4-6**  
**AGGREGATE (ALL CONTRIBUTING COMGRTS)**  
**TOTAL ENLISTED ATTRITION RATE BY FISCAL YEAR**  
**(AS A PER CENT OF THE ENLISTED POPULATION)**  
**ADVERSE VS NON-ADVERSE**



- 1/ Does not include 146,608 early released to meet FY 72 end strength.
- 2/ Also includes punitive discharges, resignations for the good of the service in lieu of courts-martial and causes previously classified as "unfitness."
- 3/ Expeditious Discharge Program (EDP); Trainee Discharge Program (TDP).
- 4/ Adverse is sum of EDP, TDP, misconduct and unsuitability.

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FIGURE 4-7  
COMPOSITE  
FIRST TERM  
MALE COHORT ATTRITION PATTERNS  
(BASED ON FY 75, 76, 77 COHORTS)




FIGURE 4-8  
COMPOSITE  
FIRST TERM  
FEMALE COHORT ATTRITION PATTERNS  
(BASED ON FY 75, 76, 77 COHORTS)






FIGURE 4-9  
COMPOSITE FIRST-TERM  
CUMULATIVE MALE COHORT ATTRITION  
(BASED ON FY 75, 76, 77 COHORTS)





FIGURE 4-10  
COMPOSITE FIRST TERM  
CUMULATIVE FEMALE COHORT ATRITION  
(BASED ON FY 75, 76, 77 COHORTS)



When considering tour lengths, it is useful to look at the relationship between attrition after training since losses while a soldier is a member of a unit become increasingly important. Fifty percent of the male attrition while a soldier is assigned to a unit occurs within approximately the first 8 months after training. For females, fifty percent occurs during the first 9 months after training. The seventy-five percent marks are reached after only 15 months after training for males and 18 for females.

#### Correlation of Attrition with Demographic Characteristics

Attrition rates vary substantially for accession groups having different demographic characteristics. Analysis of Army attrition data using a correlation computer program, AID-E, has established that the four characteristics at entry best correlated with attrition are, in order of importance, (1) education, (2) sex, (3) mental category, and (4) age.

A high school diploma graduate is only half as likely to fail as a non-high school diploma graduate (which also includes GED). Within educational level, Mental Categories I through IIIA experience less attrition than IIIB, which, in turn, has less than Mental Category IV. Within educational level and mental category, the male attrition rate is approximately two-thirds the female rate. Finally, within educational level, mental category, and sex, the 18-21 year old (at entry) soldiers have approximately 6 percent less attrition than the

group that is either seventeen or at least twenty-two. Table 4-4 summarizes these findings while figure 4-11 shows the significance of educational level and mental category. This figure is based on male cohort attrition data as of December 1978. Note that in all cases the attrition rate for high school diploma graduates is less than non-graduates, and --within educational level-- the mental category I-IIIa rate is less than IIIB.

#### USAREUR Attrition


The attrition described up to this point has been aggregate data for the entire Army. The question arises as to whether this data is applicable to soldiers assigned to Europe or, as a group, they experience a different attrition rate. No definite conclusions could be reached on this point but strong implications were drawn to support a conclusion that the USAREUR attrition rate is no higher than that of FORSCOM.

The fundamental problem in comparing USAREUR and FORSCOM cohort attrition data is the lack of longitudinal historical records allowing a comparison coupled with difficulty in extracting data from the Enlisted Master File which clearly distinguishes between first-term enlistees in Europe who were assigned directly out of training from those assigned to Europe following duty in CONUS. This distinction is important since attrition is more closely related to time in service than time in a given command and the SEPOS soldier can be expected to

TABLE 4-4

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS HIGHLY CORRELATED WITH ATTRITION

- o EDUCATION LEVEL: HSDG RATE  $<$  NHSDG RATE
- o MENTAL GROUP: WITHIN EDUCATION LEVELS I-III A RATE  $<$  III B RATE  $<$  IV RATE
- o SEX: WITHIN EDUCATION LEVEL & MENTAL GROUP: MALE RATE  $<$  FEMALE RATE
- o AGE: 17 AND OVER 22 RATE  $>$  18-22 RATE



attrit at a far lower rate than one assigned immediately from training with comparable time in command.

A comparision of USAREUR and FORSCOM attrition rates, using the AID-E data tapes, which are derived from the Enlisted Master File, was made for soldiers having between seven and seventeen months service. The seven month lower limit was introduced to screen out most attrition occuring during training while the seventeen month upper limit was imposed to eliminate virtually all soldiers in Europe with previous CONUS duty assignments. Fiscal Year 1978 losses, experienced by soldiers accessed prior to that time, were analyzed to develop implied cohort attrition rates.

The results of this analysis show that the 7-17 month attrition for male high school diploma graduates for FORSCOM was approximately 6.4 percent of the entering cohort assigned to FORSCOM while USAREUR experienced a loss of 5.0 percent. For male non-high school degree graduates, FORSCOM was 12.9 percent while USAREUR was 11.0 percent. The differences between FORSCOM and USAREUR partially, but not totally, appear to be explained by different demographic content since the first-term enlisted high school degree graduate content is 64.2 percent for FORSCOM and 56.3 percent for USAREUR; while the mental category contents, shown in Table 4-5, are approximately the same for each command. Additionally, USAREUR has approximately 7.8 percent female soldiers with FORSCOM 10.4 percent.

The difficulty in concluding that USAREUR experiences a lower

Table 4-5  
 MENTAL CATEGORY COMPOSITION  
 FOR FIRST TERM ENLISTED SOLDIERS IN  
 USAREUR AND FORSCOM  
 (PERCENT)

PERCENT IN MENTAL CATEGORY	USAREUR	FORSCOM
I	3.8	3.5
II	23.7	22.2
III	61.9	63.7
IV	10.6	10.6



attrition rate is the absence of realistic data beyond the seventeenth month of service. If USAREUR experiences a higher rate than FORSCOM during this period, due to increased disillusionment contributed to by the length of the tour, these losses could make up for part of the increased FORSCOM attrition experienced earlier. Considering that the highest attrition occurs early in a soldier's career, however, it is unlikely that the USAREUR rate would exceed that of FORSCOM. Since a strong case could not be made for different attrition rates between USAREUR and FORSCOM, the Army-wide rates were used in the task force analysis for both.

#### Attrition Used in Analysis

The attrition input for the model is entered in the form of survivability curves for each accession input cell. The survivability at any point in time for a given cohort is defined as one minus the probability of attriting prior to that time. Historical survivability statistics, and projections for out years, were obtained from the Enlisted Strength Manpower Division, ODCSPER, and are compatible with those used in developing the Army Manpower Program projections (ELIM-COMPLIP). Figure 4-12 graphically portrays the present survivability for different demographic compositions of accessions while figure 4-13 depicts the survivability for the planned demographic mix of FY 81 accessions used in the model for analyzing the FY 82 time frame. Table 4-6 summarizes this expected demographic mix.

Figure 4-12  
Survivability vs Time in Service  
by Sex, Education and Mental Category (MC)




Figure 4-13  
Survivability vs Time in Service  
for 1981 Accessions




Table 4-6  
Demographic Characteristics for  
FY 81 Accessions

Percent Male	84.2
Percent Female	15.8
Percent Male High School Diploma Graduates	65.0
Percent Male Non-High School Diploma Graduates	35.0
Mental Category Breakout for Male Non-High School Diploma Graduates	
I-IIIa	46.1
IIIb-IV	53.9

### Impact of Reducing Tour Lengths

A basic consideration used when evaluating any change in tour length for first-term personnel in Europe was that the manyears now contributed by the European force on their first enlistment will continue to be provided by personnel on their first enlistment. This consideration insures that the manyears contributed by career personnel, and subsequently their expected requirements for Europe, remain fixed. A second consideration is that we are now assigning the maximum number of first-term personnel to Europe directly from training and therefore, without changing the number of accessions or enlistment options, we cannot increase this number. The impact of this consideration is that the increased number of replacements needed for Europe due to a shorter tour must come exclusively from SEPOS personnel. Since the number of soldiers assigned to Europe immediately following training is expected to increase by an undetermined amount, due to higher overseas demands resulting from reduced tour lengths, the second consideration is later relaxed for the 18-month tour to determine its sensitivity.

Prior to presenting the actual numbers of personnel expected to be attrited by reducing the tour length for first-term unmarried or unaccompanied personnel to 18 months, it is useful to provide an overview of the tradeoffs. Both the present tour length policy and the reduced tour will send the same number of soldiers to Europe immediately after training. Upon arrival in Europe each policy would

result in approximately the same amount of attrition for the first 18 months. Although it can be argued that the improved morale will reduce attrition somewhat, under an 18-month tour, the similarity between existing USAREUR and FORSCOM attrition statistics during the first 18 months of service suggests that little improvement will occur. At 18 months under the reduced tour the soldier returns to CONUS and has the many years he would have contributed during the last portion of his European tour replaced by a soldier who is SEPOS to Europe. Whether a one-for-one replacement is needed or not depends on the expected tour duration of the SEPOS soldier since a specified number of many years lost by the returnee must be replaced.

If the soldier who is SEPOS to Europe has less time in service than the soldier he replaces, the SEPOS soldier will be more likely to attrit than the soldier he replaces since propensity to attrit is reduced with time in service. In more general terms when the entire SEPOS population is considered, Europe will have more soldiers attrited than now if the average time in service of the replacement is less than the average time in service of the returnee. Europe will, conversely, have fewer soldiers attrited if the replacements have more time in service on the average than the returnees they replace.

The price paid for lower attrition, of course, is the shorter expected tour lengths of replacements and the greater number of replacements required to accumulate the needed many years. Since all soldiers who have succeeded this far into their term of enlistment have

a relatively low attrition rate, however, one would not expect overall European attrition to vary considerably with the tour length.

Attrition statistics for the present tour length policy and all investigated reduced tour lengths are presented in table 4-7. The quality characteristics and numbers of personnel projected for the 1982 time frame are used for both, allowing a direct comparison. Note that there is no significant change in the number of soldiers expected to be administratively discharged from Europe caused by changing the tour length.

If the number of soldiers assigned to Europe and Japan immediately following training is increased, the experienced overseas attrition is expected to rise. Table 4-8 compares the expected attrition under the 18-month tour with all additional replacements provided by SEPOS to alternatives assigning 5,000 and 10,000 additional personnel directly from training. The number of first term overseas manyears was held constant for all cases and overall Army first term attrition did not increase.

#### Conclusion

First-term enlisted attrition is highly correlated to four demographic characteristics of the input force -- education, sex, mental category, and age. A partial analysis of European and FORSCOM first-term attrition was conducted with the results indicating that there was no sufficient reason to assume different patterns for CONUS

TABLE 4-7  
COMPARISON OF EUROPE AND JAPAN FIRST-TERM ATTRITION  
FOR PRESENT TOUR POLICY AND REDUCED TOUR LENGTHS

(FY 82 PROJECTION)

	<u>Assigned Directly From Training</u>		<u>SEPOS</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>NUMBER ASSIGNED</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTRITED</u>	<u>NUMBER ASSIGNED</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTRITED</u>	<u>NUMBER ASSIGNED</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTRITED</u>
PRESENT TOUR POLICY	49,800	10,370	9,200	860	59,000	11,230
18-MONTH TOUR	49,800	8,520	29,200	2,760	78,800	11,280
19-MONTH TOUR	49,800	8,680	26,800	2,600	76,600	11,280
21-MONTH TOUR	49,800	9,150	21,100	2,180	70,900	11,330
24-MONTH TOUR	49,800	10,100	12,900	1,270	62,700	11,350
50/50 RULE	49,800	8,810	24,000	2,530	73,800	11,340



Table 4-8

Comparison of Europe and Japan  
First Term Attrition for 18-Month  
Tour with Increased Numbers of  
Soldiers Assigned Overseas  
Directly from Training

	Number Assigned	Number Attrited
18-month tour with 49,800 assigned directly from training	78,800	11,280
18-month tour with 5,000 additional assigned directly from training	78,800	11,760
18-month tour with 10,000 additional assigned directly from training	78,800	12,250

and overseas.

Analysis of the reduced tour lengths considered showed that the number of personnel expected to be attrited from Europe and Japan was insensitive to the length of the tour. The 21-month tour increased attrition the most but this amounted to only an increase of 120 soldiers (approximately one percent higher than the present tour length). The 18-month tour increased expected attrition by 50 soldiers. If an increased number of soldiers are assigned overseas directly from training, as opposed to SEPOS, overseas attrition losses can be expected to rise more sharply. An increase of 5000 soldiers assigned directly from training increases the number of soldiers attrited overseas by approximately 500. Since overall Army attrition remained constant this increase represents soldiers who did not attrit in CONUS.

Increased morale in Europe resulting from a shorter tour could conceivably reduce overseas attrition. The analysis conducted did not attempt to quantify any reduction due to this cause but any reduction is not significant to the decision.

## REENLISTMENT

Under policy that existed through the end of CY 1978, most first-termers who went directly to Europe from the training base ended their term of enlistment in Europe. This will still be true even considering the 1 January 1979 policy change which reduced the tour of duty to two years in Europe for 4-year volunteers without dependents.

In view of comments such as that made by Congressman Beard that "Soldiers in Europe appear more dissatisfied than those surveyed in the Continental United States; concern over the lower quality of life; and concern over the nature of duty in Europe, it has been speculated that soldiers who spent most or all of their first term of duty in Europe were less likely to reenlist than their counterparts who served their first enlistment in CONUS. Despite this speculation there is virtually no difference in command reenlistment accomplishments for first-termers.

Table 4-9  
First-Term Reenlistment Accomplishments

(Achievement as % of Objective)

	FY 77	FY 78	1 Qtr FY 79
USAREUR	89.3	101.7	92.8
CONUS (Less TRADOC)	90.8	101.3	94.8
Army-wide	92.7	102.3	94.8

To broaden the comparison other reenlistment data for first-term soldiers was extracted from the DCSPER 46 Report. TRADOC was excluded from CONUS data because of the impact of the Trainee Discharge Program (TDP) which allows the Army to eliminate soldiers who exhibit unsatisfactory potential for service during initial training. These soldiers, if included in the CONUS figures, would skew the comparison.

Data was collected for only first-term soldiers for FY 77 & 78 and are displayed in Figure 4-14 as the percentage of SM who were eligible for reenlistment and the percentage of the total discharged who did immediately reenlist.

--In both 1977 and 1978, first-term soldiers who were discharged from service in Europe were slightly more likely to be eligible for reenlistment than their counterparts who were discharged from CONUS (60.3% vs 51.8% in FY 1977 and 64.8% vs 61.5% in FY 1978, respectively).

--For the last two years, at least, USAREUR has reenlisted a larger percentage of all first-term SM who were due for discharge. Data for 1st Qtr FY 79 is not yet available.

--In the case of USAREUR and CONUS (less TRADOC) both the percentage of SM eligible to reenlist and the percentage who actually do reenlist are increasing.

Although there is no precise understanding of why a larger percentage of first-termers reenlist in USAREUR than reenlist in CONUS, DA Staff members state that there is considerable pressure at the unit

FIGURE 4-14

FY 77 AND FY 78

RATES OF REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY  
AND


RATES OF REENLISTMENT



USAREUR



CONUS (-TRADOC)



level in Europe to "Reenlist so you can finish your tour" or "Reenlist so you can bring your dependents over."

A disincentive may also exist for CONUS soldiers who are eligible to reenlist. So long as they are "short" they can reliably predict their retention at their current station until their discharge from active duty. Once they reenlist, unless they are otherwise stabilized or reenlist for Combat Arms Unit of Choice, they become vulnerable for world-wide assignment, especially those who have never served an overseas tour. Some "uncommitted" reenlistees are reassigned within a few months following reenlistment to meet world-wide Army requirements. The message that "Reenlistment may equal reassignment" is not lost on those who are undecided or who can not face the uncertainty of an unknown tenure at their current CONUS duty station.

A change in tour length in USAREUR could improve the world-wide reenlistment situation. With an 18-month tour, 3 year enlistees who go overseas from training can complete both a European tour and about a year long tour in CONUS before becoming eligible for discharge. This gives an additional perspective of Army life in a CONUS environment with family and "normal" recreational opportunities and is more likely to increase the number of first-termers who wish to reenlist. The soldier who serves his initial tour in CONUS and who is finishing his enlistment in Europe will also have experienced multiple assignments. These SM should have a broader perspective and a more balanced outlook on conditions of service both in CONUS and in Europe when they make

their reenlistment decisions.

SM who become eligible to reenlist in Europe under a shorter tour length will have more visible reenlistment options. USAREUR SM who now become eligible for reenlistment in mid tour may reenlist for their own vacancy; (in which case they have little voice in determining their assignment or schooling when they return to CONUS); may extend their service to the end of their overseas tour and then reenlist; or may be returned to CONUS and be discharged at ETS. Creating greater coincidence between the "reenlistment window" (currently 180 days prior to ETS) and completion of Foreign Service Tour or a tour in CONUS will give all first-term service members more visible choices in satisfying their own career interests.

However, many soldiers who now spend an entire first-term in CONUS and then reenlist might not do so after being assigned to the European theater for the last part of their initial enlistment. An 18-month tour will expose more people to overseas tours than is currently the case. This might have a deleterious effect on reenlistment; however, Dr. Moskos indicates most soldiers do not object to serving some time in Europe. They object to the amount of time currently required of them.

#### VOLUNTARY EXTENSIONS OVERSEAS

Many first-termers who adjust to the overseas environment extend either for their current duty or for a different job overseas. No data exists as to why an individual extends, but morale, job satisfaction,

and promotion opportunity appear reasonable as major contributors. An 18-month tour gives a choice to all individuals, will not reduce the number of voluntary extensions, and has the potential to increase extensions in the overseas areas. Provisions for voluntary extensions in overseas areas must be continued, and the thrust of personnel management policy should be to make voluntary extensions easier as a means of reducing the impact of increased rotations. Some benefit is derived from the soldier's feeling that he can exercise some control over his future. A soldier who extends voluntarily is more likely to have higher morale than one who is extended involuntarily.

#### Overseas Environment and the First Term<sup>1/</sup>

CINCUSAREUR emphasizes the unique problems a USAREUR soldier faces and the need for a reduced tour length. The supportive reasons for a shorter tour tend to cluster around psychological, environmental, economic, educational, duty-related, and recreational needs of young soldiers. Under each of these headings is an array of details that argue that the tour in Europe is too long for the unaccompanied first-term soldier.

#### Psychological

The psychological needs center on the limited choice available for

<sup>1/</sup>This section has been provided by HQS, USAREUR.



USAREUR soldiers in their selection of almost every life-support activity. Other than limited and austere military facilities, there are few choices available to young soldiers with regard to where they eat, where they bank, or where they find entertainment. This lack of choice highlights the very large differences between a tour in Europe and a tour in CONUS. Before the young soldiers are long in Europe, they begin to feel entrapped by their lack of apparent alternatives. They suffer from peer pressure imposed by the young soldiers around them who have already experienced the same feelings and who have turned to less savory forms of "entertainment" as alternatives to frustration. The absence of familiar lifestyles aggravates the feeling of alienation. If they are black, there are no black-culture outlets to which they can turn. But, no matter what their race, they all experience an inability to be a private person in the barracks or the inability to shed their military identity when they leave the casern. The 17-or 18-year old enlisted person's perception of time is considerably different. To them, a year is an eternity. Young soldiers talk about a tour in USAREUR as if they were discussing a decade. It is that perception that aggravates the other psychological factors and makes life in USAREUR appear unbearable to the young soldier.

#### Environmental

There are also strong environmental arguments for a shorter tour.

Young soldiers in Europe are separated from their family, frequently for the first time in their lives, and their means of immediate communication with loved ones is a foreign telephone system that is expensive and inconvenient for them to use. More often than not, USAREUR soldiers are further isolated by the remote location of their caserns and by the nature of their duties. They are living in renovated pre-World War II German barracks and, because their mobility is severely restricted, they spend most of their time in those quarters. All in all, they are living and working in an alien environment that is not at all supportive of their emotional health. The effect of this environment is further aggravated by lack of familiar American goods and services and the variety of goods and services to which most are accustomed. USAREUR life support facilities are inadequate by CONUS standards, and CINCUSAREUR states that it would take 4 billion dollars to make the living and working environment comparable to CONUS.

#### Economic

The economic view of life in Europe for a young enlisted person is just as depressing and becoming more so all the time. The overall cost of living in Europe, due largely to the devaluation of the dollar, has made buying on the economy prohibitive for the young enlisted soldier. With their pay worth less and less on the economy, the enlisted person is forced to use the AAFES facilities almost exclusively, and there

they are faced with a limited choice of goods. The expense of buying and maintaining a car in Europe and paying the insurance is so high that most young enlisted personnel find it impossible to bear the cost, which cuts down the mobility of the soldier and adds to the "barracks rat syndrome" since reliable mass transportation is frequently not convenient to the post and is expensive. In general, the difficult economic situation in Europe points up yet another inequity in tour length policy when compared to CONUS. What remains can certainly no longer be termed a "desirable" tour.

#### Education

Educational opportunities form a significant feature of today's Army. The Army tries to provide civilian educational opportunities for soldiers on each and every casern, but in most cases the variety of courses available at each of the 168 posts serviced by an education facility is severely limited when compared to many CONUS installations and their surrounding educational institutions. Even the military educational system available to the young USAREUR soldier cannot match that which is available for young soldiers in CONUS. Frequent readiness exercises, training exercises, and trips to major training areas interrupt the educational opportunities that are available because soldiers may be absent repetitively from their home station for 30 to 60 days at a stretch. Many soldiers are deprived of the very educational opportunities that in many cases were a strong motivation

for enlisting in the first place.

### Duty Requirements

Duty requirements in Europe place a generally heavier burden on the soldier in USAREUR than on the soldier in CONUS. In USAREUR, extended field duty is common and appears to be of much longer duration than the average experienced in CONUS. There is a continual drive to obtain and maintain top combat readiness in USAREUR. This drive is ultimately sustained by the junior enlisted personnel who do the work. These factors combine to form a general lack of personal freedom for the young soldier in which it is difficult for him to make and carry through on personal plans.

### Recreation

Many of these problems could be compensated for if an off-duty atmosphere could be provided for young soldiers that gave them their accustomed mode of entertainment. Unfortunately, there is very little off-post entertainment available to them that they find attractive or affordable. They are thus restricted to the entertainment that is provided to them by the military community, which is limited in variety and quality. Television in Europe is limited to one English language station whose programs consist of largely outdated shows. Live programs from home are rare and are often shown late at night or early in the morning due to time differences and technical problems. The

radio is also limited to one station, which must try to please all tastes. Travel in Europe is extremely expensive, and, even when affordable, it is difficult to schedule leave because of frequent readiness exercises and training requirements.

## Section 5

### ARMY IMPACT

#### ROTATION BASE

Disregarding special problems associated with Space Imbalance and Intelligence MOS, the annual requirement for 100.8K replacements in all overseas commands under an 18-month tour for Europe and Japan could be provided from a combination of training base and sustaining base personnel, as shown.

TABLE 5-1 1/  
Annual Replacements to Europe and Japan  
(in thousands)

	Present	18-Month	19-Month	21-Month	24-Month
Total required	59.0	78.8	76.6	70.9	62.7
Fill from AIT	41.3	55.2	53.6	49.6	43.9
Fill from SEPOS	17.7	23.6	23.0	21.3	18.8
Annual Available from SEPOS	55.4	45.8	47.2	49.9	53.7
Retained in Sustaining Base	29.4	13.9	15.9	20 3	26.6


1/Assumes a 70%-30% split between replacements assigned directly from training and those SEPOS. The actual split experienced may differ.

A simplified graphical portrayal of annual first-term replacement flows for an 18-month tour is depicted below:

Figure 5-1

18-Month Tour

ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF ACCESSIONS



Under the assumption of a 70%-30% split, the above illustration presents a fairly accurate representation of the annual distribution of Army accessions.

-- Of the 137.8K accessions who would complete AIT, 68.9K would be assigned directly overseas. The remainder, 68.9K, would be assigned to CONUS.

-- Of the 68.9K assigned to CONUS from AIT, 31.9K would be SEPOS, 11.6K would attrit from the Army prior to their 23d month in service, and 11.5K would be non-deployable for a variety of reasons (non-PGR qualified, stabilized, pending judicial action, etc.).

-- Of the 68.9K initially assigned to CONUS, 13.9K would be available for SEPOS but would be retained in the sustaining base.

The above illustration does not show the return to CONUS of soldiers who complete an 18-month overseas tour (approximately 29.9K from Europe and Japan after attrition).



## SELECT MOS GROUPS

### Introduction

The Space Imbalance MOS (SIMOS) and some of the more specialized Intelligence MOS present perhaps the greatest hurdles to an 18-month tour for first-termers in USAREUR.

### Discussion

The SIMOS have been a problem in the past and will continue to be a problem under any tour length policy. By definition, at least 55 percent of SIMOS authorizations are in overseas commands, resulting in short turnaround times in CONUS. The SIMOS soldier tends to migrate to another MOS upon reenlistment or declines to reenlist, which generally keeps the career content low in those MOS. The Army accesses and trains more soldiers in SIMOS than are required by authorized spaces in order to keep overseas commands at strength. For each SIMOS that is kept overstrength, another MOS must be kept understrength.

The SIMOS program was developed to overcome those problems.

Key elements of the program are:

- Mandatory utilization of SIMOS soldiers in their PMOS when overseas.
- Increase of SIMOS authorized positions in CONUS.
- Utilization of SIMOS soldiers in a secondary MOS while in CONUS, if no vacancy exists for the PMOS. Refresher training in the PMOS is provided before redeployment overseas.

-- Army National Guard or Army Reserve members who hold SIMOS may volunteer for 4-year active duty tours in overseas areas.

-- MTOE and TDA SIMOS authorizations in overseas commands will be reviewed to identify spaces which could be changed to space balanced MOS.

-- An incentive package is being staffed which would encourage SIMOS soldiers to extend their FST.

Authorizations for SIMOS in grades E1-4 in USAREUR comprise approximately 6.6 percent of the total USAREUR E1-4 authorizations. Another 3.9 percent of USAREUR's E1-4 authorizations are for MOS which are space imbalanced at the E1-4 level, but not by total authorization. An 18-month tour will compound the SIMOS problem by reassigning soldiers to CONUS when no requirement exists for their PMOS for longer periods of time and requiring overtraining to provide the larger number of replacements required for USAREUR. A four year enlistee who goes to USAREUR directly after AIT and serves an 18-month tour would have approximately two years left on his enlistment.

Some of the Intelligence MOS problems which would be aggravated by an 18-month tour are also SIMOS. Others are a problem because of long training times, the period of time required for a soldier to become productive, or the geographic area orientation of the MOS. See Appendix F for a detailed discussion of the impact of an 18-month tour on strategic intelligence operations in Europe.

### Summary

The ultimate solution of the SIMOS and Intelligence MOS problem is beyond the scope of the TLTF charter. It appears that the solution lies in either offering sufficient incentives to induce those soldiers to extend their FST, or a form of "Training plus Tour Length" enlistment option, or exemption of these MOS from a shorter tour length. The Army has not found a solution to the SIMOS problem yet, but the 18-month tour should not hinge entirely on this relatively small group of first-termers (approximately 10.6 percent of USAREUR's E1-4 population).

### RECRUITING

Adoption of a reduced tour length for first-term enlistees in Europe and Japan may change the attractiveness of current enlistment options. The facility with which MILPERCEN is able to reassign adequate numbers of replacements from the sustaining base to overseas may also suggest changes to current enlistment options.

Although virtually no current experience exists with the 2-year combat arms enlistment option, it may prove unusually attractive when contrasted with other enlistment options. The two year enlistee for Europe knows that he will serve a maximum of 19-21 months overseas, depending on training time for his MOS. By selecting the date that he enlists, he can also choose when he will be overseas.

Current enlistees who volunteer for 3-year or longer tours of enlistment must deal with considerably more uncertainty. The 3-year volunteer for Europe will spend up to 30+ months and the 4-year volunteer will spend up to 24 months in Europe under current policy. If either elects to serve in CONUS first, he has no means by which to predict (short of volunteering at a later date) when he may be ordered overseas after completion of his initial commitment and how much time he will be required to spend overseas.

A reduction in tour length to 18 months would overcome some of these differences since this would cause the 2-year volunteer in Europe to serve overseas longer than either the 3- or 4-year enlistee. (The 2-year volunteer would have less than 6 months remaining on active duty at the end of his 18-month tour and thus would be involuntarily extended to the end of his enlistment.

By establishing the first-term volunteer's long tour at a reduced but specific number of months, the tour becomes more easily understood and relatively more predictable for all individuals who are involved in the recruitment process - the potential recruit, his family, his peers, and members of US Army Recruiting Command. The question of "How long will I have to stay in Germany?" can be dealt with easily, clearly, and with far more precision than is now the case. Greater numbers of potential first-termers should be attracted to an 18-month tour in Europe or Japan than are now attracted to the 30+ month tour. Further,

a potential enlistee for another option might be more inclined to enlist if he knows that even if he is identified later for an overseas assignment he will be required to serve no more than 18-months overseas.

Under current tour rules and induction of 152K recruits annually, about 39% of all inductees can expect to spend part of a long tour on their first enlistment. (Of those, most will be assigned to Europe immediately following training. The remainder will be assigned overseas after a tour in CONUS.) If the 18 month tour is adopted, about 52% of all enlistees will serve a part of a long tour overseas. It is possible, but not likely, that this increased chance of being assigned to Europe or Japan may have a negative impact on recruitment if that fact becomes known in advance of enlistment.

The task of identifying by MOS the additional 1650 first-term personnel for assignment to Europe and Japan each month will be eased slightly if the Unit of Choice (UOC) option (Table H-18 AR 601-210) is changed to reduce guaranteed stabilization. A change from 16 months stabilization to 12 months would include 2000-2500 additional eligible SM in the reassignment window. DCSPER reenlistment staff members estimate that such a change will have no unfavorable impact on UOC enlistment rates.

On balance, a reduction in tour length for unaccompanied first-term volunteers is expected to have no adverse impact on recruitment. A favorable impact is possible because of the increased attractiveness of a reduced tour.

## RESERVE FORCES

### Introduction

The TLTF assumed that a reduced tour length would have to be accommodated within projections of the current manpower program; thus, additional recruitment is not necessary to support the reduction in tour length. Accordingly, there will be no direct short term impact on the IRR or SRF.

### Discussion

One favorable long-term benefit is possible. If a reduced tour length results in an increase in favorable attitudes toward military service, the reserves could expect a small increase in retention beyond the obligated 6 years of federal service.

A significant but transitory increase in the IRR will result from testing of the 2-year enlistment option. Under a current 3-year enlistment contract, a SM who completes his military obligation will spend 3 years on Active Federal Service, then 3 years in the reserves. The 2-year enlistee will spend 2 years on Active Federal Service and 4 years in the reserves. This additional manyear will accrue starting in 1981 for each SM who completes his two years of active service satisfactorily but who does not reenlist.

If the 2-year enlistee would have been a 3- or 4-year enlistee (had the 2-year option not been available), the increase in Reserve strength will "wash-out" at the end of the 3d or 4th year following enlistment (when these enlistees would have finished their 3 or 4 years on Active Federal Service under other enlistment options).

As the 2-year enlistment option attracts "new" volunteers (who would not have enlisted under either the 3- or 4-year option) to that extent reserve strength will be increased by one reservist who will have a 4-year reserve commitment. Later this year the Rand Corporation is expected to do a survey of 2-year volunteers to determine if they might have enlisted under other enlistment options. Following that project, a more precise estimate of the impact on reserves can be conducted.

Currently, the Army staff estimates that almost none of the 2-year combat arms enlistees would have been 3- or 4-year enlistees. If that estimate is correct, starting in FY 1981, reserve forces can expect an increase of up to 12,500 SM for each year the 2-year enlistment test is in effect until a steady state increase of up to 50,000 additional reservists is reached.

A reduction in enlistment commitment (from 3 or 4 to 2 years) will also result in a small reduction in the average grade level of the Active Army provided promotion policies are not changed. The same is also true for the average grade of Army reservists.

### Summary

Adoption of an 18 month tour length for unaccompanied first-term enlisted personnel will have virtually no impact on the Reserve Forces.

Adoption of the 12,500 2-year enlistment option could result in a steady state increase in Army Reserves of up to 50,000 service members.



### IMPACT ON JET

A reduction in the first-term tour length will reduce the number of service members who are willing to extend to serve a full (accompanied) tour of 36 months in Europe or Japan in accordance with AR 614-30. The greater the difference between the initial service commitment and the service requirement necessary to complete the accompanied tour, the less likely service members will be to see JET as an attractive option.

All married SM (E1, E2, E3, and E4 under 2 year service) on 2-, 3-, or 4-year enlistments who are ordered to Europe are required to execute a tour length option based on whether or not they wish to be accompanied overseas by dependents.

A 2-year enlistee who opts for JET will be required to extend his 20 month Foreign Service Tour (FST) by as much as 16 months as well as his term of service by as much as 17 months (5 months training plus 36 months overseas) to gain entitlement to dependent movement overseas.

The 3-year enlistee who is ordered to Europe from training under current tour length policies must execute a FST extension of about 5 or 6 months (training time plus 36 months overseas) and a similar extension of his term of service. A reduction of the tour length in Europe to 18 months will require a 3-year enlistee to execute a FST extension of 18 months. The requisite extension of his/her term of enlistment would be the same as under current tour length policy (5 or 6 months).

The 4-year married enlistee would be required to extend only his FST (now 24 months) since he will have sufficient time on his enlistment to complete a 36-month overseas tour.

The FST and Term of Service extensions discussed above pertain only to the first-termers who is ordered to USAREUR or Japan directly from training. Those who are selected for assignment overseas at a later date will be required to execute even longer extensions.

A reduction of the FST length will reduce the attractiveness of JET. The shorter the tour, the less attractive first-term enlistees will find JET. Notwithstanding the probability that JET will not attract as many service members as had been estimated during planning for the JET Program, the bulk of JET travel funding must continue to be available since service members who do not opt to take their dependents overseas will still be entitled to move their dependents to a designated point in the United States. They will also be authorized to ship an automobile and increased baggage overseas at government expense.

During the interim from announcement of approval (17 October 1978) to the effective date of the program (1 January 1979), USAREUR received 198 JET applications (36 from AIT, 162 other than AIT). From this application rate, the reduced tour length for 4-year enlistees which came into effect on 1 January 1979 and in anticipation of an 18-month tour for unaccompanied first-term enlistees, USAREUR believes that a steady-state approval rate of 167 per month (to sustain 6,000 JET families in Europe over a 36-month tour) is reasonable .

## SECTION 6

### CONCLUSION

#### FINDINGS

After weighing the quantifiable and non-quantifiable considerations, the TLTF assesses that an 18-month tour has the following advantages and disadvantages:

##### -- Disadvantages

- o Increases PCS travel costs by 5.8 percent (\$33.3 million).
- o Increases annual rotations to Europe and Japan by 19,800 (supportable in steady-state).
- o Increases the Individuals Account by 2.8 percent (2800 spaces).
- o Increases administrative costs by \$1.4 million.
- o Increases quarterly turnover by 1.6 percent in CONUS and 2.5 percent in USAREUR (neutral impact on ability to train).
- o Has a possible negative impact on career force (enlisted and officer).
- o Is inconsistent with DOD policies of 1 PCS assignment for a 3-year enlistee and 95% of overseas first-term assignments from training base.

##### -- Advantages

- o Improves morale in USAREUR (no significant adverse impact on CONUS).
- o Reduces indiscipline in USAREUR (no adverse impact on CONUS).

- o Reduces hard drug use in USAREUR (no comparable increase in CONUS).
- o Increases propensity to reenlist in both CONUS and USAREUR.
- o More equitably shares burden of overseas duty among all first-termers.
- o Responds to problems of volunteer soldiers in Europe and Japan.
- o Enhances overall combat readiness in USAREUR without degrading CONUS readiness.

#### DISCUSSION OF OPTIONS

The TLTF was tasked to determine the feasibility of an 18-month overseas long tour for single unaccompanied first-term soldiers. ASA (M&RA) verbally requested that other tour lengths be examined.

An 18-month tour is feasible in steady-state and can be supported by the Army. Funds to accommodate increased PCS and administrative costs will have to be reprogrammed if the 18-month tour is implemented (FY80) in advance of the regular FY81 budget cycle. Force structure levels or levels of manning will have to be modified (end-strength increases are assumed infeasible) to accommodate the increase in the Individuals Account. The modification should be shared between the sustaining base and overseas areas.

Other tour length options are also feasible. A range of options would include:

<u>Option</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81 or 82</u>
1	No Change	No Change
2	No Change	24-Month
3	No Change	18-Month
4	24-Month	18-Month
5	18-Month	18-Month

From the standpoint solely of PCS cost, turbulence, and the Individuals Account, Option 1 is preferable. For the greatest benefit to overseas commanders and their soldiers, Option 5 is preferable.

While a 24-month tour is feasible, it is probably least preferred by individuals and CONUS commanders. Under a 24-month tour, the major category of personnel assigned overseas (3-year first-termers direct from AIT) would serve 30 months overseas (if initial training time is greater than 6 months) or 24 months overseas and only 6 to 8 months in CONUS before ETS (if initial training time is less than 6 months). This assumes that individuals within 6 months of ETS would continue to be involuntarily extended overseas. The net effect of the 24-month tour is status quo (a 30 month tour) for 3-year first-termers who took a long training course, "short time" in a CONUS unit for 3-year first-termers who took a short training course, and no change for anyone else.

Any tour length between 18 and 24 months is also feasible. As tour length is reduced toward 18 months, costs (PCS, Individuals Account, turbulence) increase and the desirability of the option to individuals and to commanders both overseas and in CONUS (more time in a CONUS unit after overseas service) also increases. Tour lengths in excess of 20 months but short of 24 months become less preferable to individuals and undesirable to overseas and CONUS commanders (too long overseas; too short in CONUS) but lead to lower costs. Possible options range between no change in tour length and implementation of an 18-, 19-, or 20-month tour. Tour lengths overseas would be:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Expected Months Served</u>	
	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Reduced Tour</u>
Married Accompanied Careerists	36	36
Married Unaccompanied Careerists	24	24
Careerists without Dependents	36	36
Married Accompanied First-termers(JET)	36	36
Four-year First-term Personnel	24	18, 19, 20
Three-year First-term Personnel	30	18, 19, 20
Two-year First-term Personnel	20	20

Instead of identical tour lengths for all 3- and 4-year first-termers, a more practical approach to the tour length problem would be to relate tour length to enlistment options. For the 2-year enlistee, a 20-month tour (24 months less training time) is warranted. For the 4-year enlistee, a 24-month tour is practical. In general, 4-year enlistees represent long training times or critical skills, and 24 months overseas allows utilization both overseas and in CONUS without significant adverse impact on morale. For the 3-year enlistee, 18-months overseas is a balance between individual morale and overseas and CONUS unit utilization. Under this tour length option, the following tour rules would exist:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Expected Tour Length</u>
Married Accompanied Careerists	36 Months
Married Unaccompanied Careerists	24 Months
Careerists without Dependents	36 Months
Married Accompanied First-termers(JET)	36 Months
Four-year First-term Personnel	24 Months
Three-year First-term Personnel	18 Months
Two-year First-term Personnel	20 Months

This option:

- is based on a simple, rational, explainable rule
  - o full term of enlistment spent overseas (less training) for 2-year first-termers.
  - o 50 percent of term of enlistment spent overseas for 3- and 4-year first-termers.
- substantially meets desires of overseas commanders.
- substantially obtains benefits of reduced tours for individuals.
- is most efficient and cost-effective in terms of 2- and 4-year enlistees.
- increases flexibility of MILPERCEN to manage.
- maintains DOD comparability by term of enlistment
  - o USAF has 4-year enlistments and 24-month tours
  - o USA has 3-year enlistments; USAF does not
- costs less (PCS, turbulence, Individuals Account)
  - than an 18-, 19-, or 20-month tour for all first-termers.
- represents change for only one category, the 3-year first-termers
  - o 2-year enlistee already has 20-month tour
  - o 4-year enlistee already has 24-month tour

A summary of decision considerations as assessed by the TLTF for various tour length options is contained in the table on the following page.



TABLE 6-1

SUMMARY OF DECISION CONSIDERATIONS							
DECISION CONSIDERATIONS		PRESENT RULES	18-MONTH TOUR	18-MONTH TOUR	21-MONTH TOUR	20/10 RULE	24-MONTH TOUR
MANPOWER	NUMBER OF ACCESSIONS	152K	152K	152K	152K	152K	152K
	INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT MANYEAR CHANGE	0	+2.8K	+2.6K	+2.0K	+2.3K	+ .8K
	ROTATION MOVE CHANGE	0	+39.7K	+37.3K	+29.7K	+34.4K	+13.5K
	REPLACEMENTS TO EUROPE CHANGE	0	+19.8K	+17.6K	+11.9K	+14.9K	+ 3.7K
	RECRUITING ABILITY CHANGE	0	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
COST	ROTATION MOVE CHANGE	0	+ 33.3M	+ 30.6M	+ 22.9M	+ 27.3M	+ 9.2M
	FOR IN-OUT PROCESSING CHANGE	0	+ 1.4M	+ 1.2M	+ .8	+ 1.0M	+ .3M
	TOTAL CHANGE	0	+ 34.7M	+ 31.8M	+ 23.7M	+ 28.3M	+ 9.5M
UNIT EFFECTIVENESS	AVG EUROPEAN TOUR LENGTH SERVED (MONTHS)	22.2	16.6	17.1	18.4	17.7	20.9
	SOLDIERS REASSIGNED TO CONUS WITH LESS THAN 12 MONTHS UNTIL ETS	3.0K	1.0K	1.0K	20.7K	1.0K	12.8K
	SENIORITY OF FORCE	EUROPE	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	MOB MATCH CHANGE	EUROPE	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	QUARTERLY UNIT TURNOVER	EUROPE	10%	+2.7%	+2.4%	+1.6%	+2.0%
		CONUS	14%	+1.6%	+1.4%	+1.0%	+1.2%
	TRAINING READINESS	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	+
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	TURBULENCE IMPACT	EUROPE	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	—	—	—	NC
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS	CRIME RATE	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	DRUG USAGE	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	ATTRITION	EUROPE	NA	+	+	NC	NC
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
	MORALE	EUROPE	NA	+	+	+	+
		CONUS	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC
ARMY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT	REPLACEMENT QUALITY	NA	+	+	+	+	NC
	ABILITY TO PROVIDE REQUIRED REPLACEMENTS	NA	—	—	—	—	NC
	SPACE IMBALANCED MOB AND THOSE HAVING LONG TRAINING	NA	—	—	—	—	NC
	JUNIOR ENLISTED TRAVEL (JET)	NA	REDUCE	REDUCE	REDUCE	REDUCE	NC
	INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVES (IRR)	NA	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC

NA = NOT APPLICABLE

NC = NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE

+ = IMPROVEMENT POSSIBLE BUT SIZE UNKNOWN

— = WORSEMENT POSSIBLE BUT SIZE UNKNOWN

## CONCLUSION

Times and circumstances have changed dramatically over the past decade. The economic and social conditions which prevailed when Europe was categorized as "Desirable" (long tour) and Korea as "Undesirable" (short tour) no longer pertain. Life for many soldiers in Europe is grim, and three years to a teenage soldier separated from wife/girl friend and family seem like eternity.

An 18-month tour will cost \$33,300,000 in PCS costs; quarterly turnover will increase 1.6% in FORSCOM and 2.5% in USAREUR; the Individuals Account will increase by 2800 spaces; and MILPERCEN's problems will become more difficult. The tradeoffs are believed to be higher morale in Europe, more equitable sharing among first-termers of undesirable overseas assignments, slightly less attrition, fewer drug problems, less indiscipline, increased reenlistment interest, and improved combat readiness for USAREUR.

All the traditional issues and almost every indicator which can be quantified argue against a shortened tour length in Europe. In fact, a statistical argument could be developed to show that it would be more cost effective to increase overseas tour lengths to six years. From a monetary point of view, PCS savings alone could justify doubling current tour lengths.

Currently, reenlistment rates in USAREUR are good, indiscipline rates compare favorably with other MACOM, attrition rates are high but not out of line with Army loss rates, and combat readiness indicators are satisfactory.

If a case is to be made for an 18-month tour, it must be made in "human" terms--all of which are impossible to quantify and assign dollar values. The voice of the soldier must be heard as well as cost effectiveness arguments. Clearly a reduced tour length will improve morale. But how much will improved morale:

- reduce attrition?
- increase reenlistment intent?
- facilitate recruiting?
- encourage extensions?
- improve discipline?
- decrease drug usage?
- enhance combat readiness?

The issues supporting a reduced tour are very subtle--but very real. How long will young men and women continue to volunteer for the Army once they clearly understand that they are likely to be sent to Europe on a 36-month tour?

The Army has more married first-termers than it has had in any period in recent times. How many married men and women would volunteer for the Army if they understood beforehand the emotional pressures of trying to maintain a new marriage through a 24-month separation--or maintain a marriage in poverty and cultural alienation for 36-months in Europe? During the last two wars, when the Army was manned by the draft, soldiers were separated from their wives for only one year. What

is the rationale that dictates a volunteer soldier should be separated for two years?

The TLTF does not have the answers to these questions. Any attempts to put a cost estimate on higher morale would be too contentious and weaken credibility. Experienced and professional judgment must evaluate the cost of a shorter tour in association with the human considerations and the commitment of the Army leadership to soldiers and their quality of life.

US Commanders in Europe are without equivocation and ambiguity when they make this judgment. In August 1978, CINCEUR stated that "absent an effective solution to this problem, we can expect an increasing erosion in our efforts to improve combat readiness in USAREUR." CINCEUR represents the beliefs of most US Commanders in Europe when he concludes that:

A reduction in the first-term unaccompanied soldier's tour of duty in Germany to 18 months, with provisions for voluntary extension on an individual basis, is the single most effective step we can take to effect an immediate increase in the morale and combat readiness of this command.

An 18-month tour for single/unaccompanied first-term soldiers in USAREUR will not be a cure-all for the many problems associated with young soldiers in Europe. However, commanders in Europe today have practical limits on what they can realistically be expected to do in coping with problems of cultural alienation, boredom, poverty, and homesickness. This is not USAREUR's problem; this is the Army's problem.

APPENDIX A

TOUR LENGTH TASK FORCE (TLTF)

LETTER OF ESTABLISHMENT

December 1978

MEMBERS

BG John D. Granger, Director

LTC Nelson V. Wood, Executive

LTC Patricia A. McCord, Personnel Management Specialist

LTC Benjamin L. Willis, FORSCOM Representative

MAJ Alexander J. Fox, ORSA Specialist

MAJ Harry J. Thie, USAREUR Representative

SFC Lloyd M. Thorpe, Personnel Management Specialist

SP4 Karen Paxson, Clerical Support

PVT Debbie Sharpe, Clerical Support



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL AND THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

HQDA Ltr 10-78-9

DAPE-MPE-DR (M) (28 November 1978)

4 December 1978

Expires 1 July 1979

SUBJECT: Tour Length Task Force (TLTF)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. PURPOSE: This letter establishes the Tour Length Task Force which will develop a recommended Army position concerning an 18 month overseas tour for all first term enlisted personnel who serve in a long tour area and who do not have command sponsored dependents accompanying them.

2. REFERENCE:

a. DOD Directive 1315.7, Military Personnel Assignments dated 6 December 1977.

b. AR 614-30, Overseas Service, dated 15 June 1978.

3. BACKGROUND:

a. CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR have requested that the tour length for first term enlisted personnel in Europe be reduced to 18 months. On 11 October 1978, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs requested that an analysis be undertaken to determine the implications of changing the tour length in Europe.

b. Personnel turbulence, stabilization, troop morale, end strengths, training loads, PCS costs and readiness (overall and within mission/functional areas) are some factors that are affected by tour length changes. Every MACOM and most agencies concerned with the effectiveness of Army programs/systems experience an impact when there is a change to an overseas tour length.

4. MISSION: The TLTF will determine the full impact of a tour reduction to 18 months for Europe and all other overseas areas where the prescribed tour length (para 2, above) exceeds 18 months for first term enlisted soldiers who are not accompanied (command sponsored) by dependents.

5. COMPOSITION AND DURATION:

a. The TLTF will convene not later than 4 December 1978. Requirements for full-time and part-time composition of the TLTF are provided at Inclosure 1. The extent of the part-time participation will vary by organization and will depend on the degree/complicity of the impact on that organization.

b. Estimated duration of the TLTF will be 90 days.

6. DIRECTION AND CONTROL: The Task Force Director will--

a. Report directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

b. Comply with the study milestones and timetable at Inclosure 2.

7. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. DCSPER will:

(1) Approve the selection of full-time members of the TLTF.

(2) Have overall responsibility for the project and will provide guidance, as required, to the Task Force.

(3) Review and forward to OCSA the TLTF report of findings and recommendations.

b. The ARSTAFF, FOA's and MACOM's will:

(1) Furnish membership in accordance with the requirements at Inclosure 1. The names of the representatives will be provided to the TLTF when called for by the Director.

(2) As appropriate, determine the impact on the mission and skills (MOS) for which they have proponentcy or a vested interest. For example, INSCOM should evaluate and be prepared to advise the TLTF on the impact the reduced tour would have on intelligence missions and personnel.

c. Other staff agencies will participate as requested by the Task Force Director.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT:


a. Funds for travel, per diem and overtime will be provided by the parent organization of the study group member. Other costs incident to and in support of this effort will be provided by ODCSPER.

SUBJECT: Tour Length Task Force (TLTF)

b. MILPERCEN will provide office space and office equipment.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

2 Incl  
as

  
J. C. PENNINGTON  
Brigadier General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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US ARMY JAPAN  
US ARMY RECRUITING COMMAND

INFO:  
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### TOUR LENGTH TASK FORCE COMPOSITION

Army Commands/Staff Agencies listed below will provide, as a minimum, the personnel designated, with the skills/background indicated, to form the nucleus of the Task Force. Part-time members will be at the call of the Director. Other individuals with needed skills/backgrounds that have yet to be identified, may be requested, as required, by the Director.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1. Full-time Members			
Director	General Officer (07-08)	1	To be nominated
Command** Representative	04/05	1	USAREUR
Command** Representative	04/05	1	FORSCOM
ORSA Specialists	03/04/05 or civilian equivalent	1	DCSPER
Computer Programmer	03/04/05 or civilian equivalent	2	USAMSSA
Personnel Managers*	03/04/05 or civilian equivalent	2	DCSPER/MILPERCEN
Personnel Manager*	E6/E7/E8 or civilian equivalent	1	MILPERCEN
Administrative	E3/E4/E5 or civilian equivalent	2	HQDA/MILPERCEN
2. Part-time Members			
Command Representatives	(03/04/05) or civilian equivalent	1	Each MACOM on Distribution List (or as required by TLTF Director)

ARSTAFF

Representatives

(04-05)

1

Each ARSTAFF (or as  
required by TLTF  
Director)

\*Must be knowledgeable in areas of tour lengths, attrition, year group management, tour sequencing, distribution, initial training course lengths, SIMOS, etc.

\*\*Command representatives will be full time members of the Task Force, but will be called to Washington, D.C. only on an as required basis.

## MILESTONES AND ANALYSIS OUTLINE

1. Problem Statement: To determine the effects and implications of a tour reduction to 18 months for overseas areas where the prescribed tour length exceeds 18 months for first term soldiers who are not accompanied (command sponsored) by dependents.

2. Study Milestones and Timetable:

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE DURATION</u>
Organize for the task and prepare a Study Plan (refine problem statement, essential elements of analysis and timetable)	10 days
IPR, Study Plan approval	1 day
Design a Simulation Model (flow diagram)	19 days
Prepare a computer program and collect data	20 days
Conduct computer runs	10 days
Evaluate outputs and determine costs	10 days
Analyze tradeoffs/sensitivities and conduct out-of-model assessments	10 days
Prepare and submit report (conclusions and recommendations)	<u>10 days</u>
Estimate total duration	90 days

3. Other Parameters and Guides:

a. Analysis of costs and benefits must be objective and evenhanded, examining the impacts on all MACOM's and agencies.

b. The study must be directed toward steady state conditions.

c. Initial assumptions:

(1) Junior Enlisted Travel--Overseas policy has been implemented.

(2) The two-year enlistment option has been implemented.

(3) All soldiers who have no dependents and who are serving on a four-year enlistment are serving a 24 month tour in Europe.

Inclosure 2

d. Desired outputs include:

- (1) Strength of personnel by term of enlistment, total and by tour area.
- (2) Personnel gains by term of enlistment, Army-wide and by tour area (accessions, reassignments, reenlistments).
- (3) Personnel losses by term of enlistment, Army-wide and by tour area (attrition, ETS, reenlistment, reassignment), with particular attention to retention of personnel in Europe.
- (4) Average months of service of personnel by term of enlistment, Army-wide and by tour area.
- (5) Average tenure in tour area by term of enlistment and months of service.
- (6) Tour lengths for personnel by term of enlistment, by tour area.
- (7) Average number of trainees and transients by term of enlistment, Army-wide and by tour area.
- (8) Life-cycle costs, total and cost element. Independent appraisal of costs.
- (9) Personnel readiness assessment (strength, specialties, grade), Army-wide and by tour area.
- (10) Training base requirements.
- (11) Assessment of change of discipline indicators by tour area, with particular attention to Europe.
- (12) Tour sequencing requirements and resulting impacts on turbulence and readiness.

4. Study Reporting: Study reports (DD Forms 1498 and final study document) will be submitted in accordance with paragraph 3-6, AR 5-5.

## Appendix B

### MODEL DESCRIPTION

1. OVERVIEW: The evaluation of tour length changes for soldiers on their first enlistment assigned to Europe or Japan is a complex task. Soldiers assigned overseas with a specified tour length are likely to serve less than this time due to attrition. Soldiers that the Army plans to assign overseas after training may not be available for movement due to attrition during training personal considerations, or previously unforeseen Army requirements. Enlistment commitments restrict the Army's ability to initially assign a soldier to Europe or reassign a soldier overseas from duty in CONUS. Factors such as marital status, involuntary extensions, varying costs and contributions to the Individuals Account for different types of moves, and time remaining until ETS for returnees from overseas further complicate the impact on tour lengths.

A computer model was used to assist the TLTF evaluate tour length options since it allows substantially more detail, accuracy, and insight than manual analysis. The model is conceptually simple, deterministic, and limited in application to soldiers on their first enlistment.

The model simulates the steady state flow of personnel from their accession, through training, assignment to not more than two duty assignments, to the decision to reenlist or be discharged. Attrition is accounted for throughout the period of enlistment and is determined

by the demographic characteristics of the force (education, sex, and mental category). Two-, three-, and four-year enlistees are treated separately due to different demographic characteristics, possible tour sequencings, marriage rates and reenlistment rates. The model records moves, costs, contributions to the Individuals Account, manyears in structure spaces both in Europe and other than Europe base, and contribution to the career force. Manyears realized for both SEPOS soldiers and those assigned directly from training are calculated as well as time in service, time in command, and time until ETS probability distributions. Moves are broken out by type--accession, rotation, and separation.

Factors such as morale, adequacy of training, etc. cannot be accurately quantified and are therefore not simulated.

Each of the options considered by the TLTF, as well as the tour length rules applying to 1978, were used for exercising the model. The 1978 rules were modeled for validation and projection purposes since these rules are the most recent ones for which data have been collected. Model predictions were compared to available actual data with good overall agreement.


2. DESCRIPTION: A basic assumption of the model is that the number and types of assignments a first-term service enlistee may have is limited and definable. All first-term non-prior service enlistees are assumed to initially pass through the training base with those

successfully completing training being assigned to one of two geographical locations for duty--Europe or Other than Europe. Some portion of these soldiers will have a second duty assignment prior to expiration of their enlistment contract with the remainder having only one. Attrition, the unprogramed loss of soldiers prior to expiration of their enlistment contract, may occur any time during the term of enlistment. Assignments below the level of Europe or Other than Europe are not treated by the model and the resulting turbulence caused by this must be externally evaluated.

Figure B-1 represents the tour sequencing permitted for first term soldiers within the model. The large rectangular block on the left labeled "Training Base" represents the initial active duty training undergone by soldiers entering the Army. This block is divided into three major sections. The top section which includes cells At, Bt, Ct, and Dt, represents soldiers with a 4-year obligation. The middle section that includes cells Et, Ft, Gt, and Ht, represents those with 3-year obligations. In a similar manner the bottom section, consisting of cells It and Jt, represents 2-year enlistees.

Each of the major sections within the Training Base rectangle is subdivided into cells whose population follows a unique tour sequencing pattern through their first enlistment. For example: (1) Members of cell At are scheduled for assignment to Europe during the remainder of their first enlistment. Duty in Europe is represented by the upper right rectangular block. (2) Members of cell Bt are assigned to Other-than-Europe after training, represented by the lower right

Figure B-1  
TOUR SEQUENCING OF FIRST TERM ENLISTEES





rectangular block, and are not further reassigned during their first enlistment. (3) Cells Ct and Dt represent populations experiencing two duty assignments following training. Members of cell Ct are scheduled for initial Other-than-Europe duty with subsequent SEPOS to Europe. Soldiers in cell Dt are initially assigned to Europe with a subsequent return for duty in Other-than-Europe.

Three-year enlistees passing through the Training Base are able to experience the same tour sequencing possibilities as the 4-year obligor. The assignments given these soldiers are represented by the lines from cells Et, Ft, Gt, and Ht and correspond to the sequencing of cells At, Bt, Ct, and Dt respectively.

Two-year enlistees, due to the short time they are available to the Army for duty, are allowed only two possibilities. Those from cell It are assigned to Europe and not further reassigned while those from cell Jt are assigned exclusively to Other-than-Europe.

Since the functioning of the model for soldiers initially assigned to any cell within the Training Base is similar, only one will be described in detail. For example purposes, consider the soldiers assigned initially to cell Gt -- 3-year enlistees who are assigned to Other-than-Europe when they complete the Training Base and who are subsequently SEPOS to Europe.

The input to cell Gt, represented by ga soldiers, is the number of new arrivals for training who are 3-year enlistees with the specified tour sequencing. These soldiers may either successfully complete training or be administratively discharged under the Training Discharge

Program (TDP) or other elimination procedures. Those who do not successfully complete training leave the Army and are represented by gb. The training successes, gc, move to their Other-than-Europe assignment at G O/E. During this assignment the soldiers will either succeed or be administratively discharged. Those that succeed are SEPOS to Europe (ge) where they also have an opportunity to attrit. Attrition from Europe is represented by gf. Those soldiers who are not administratively discharged from Europe gg, reach the end of their enlistment obligation in Europe. At this time they choose to either reenlist (gr) or be discharged (ge). Regardless of their choice, however, they leave the model at this point since the model considers only those manyears contributed during the first enlistment.

The number of soldiers attrited, manyears contributed to structure spaces in Europe and Other-than-Europe, manyears in individuals accounts, number of moves, and other statistics on soldiers of type G are computed using a survivability curve reflecting the demographic characteristics (i.e., education, sex, mental category) of soldiers in the cell. This survivability curve is based on historical data and projected to the 1982 time frame. Figure B-2 represents the calculation procedure for soldiers falling into cell G.

The number of soldiers entering training ga is located on the y axis while the attrition from training, a time extending from entry to time TTR is shown as gb. The total number of manyears spent in training, Gt, is the area under the survivability curve between entry

Time in Service (months)

88 x (SUTAVINS)P

and TTR less the cross-hatched area at the top. This cross-hatched area represents many years in the individuals account for the processing and movement of training failures. Those successfully completing training, gc, are then sent to their Other-than-Europe duty station where they stay until the time they are SEPOS to Europe (TSEPOS). The many years in Individuals Accounts reflecting the move from training is the cross-hatched area at TTR. The number attrited at the Other-than-Europe duty station, gd, is shown on the diagram. The area under the survivability curve between TTR and TSEPOS (GO/E), less the cross-hatched portion at the top similarly represents time in the individuals account for personnel administratively discharged and the vertical cross-hatched bar at TSEPOS, the Individuals Account contribution of Other-than-Europe successes who are transferred to Europe. Upon the arrival of the ge successes in Europe, the same procedure is used to identify the gf losses during European duty, the GE many years contributed to structure spaces, the contribution of failures to the Individuals Account, and the gg personnel who reach ETS. Voluntary extensions to a European tour by individuals are permitted and accounted for in the model. Applying the reenlistment rate of survivors to gg, the number of soldiers who reenlist, gr, is determined and Individuals Account contributions for both those who reenlist and those who ETS are calculated.

The model uses a similar procedure for each input cell and survivability curves are tailored to each cell as dictated by the

demographic composition of the soldiers (e.g., the survivability for FY79 two-year enlistees (FT2) will be greater than 3-year enlistees since all FT2's have high school diplomas and are in the upper 50th percentile mentally). The sum of all cells combined reflects the overall effect of a specific tour length option. Table B-1 lists the input variables required for exercising the model while Table B-2 lists model outputs. Inclosure 1 is this Appendix lists the values assigned to input variables held constant across the options.

3. CASE SETUP: The ability of the model to produce credible results is, of course, dependent on the ability to provide accurate input data. Certain data, such as survivability, cost, contributions to Individuals Accounts, reenlistment rates, marriage rates, time in service at SEPOS, and planned tour length are fairly easily and reliably defined. Others, primarily those needed to identify the number of soldiers falling into each of the ten cells, are more difficult.

Recognizing that the existing tour length policy (as well as any proposed change) allows many variations of actual realized individual tour durations, a set of diagrams similar to that of Figure B-3 was developed for both the present policy and all examined variations. Each set was made up of a diagram representing the 4-year enlistee assigned to Europe immediately after training, one for the 4-year enlistee SEPOS to Europe, one for the 3-year enlistee assigned to

## Table B-1


### Input Required for Model Execution

- Number of accessions for each of the ten Training Base calls.
- Survivability curves for soldiers in each cell during their term of enlistment.
- Duration of Initial Active Duty Training.
- Manyears contributed to the Individual's Account for soldiers:
  - Administratively separated from training.
  - Administratively separated from European duty.
  - Administratively separated from CONUS duty.
  - Moved from training to Europe.
  - Moved from training to CONUS.
  - Moved from CONUS duty to European duty.
  - Moved from European duty to CONUS duty.
  - Moved from Europe to CONUS for ETS discharge.
  - Discharged from CONUS at ETS.
- Reenlistment rates for two, three, and four year soldiers.
- Percentage of soldiers who reenlist for present location.
- Cost of moving a soldier:
  - To training.
  - From CONUS to Europe for duty (accompanied and unaccompanied).
  - From Europe to CONUS for duty (accompanied and unaccompanied).
  - From training for discharge.
  - From Europe for discharge (accompanied and unaccompanied)
  - From CONUS duty for discharge (accompanied and unaccompanied).
  - From CONUS to CONUS (accompanied and unaccompanied).
- Percentage of two, three, and four year soldiers married.
- Probability of soldiers assigned to Europe voluntarily extending tours.
- Planned European tour lengths for option being considered.
- Length of CONUS duty assignments prior to SEPOS for different terms of enlistment.

Table B-2  
Model Output for Each Cell and Aggregate

- Moves
  - Total
  - Accession
  - Rotation
  - Separation
- Manyears
  - Training
  - Europe
  - Other than Europe
  - Individuals Account
    - Total
    - Training failure
    - European failure
    - Other than Europe failure
    - Training success
    - European success
    - Other than Europe success
- Attrition (number and percent):
  - Total
  - European duty
  - Other than European duty
- Movement Cost
- Soldiers Reenlisting
- Soldiers Reenlisting for present location
- Number of replacements to:
  - Europe
  - Other than Europe
- Time in service probability distribution for soldiers assigned to:
  - Europe
  - Other than Europe
- Time in Command probability distribution for soldiers assigned to:
  - Europe
  - Other than Europe
- Time until ZTS probability distribution for soldiers at last duty assignment.

## Decision Tree for Determining





Europe directly after training, and one for the 3-year enlistee SEPOS to Europe. Those options including 2-year enlistees also included a diagram for those soldiers assigned to Europe.

The purpose of the diagrams was to more precisely define the reasons for tour length variations by identifying personnel affected by such factors as voluntary extensions, involuntary extensions due to closeness of DEROS and ETS, ETS prior to desired tour length, "all others" tours for married personnel, and JET. Establishing probabilities for soldiers following each of the feasible paths for his/her enlistment option and timing of the assignment to Europe, coupled with the number of soldiers involved for each diagram, allowed the calculation of the input quantities aa through ja (Figure B-1).

Since data have not historically been collected for all of the values required for the diagrams, subjective estimates for some of the probabilities were required. These estimates were made by personnel from MILPERCEN, 1st PERSCOM in Europe, and members of the Task Force.

Inclosure 1 to

Appendix B

Model Input Values Held Constant  
Across Options

- Duration of Initial Active Duty Training.	4 Months
- Manyears contributed to the Individual's Account for soldiers:	
- Administratively separated from training.	.0717 Month
- Administratively separated from European duty.	.373 Month **
- Administratively separated from CONUS duty.	.0717 Month
- Moved from training to Europe.	.579 Month
- Moved from training to CONUS.	.389 Month
- Moved from CONUS duty to European duty.	.873 Month
- Moved from European duty to CONUS duty.	.829 Month
- Moved from Europe to CONUS for ETS discharge.	.373 Month **
- Discharge from CONUS at ETS.	.0717 Month
- Reenlistment rates for two, three, and four year soldiers.*	.15,.165,.281
- Percentage of soldiers who reenlist for present location.	.485
- Cost of moving a soldier:	
- To training.	\$35
- From CONUS to Europe for duty (accompanied and unaccompanied).	\$1879,\$589
- From Europe to CONUS for duty (accompanied and unaccompanied).	\$2214,\$779
- From training for discharge.	\$35
- From Europe for discharge. (accompanied and unaccompanied).	\$2064,\$668
- From CONUS duty for discharge. (accompanied and unaccompanied).	\$309,\$309
- From training to CONUS (accompanied and unaccompanied).	\$200,\$200
- Percentage of three, and four year soldiers married.	.19,.28

\*Rate for survivors at ETS, Not eligible survivors.

\*\* Man-month factors used in calculating the individuals account were computed using a weighted average of data reported in the DCSPER-440 Report (Part II) for the months of December 1977 through November 1978.

APPENDIX C

US ARMY EUROPE INPUT

General George S. Blanchard Letter

(Origin: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel)

General George S. Blanchard Letter

(Origin: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management)

General George S. Blanchard Letter

(Origin: 1st Personnel Command)



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY**  
**THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF**  
**APO NEW YORK 09463**

AEAGA-MM

19 January 1979

Brigadier General John D. Granger  
Director, Tour Length Task Force  
Washington, DC 22314

Dear General Granger:

The purpose of this letter is to present my rationale for seeking a reduced tour length for first term, unaccompanied soldiers in USAREUR. Since you have General Haig's 7 November 1978 message on this subject, I know that you are aware of our general position. I wish to amplify on that message, however, in order to ensure that your task force has a complete understanding of my reasons for seeking a reduced tour.

I consider 18 months to be the optimum tour length for the first term, unaccompanied soldier. While I am aware that no first term soldier now serves a full 36 months in USAREUR, I know that these soldiers are still serving more than 18 months on the average. I believe that reducing the tour for these personnel to a maximum of 20 months, on the average, will pay great dividends in terms of morale and the command's readiness. I also realize that reducing the tour length for my soldiers may have far reaching effects on the rest of the Army, and I recognize that you must assess all the potential impacts. As you make that assessment, I believe it would be helpful if you would give priority consideration to two principles.

The first principle is that life in Europe is different for our soldiers than it is for their CONUS counterparts. The USAREUR soldier faces unique problems with regard to mixing in the surrounding culture, which is a particularly troublesome problem for our minority soldiers in terms of socializing; with regard to the cost of recreation in the local economy, particularly in view of dollar-deutsch mark devaluation; with regard to a very dangerous drug environment; and with regard to unsatisfactory living and working facilities. Our soldiers must confront the resulting lack of comparability with their CONUS counterparts--or even with their USAFE counterparts, who already serve only a two year tour on a modern, fixed USAFE installation--for their entire tour. They are reminded of the disparities every day.

AEAGA-MM

19 January 1979

Brigadier General John D. Granger

It would take 4 billion dollars right now to provide our soldier with a quality of life that is comparable to what is available in CONUS, and even then we would not be able to attack those cultural problems that I have mentioned. The only way to achieve comparability in the near term, therefore, is to reduce the first term unaccompanied soldier's exposure to these personal hardships and the dangerous drug environment to the minimum that the Army can afford. This comparability that I seek through a tour reduction is only for the inexperienced first term soldier. Once a soldier reenlists, I believe that he or she does so with the full acceptance of the hardships that may accompany duty overseas.

The second principle is that we must obtain comparability for all USAREUR first term, unaccompanied soldiers, regardless of grade, MOS, duty position, or unit of assignment. We must shorten the tour across the board so that all soldiers in this category share in the benefits equally. If we cannot do so--as may be the case with soldiers in space imbalanced MOS, for example--then we must provide some appropriate compensation in the form of increased leave benefits or a guaranteed more desirable follow-on assignment in a secondary MOS.

Not long ago, the leadership of the Army rejected the formation of labor unions for soldiers. We maintained at that time that unions were not needed because commanders look to the soldiers' interests. In effect, the Army undertook the role of assuring that our soldiers are afforded reasonable conditions of employment, and our soldiers expect no less of the Army leadership. I am representing my soldiers when I state that the only way to achieve equity for USAREUR's first term, unaccompanied enlistees is to reduce their tour.

The principles that I have enunciated in this letter are based on my observations during my six years of command in USAREUR, and are intended to provide you with my basic philosophy on tour reduction. More detailed assistance is forthcoming in the responses that we are preparing to the questions posed in your 3 January letter, and I will see that you receive specific answers to any further questions that you may have.


AEAGA-MM

19 January 1979

SUBJECT: Brigadier General John D. Granger

I look forward to talking with you during my visit to Washington next week.

Sincerely,

  
GEORGE S. BLANCHARD  
General, USA  
Commander in Chief



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY**  
**THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF**  
**APO NEW YORK 09463**

AEAGF-R

19 January 1979

Brigadier General John D. Granger  
Director, Tour Length Task Force  
Washington, DC 22314

Dear General Granger:

One month ago, I requested that the USAREUR staff perform a cost effectiveness analysis to determine the optimal tour length for first term enlisted personnel. The results of the analysis (inclosed) should assist you in your tour length study effort.

Three tour length options were evaluated; 36, 24, and 18 months. We also considered reducing a percentage of tours for soldiers based on enlistment option, grade, MOS, duty, and area of assignment. We concluded that no "percentage" alternative is acceptable; i.e., any tour length reduction must be shared equally by all bachelor first term enlistees.

You should be aware of certain key assumptions of the analysis. We assumed a steady state condition, as you have done; however, we do not know the final impact that JET, the 2-year enlistment option, or the 24-month tour for 4-year enlistees will have upon personnel turnover, tour completion, or unprogrammed losses. If I knew these answers, I would be in a better position to assess the impact of an incremental change in tour length policy. Current rates, therefore, were used for reenlistments, extensions, and unprogrammed losses.

Given these assumptions, the findings of the cost-effectiveness analysis support the conclusion that an 18-month tour is optimal. Adoption of this tour length should not impact on USAREUR's personnel readiness, if DA can provide us with enough E-4's and E-5's. Space imbalanced MOS would be a problem unless incentives could be provided to induce soldiers in these MOS to extend. Morale, discipline, attitude, and personal readiness should improve. Training readiness would be adversely affected only to the extent that turbulence would increase, assuming HQDA could provide a sufficient number of personnel to meet anticipated junior leadership shortfalls and adjust the AIT/SEPOS mix to maintain

AEAGF-R  
Brigadier General John D. Granger

19 January 1979

our current experience levels. Additional Army resources may be required to implement an 18-month tour. If so, early action should be taken to include these requirements in the Army Program Objective Memorandum.

I believe the 18-month tour is a feasible, affordable, and cost-effective solution to USAREUR's first term tour length problem. I am looking forward to talking with you further about this next week.

Sincerely,

  
GEORGE S. BLANCHARD  
General, USA  
Commander in Chief

1 Incl  
as





**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY**  
**THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF**  
**APO NEW YORK 09463**

AEUPE-MZC-OP

19 January 1979

Brigadier General John D. Granger  
Director, Tour Length Task Force  
Hoffman Building, Room 7N31  
Alexandria, VA 22331

Dear General Granger:

I have reviewed the list of questions that you furnished General Joyce and I want to personally respond to a number of them. Generally, I will restrict myself to your first 12 questions and will ask General Joyce to furnish you the statistical data requested in the remaining questions under separate cover.

1. We estimate an additional 800 rotational moves monthly to support an 18 month tour. Calculations which support this estimate and our estimates of the cost of these increased moves will be provided by separate letter.
2. I am opposed to offsetting the tour length reduction by reducing operating strengths of USAREUR units. I believe that any impacts which involve the Individual's Account for operating strength Army-wide should be absorbed by HQDA; however, if I were confronted with an absolute choice, I feel so strongly that tour length needs to be reduced that I would be willing to accept a decrease in structure if this were indeed the only way it could be done. I am not prepared to state at this time what my recommendations would be if I were faced with that choice.
3. Space Imbalanced MOS are a problem overseas now and will continue to be, probably regardless of tour length. I acknowledge that shorter tours in general would tend to exacerbate this problem unless the Army were able to produce some innovative solutions to this problem which have not been forthcoming as yet. Given our current experience on actual tour length, I am not certain that shorter tours would produce a serious degradation of readiness which, of course, I could not tolerate. The problem of space imbalanced MOS must be recognized when considering reduced tour length, but I think it needs to be solved apart from the tour length study itself. Your tour rotation model, replicated for SIMOS,

AEUPE-MZC-OP

19 January 1979

Brigadier General John D. Granger

may help in analyzing the effect of shorter tours on these MOS. I think we must advance some new solutions, e.g., incentives or training plus tour length enlistment options, to this old problem apart from tour length consideration itself.

4. I expect to be able to man other than SIMOS PRP positions, but I foresee increased costs of security clearances and disqualifications as people are moved more quickly through these positions. Also, retraining, reclassification, and reassignment of those disqualified is more difficult with shorter tours. I believe we can overcome any problems in this area by changing USAREUR policies (such as our MP rotation plan) or seeking change to DA policies, if needed, after experience with shorter tours is gained. The entire PRP program is in process of change, and our ability to support the new program will have to be evaluated when implemented.

5. Increased rotations certainly have an impact on crew/team experience and proficiency; however, at this point I cannot determine how significant that impact will be. An important point is that no team stays together 18 months even now. With the annual training cycle currently followed in USAREUR, each soldier would participate in at least one complete iteration of training and evaluation in both the collective and individual areas during an 18 month tour. As we achieve the goal of sustainment training, a three month decrease in tour length will have even less of a decrease in readiness than might be expected under the current annual schedule.

6. I do not perceive that a significant increase in either MOS mismatch or grade imbalance will necessarily follow as tours are shortened. The fact that more assignments mean more opportunities for both of these conditions to occur should be counter-balanced by the fact that remedial action will be facilitated by faster turnover.

7. I would consider the 15 to 16 month first term average tour length for SEPOS to be acceptable. I make this judgment with the understanding that we receive substantial numbers of such people now and would continue to receive equivalent numbers in the future. If the distribution of first termers with stabilization options should result in USAREUR receiving higher proportions of SEPOS soldiers in the future, the added turbulence could well be offset by the fact that we would at the same time be receiving more experienced soldiers.

8-9. I would expect all indicators to improve for USAREUR rates of crimes of violence, crimes against property, marijuana use, other drug use, confinement, AWOL, desertion, but I cannot project the expected magnitude of change. My staff is assessing this issue, and I will furnish any better estimates that we may make. My staff will respond in greater detail to specifics of both your questions, eight and nine, under separate cover.

AEUPE-MZC-OP

19 January 1979

Brigadier General John D. Granger


10. In general, I expect a reduced tour length would decrease utilization of JET entitlements. In making the USAREUR analysis, my staff used an estimate of 6,000 JET families at steady state under all tour possibilities. With limited JET experience thus far, we are unable to verify or improve on this estimate. To date (17 Oct - 31 Dec), USAREUR has had 198 JET applications (36 from AIT, 162 other than AIT). Of this number, 29 were granted concurrent travel, 77 deferred travel, 17 disapproved, and 75 are still pending. Applications increased from seven for one-half of October, to 78 for November, to 113 in December which leads me to believe that a steady state approval rate of 167 per month (to sustain 6,000 over a 36 month tour) is a reasonable estimate. This estimate is substantially below our initial estimates for JET utilization (11,000). We will continue to attempt to refine this data and to respond to the remaining issues of your question 10 under separate cover.

11. Reducing the required tour length for first termers below 24 months clearly has the potential to create some new problems with the career force. For one thing, it would reverse the current perception that married soldiers are better off than single ones and would definitely produce some potential problems in comparability between first termers and careerists. For the long run we should probably have a common tour policy for all, but in the short term, without more careful analysis of impact, I do not foresee that tours for the career force can be reduced. Faced with this dilemma, one might consider establishing the 18 month tour for first termers as a goal and move toward it incrementally with the first step being establishment of a tour length between 18 and 22 months. We opt for the 18 month tour as being in the best interest of the first term soldier, however between 18 and 22 would ameliorate any immediate disparity which could be troublesome with the career force and would give us an opportunity to see how a reduced tour would work before we took on a future challenge.

12. My impression of the reason why an 18 month tour in Europe no longer obtains is that when the draft expired, we no longer had large numbers of two year soldiers available for assignment to USAREUR. I am not able to comment on whether the cost, turbulence, or readiness considerations had anything to do with the end of the 18 month tour.

I assure you of my support for your undertaking. Major Harry J. Thie of the 1st Personnel Command will be my representative and will report to you on 22 January. I will also make available any individual within my command whom you feel can contribute to the Army study.

Sincerely,

  
GEORGE S. BLANCHARD  
General, USA  
Commander in Chief

C-8

APPENDIX D

MILPERCEN INPUT

Incentives Cost Effectiveness Inclosure  
to Space Imbalanced MOS  
Incentives Package (In Staffing)  
DAPC-EPZ-H

## TAB D - Incentives Cost Effectiveness

1. General: Each oversea authorization carries with it an implied, annual charge just to cover the discounted permanent change of station (PCS) costs required to keep that position filled. The proposed FST extension incentives are a no-cost program, their cost being offset and exceeded by the PCS savings generated by FST extensions. The level of analysis to demonstrate this will focus on costs associated with one soldier (with appropriate weighting of data to reflect demographic and preference considerations). If the program is cost-effective for one soldier (appropriately data weighted), the sum of all extendees will be cost-effective. There are other potential savings of undeterminable size, besides reduced PCS, which will flow from this program. No attempt has been made to quantify these savings although they will generate a substantial cost-effectiveness ratio for the incentive program. These potential "savings" are:

- a. Increased unit readiness.
- b. Increased reenlistment which is expected in SIMOS MOS as a result of this program.
- c. Reduced MOS migration from SIMOS MOS.
- d. Reduced training costs, both with regard to the training program element of the SIMOS program itself as well as for service accessions permitted by increased reenlistment/reduced MOS migration from SIMOS MOS.
- e. Reduced accession and personnel turbulence costs associated with termination of the present, required policy of having some SIMOS MOS authorized overstrength in order to fill overseas requirements in key weapons systems.
- f. Reduced personnel administrative and in-processing time associated with PCS moves plus job learning curve time.
- g. Improved personnel utilization.

### 2. Cost Factors:

a. MAC Seat Costs: For any travel to or from overseas locations, the established MAC seat costs will be utilized. While there are some "long tours" for SIMOS soldiers in locations other than Europe and "short tours" other than Korea, for approximation purposes these deviations are discounted. Hence, cost:

Frankfurt - Charleston/McGuire = \$190.00

Soul - Travis = \$302.00

### b. PCS Movement Costs:

(1) Long Tour: For budgetary purposes, ODCSPER uses the value of \$1600 as the average cost of moving an enlisted soldier to or from Europe.

#### TAB D - Incentives Cost Effectiveness

Hence, the discounted cost of one year of his three year tour will be:

$$\text{COST} = \frac{2 \times 1600}{3} = \$1,066.67 = \$1067$$

(2) Short Tour: Since short tours are all unaccompanied, the PCS costs of moving a soldier to or from the oversea location are largely only his movement costs. While PCS of a soldier to or from a short tour does obligate the government to the additional cost of moving the married soldier's family, with the advent of home basing this cost can be substantially reduced. For this analysis, we have assumed that all SIMOS soldiers going to a short tour location will have their families home based at their present location, no additional movement cost will occur, and the soldier will return to the post from which he departed at the end of the short tour. A modest travel cost of \$75.00 to get to or from Travis AFB is also included, the approximate cost from Fort Bliss to Travis. (Note: This series of conditions/constraints represent optimal conditions to keep PCS costs for a short tour low. As such, they represent an acknowledged understatement which will be addressed below.) Hence,

$$\text{COST} = (302 + 75) \times 2 = \$754$$

c. Extension Incentive Pay: Soldiers who elect this option will receive \$50.00 per month (hereafter referred to as an Extension Bonus). Payment may be authorized under the provisions of Special Duty Incentive Pay, if approval for changing the implementing instructions for that pay can be obtained. Otherwise separate enabling legislation will be required. On an annual basis: (For Source: See page 24)

$$\text{COST} = \$600.00$$

d. Leave/Travel: In assigning cost factors to the three leave/travel options, one must acknowledge that there are actually two different costs which must be used. At one level of analysis there are the obvious budgetary values, eg., MAC seat costs for space required travel, etc. There are, however, less evident costs which flow from the inclusion of gratuitous leave in the option array. The leave clearly has some value, but it will not be wholly reflected in any year's budget as a cash flow. This fact is particularly true since enlisted personnel have been limited to "cashing in" only a total of 60 days during a career. Although provision of a gratuitous leave option offers the prospect of SIMOS soldiers "cashing in" more leave than they might otherwise do, the likelihood is slight that it will be a direct one-for-one relationship. Nevertheless, for this analysis, the base pay for the period of gratuitous leave will be used as the cost of this incentive although that is an acknowledged overstatement.

**TAB D - Incentives Cost Effectiveness**

(1) **Thirty Days Gratuitous Leave:** For costing purposes, an average of an E5 and E6, both with 8 years of service will be used, although this is above the mean value expected for extendees selecting this option. As noted above, cost figures will be developed for both budget purposes and total cost purposes.

(a) **Budget:** For this option, the only additional budget expense will be the subsistence pay the soldier would receive during his period of gratuitous leave. Hence,

$$\text{COST} = \$85.20 = \$85$$

(b) **Total Cost:** Under this option, cost will equal base pay for the period plus subsistence.

$$\text{COST} = \frac{657.30 + 721.80}{2} + 85.20 = \$775$$

(2) **Fifteen Days Gratuitous Leave plus CONUS Travel:** Leave cost is computed as in subparagraph 2d(1) above. Travel cost will be MAC seat cost. Hence:

(a) **Budget - Short Tour:**

$$\text{COST} = \$42.60 + (302 \times 2) = \$646.60 = \$647$$

Long Tour:

$$\text{COST} = \$42.60 + (190 \times 2) = \$422.60 = \$423$$

(b) **Total Cost - Short Tour:**

$$\text{COST} = \frac{774.75}{2} + (2 \times 302) = \$991$$

Long Tour:

$$\text{COST} = \frac{774.75}{2} + (190 \times 2) = \$767$$

(3) **Space required travel to CONUS for service member and dependents.** The average SIMOS soldier in skill level 2 or above, who is married, has three dependents. For this incentive option there is no difference between the budget cost and total cost in conducting the analysis. The incentive is only available in long tour areas, hence:

$$\text{COST} = 4 \times 190 \times 2 = \$1520$$

TAB D - Incentives Cost Effectiveness

e. Assignment of Choice (Constrained): There are no additional costs incident to this incentive, beyond the costs which will already be required when the soldier PCS's to CONUS. Hence,

COST = \$0

3. Distribution of Option Choices: While no precise market analysis of SIMOS soldiers has been completed, informal survey of soldiers holding SIMOS MOS has tentatively identified their preference patterns. This expression of their preferences, weighted by demographic data and the existing percentage of "all others" long tours, yields the following probability distribution of incentive option selection:

<u>Incentive</u>	<u>Short Tour</u>	<u>Long Tour</u>
Bonus	.35	.25
30 Days Gratuitous Leave	.10	.15
15 Days Gratuitous Leave		
with Space Required Travel	.55	.27
Space Required Dependent		
Travel	N/A	.33
Choice of Assignment	0.0	0.0

It should be noted that in this analysis we have "worst cased" the selection probabilities by skewing the percentages away from the zero cost option, to wit: choice of assignment. Survey data indicates that a very modest percentage of the extendees will select this option. Nevertheless to further safe-side the analysis we have permitted none to select it.

4. Cost - Effectiveness Computation:

a. General: To determine incentives program costs, a technique of weighting the cost of each option by the probability of its being selected was used. Hence,

COST = Bonus Cost x Probability of Selection + 30 Days  
Gratuitous Leave Cost x Probability of Selection + ..



TAB D.- Incentives Cost Effectiveness

Additionally, as was noted at paragraph 2d, above, cost figures on the basis of both budget and total cost will be developed for effectiveness comparison purposes.

b. Long Tour:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Total Cost} &= (\$600 \times .25) + (\$775 \times .15) + \\ & (\$767 \times .27) + (\$1520 \times .33) + (\$0 \times 0.0) = \\ & \$974.94 = \$975\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Budget Cost} &= (\$600 \times .25) + (\$85 \times .15) + \\ & (\$423 \times .27) + (\$1520 \times .33) + (\$0 \times 0.0) = \\ & \$778.56 = \$779\end{aligned}$$

c. Short Tour:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Total Cost} &= (\$600 \times .35) + (\$775 \times .10) + \\ & (\$991 \times .55) = \$832.55 = \$833\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Budget Cost} &= (\$600 \times .35) + (\$85 \times .10) + \\ & (\$647 \times .55) + (\$0 \times 0.0) = \$574.35 = \$574\end{aligned}$$

d. Cost Effectiveness Comparison: The cost-effectiveness comparison of this incentive program needs to be done at both the budget cost as well as the total cost levels of analysis. In establishing figures for total program cost-effectiveness, weighted average of 2.74 SIMOS spaces in long tour area to 1 in short tour area is used.

(1) Long Tour:

$$\text{Total Cost-Effectiveness} = \frac{\text{Savings}}{\text{Total Cost}} = \frac{\$1067}{\$975} = 1.09$$

$$\text{Budget Cost-Effectiveness} = \frac{\$1067}{\$779} = 1.37$$

(2) Short Tour:

$$\text{Total Cost-Effectiveness} = \frac{\$754}{\$833} = .91$$

$$\text{Budget Cost-Effectiveness} = \frac{\$754}{\$574} = 1.31$$

TAB D - Incentives Cost Effectiveness

(3) Total Program:

Total Cost-Effectiveness = 1.04 to 1

Budget Cost-Effectiveness = 1.35 to 1

5. Analysis: To some extent it is a misnomer to refer to the above computations as "cost-effectiveness comparisons". In actuality they are only "cost-PCS savings comparisons". As detailed at paragraph 1, this incentive program offers several other savings which when combined with the above detailed PCS savings establishes the "true" cost-effectiveness of the overall proposal. Nevertheless, from the computations in paragraph 4, above, it is clear that an incentive program to encourage voluntary extensions of foreign service tour is not only cost-effective but is self-financing from PCS cost savings alone. It should be noted that in every instance, in these computations, worst-case data has been used. This observation applies to the probability of selecting the zero cost incentive (choice of assignment) as well as PCS costs for movement to short tour areas.

As discussed at paragraph 2d above, there is a subtle, but critical, difference between total cost and budget cost figures developed in this analysis. Rigorous analysis demands that some value be ascribed to the gratuitous leave element of the incentive option even though it will not be wholly reflected as a cash flow. Indeed, gratuitous leave might be thought of as cost-less in that while it does represent non-productive time for an extendee, a new arrival in an overseas command has a period of unproductive time during in-processing, settlement of family, etc. Similarly, each overseas departee has a period of out-processing, shipment of automobile and baggage/household goods, etc. In each instance these periods of "lost time" are roughly one and a half weeks per individual who is married, with automobile, etc., (the vast majority of the SIMOS population is in this category). Extensions of FSI reduce the net impact of this type of non-productive time and, accordingly, a case could be made that gratuitous leave for extendees, on balance, is "cost-less" because it is offsetting. However, this analysis has taken a somewhat different course, costing the gratuitous leave and accounting for the PCS frictional costs (in-processing times, etc., discussed above, plus learning curve times) as an unquantified savings.

#### TAB D - Incentives Cost Effectiveness

Analysis demonstrates that the incentive package is clearly budget cost-effective (or cost-PCS savings effective). Based upon presently available market analysis data and estimates, the recommended SIMOS incentives when fully implemented are estimated to cost \$3.7 million per year with a \$5.0 million per year PCS savings. In actuality, PCS savings will probably be substantially greater since the PCS costs for a large fraction of the SIMOS population are two to three times the \$1600 value used in this analysis by virtue of their grade, number of dependents, authorization to ship POV, household goods allocation, etc.

## Appendix E

### COSTS FACTORS

Cost factors used by the TLTF and sources from which obtained are listed below:

#### Accession and Training Costs (FY 80)

--Accession Costs. The average cost to recruit, examine and process a non-prior service enlistee:

Recruit - \$1440.00

Examine - 2.91

Process - 25.00

Total \$1467.91 (Source: DAPE-PBB)

--Training Costs.

\$4538.00 - Average cost per NPS soldier, to include pay and allowances, instructor and overhead support, travel and per diem, share of supplies, equipment and utilities, contractual purchases, ammo and installation overhead. (Source: DAMO-FDR)

\$504.00- Clothing Bag. (Source: DAPE-PBB )

#### Administrative

-- Average Junior Enlisted Travel (JET) entitlements, other than movement costs:

	<u>COLA</u>	<u>SHA</u>
Without Dependents	\$2.00 per day	\$1.35 per day
With Dependents	2.40 per day	2.20 per day

(Varies by grade and geographic location.) (Source: DAPE-HRC)

--Court Martial Costs (include personnel costs only, do not include travel costs for witnesses).

General Court Martial	\$6438
BCD - Special Court	4000
Special Court Martial	2665
Summary Court Martial	777

(Source: DAJA)

APPENDIX F

MACOM INPUT

INSCOM Letter.....	F-1
Japan Message (BG Kennedy).....	F-8
Alaska Message (BG Jenes).....	F-9
Canal Zone Message (BG Anson).....	F-12
Hawaii Message to FORSCOM.....	F-14



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**ARLINGTON HALL STATION**  
**ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212**

**IAOPS-PTR-T**

**24 JAN 1978**

**SUBJECT: Estimated Impact on INSCOM Mission of Reduction for First Term  
Single/Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel**

**Director**  
**Tour Length Task Force (TLTF)**  
**Hoffman Building II (Room 7N12)**  
**200 Stovall Street**  
**Alexandria, VA 22332**

1. Reference is made to TLTF DF dated 15 Dec 78 and meeting held in the Pentagon, 15 Dec 78.

2. The impact of subject tour reduction must be assessed through three perspectives: (1) service time remaining upon arrival in overseas area combined with current assignment policies, (2) quantity of personnel by unit/mission affected, and (3) utilization/productivity of personnel for money/geographical-orientation-training-time spent on the soldier for his assignment. Examination of these factors allows INSCOM to categorize the impact of subject program in various degrees: severe, minimal, and none.

3. Analysis of the attached data sheet at inclosure 1, reveals that there is little impact difference between an 18 or a 20 month overseas (O/S) long tour with respect to the intelligence MOS. A soldier with MOS 05D would return to CONUS under current assignment policy\* if serving an 18 month tour; while, on a 20 month tour he would probably remain overseas (O/S) until ETS (depends on leave taken prior to reporting O/S). Therefore, with respect to the intelligence MOS the discussion of tour length narrows down to 18 months, 24 months or 30 months with the 24 month tour length being a compromise and the 30 month tour length being no different for the first term than 36 months. The ensuing analysis will address 18 months versus 24 months in assessing mission impact. There is no impact on the following 3-year enlistees with: MOS 26C (Interrogator), MOS 98C L (EW/SIGINT Analyst/language qualified), and MOS 98G (EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor) because the language training (8-12 months) combined with BCT/AIT/

\*Individual with 6 months or less remaining on O/S tour until ETS will not be PCS'd until ETS.

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leave allows the 3-year enlistee to complete his term of service overseas. For the record, there is no impact on missions requiring the use of MOS 97B (CI Agent) and MOS 97C (Area Intelligence Specialist) as these personnel are all careerists.

4. Analysis of the authorization data sheet at inclosure 2 will now be discussed. The figures shown were derived by extracting authorizations from the appropriate MTOE/TDA for grades E3, E4, E5 and summing E3 plus E4 plus 50% of E5. The 50% for E5's is arbitrary and based on the rationale that some of the E5 spaces are filled with first term personnel; it is felt this is more realistic than assuming all E5 slots are filled with careerists. Looking at the totals by MOS for Europe, there appears to be minimal mission impact for MOS 05G (SIGSEC Analyst), MOS 96B (Intelligence Analyst) and MOS 98J (EW/SIGINT Non-Communications Interceptor) for the following reasons:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>RATIONALE</u>
05G	There are only 4 estimated first term allocations, 1 of which (E5) could be filled with a careerist. Assuming training pipeline adjusted for reduced O/S tour length, fill shouldn't be a problem.
96B	Less than 10 estimated first term allocations, all of which are E5 spaces and could be filled with a variable mix of career/first term personnel. Additionally, AIT is not highly technical and any good intelligence-oriented EM could be OJT'd in relatively short order.
98J	The 12 allocations are all at FS Berlin, 4 of which could be filled with careerists. With the reopening of FS Sinop, there should be more than enough personnel available to keep these spaces adequately manned. This may require increased intra-theater transfer of personnel (i.e., Sinop to Berlin).

5. The Morse/Non-Morse collection and EW/SIGINT emitter identification personnel, MOS 05H, 05K, and 05D are severely impacted upon with an 18 month tour while completing an enlistment O/S on the 24 month tour. The entire non-voice communication intelligence collection effort revolves around these personnel. Current experience with DA's inability to recruit



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and train sufficient personnel in these MOS mitigates against an 18 month O/S tour for these personnel; however, reduction to 24 months will allow the status quo as personnel would have less than six months remaining until ETS. For the record, it is noted that an O/S tour of 22 months or greater will preserve the status quo and allow most to complete their term of service O/S.

6. With respect to MOS 33S (EW/Intercept Equipment Repairer), a case must be made for the highly complex technical training that prepares them for their field station equipment repair job once assigned; additionally, these personnel take six months to one year becoming familiar with the equipment on site. These personnel arrive full of electronic theory and commence learning the peculiarities of the on-site equipment; by the end of a year they become productive and the training investment is starting to pay dividends as reflected in less mission equipment down time. Additionally, the TRADOC school system provides mobile training teams to teach repair of sophisticated one-of-a-kind systems in Europe (LEFOX, LAFAIRE VITE, AN/FLR-9); increasing the turnover of these highly trained personnel is not cost effective and will certainly contribute to reduced mission effectiveness. If less than full utilization of these personnel is a must because of forces lying outside INSCOM (i.e., fairness, equity, uniform personnel policy, morale, perceived long range increased retention, etc.) then the highly skilled MOS 33S soldier must be offered an enticement to extend his tour in Europe in the form of a monetary bonus for every month extended.

7. The dilemma for the 4-year enlisted linguists (MOS 96C, 98C L, and 98G) is similar to that of the MOS 33S in that extensive AIT training time, extended on-site OJT, and European language orientation simply mitigate against reassigning these individuals when they are most productive. Once again if the O/S tour length must be reduced, then these individuals must be offered monetary enticement for months extended O/S. Currently LEFOX linguists extend their term of enlistment while at DLI to receive additional language training in exchange for a full tour in Europe (35-36 months). If monetary rewards for extended service O/S becomes a reality, this policy will need reexamining. It is worth mentioning that one of the purposes of having a four-year linguist was to maximize O/S utilization vs training cost.

8. The MOS 98C (EW/SIGINT Analyst without language) is the analyst/reporter of the intelligence gathered at the SIGINT field stations. This soldier is critical to the timely dissemination of the field station product. The individual requires extensive on-site OJT to "know the

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
enemy" in order to predict intelligence indications including indications of hostility. This soldier arrives in theater with approximately two and one-half years service remaining, and does not really become productive until six months after arrival. It is noted that a 22 month O/S tour would significantly reduce the losses in this MOS similar to the collection MOS mentioned earlier. If an 18 month tour O/S is a must, then monetary incentives should be provided for extensions of O/S tour.

9. Although MOS 74D (ADP Operator) and MOS 74F (Programmer/Analyst) are not intelligence MOS's as they are used throughout the Army, their unique role in the O/S intelligence community is worth mentioning briefly. Our SIGINT systems at FS Berlin and Augsburg are highly complex massive intelligence data collection systems where computer devices control and direct information flow in addition to the normal processes expected in computerized operations. Although the length of AIT is not extensive (2 months) and the quantity of personnel is not large (27, 10) the criticality of retention O/S lies in the on-site OJT time of 6-12 months before becoming productive. Once again the loss of these experienced European field station oriented ADP personnel when they are most productive would have a deleterious impact on the intelligence collection mission and would have to be compensated for through increased expensive contractor support or monetary incentives for these highly skilled personnel to remain O/S if an 18-24 months O/S tour policy is implemented.

10. In summary, and for simplicity, a graphic portrayal of the preceding verbalized impact on the INSCOM intelligence mission is attached at inclosure 3. If an 18, 20 or 24 month O/S long tour policy is established, then alternatives for those MOS's shown in the "severe" category must be addressed. These alternatives should include: (1) exemption from shorter O/S tour policy, (2) monetary O/S tour extension incentives, and (3) linguists and maintenance personnel with four year enlistment with theater orientation (i.e., Europe language serving in Europe or maintenance personnel specially trained and working on LEFOX, LAFAIRE VITE and AN/FLR-9 in Europe) be committed to full O/S tour/serve until ETS. The increased costs for Army recruiting, training, personnel movement, and increased clearance processing are not addressed as the responsibilities for these services are outside of INSCOM's charter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl  
as

  
J. J. KRAYNAK  
CPT, GS  
Asst AG

# MOS PROFILE

NOS	MOS DESCRIPTION	TERM OF ENLISTMENT(MO)	TNG TIME (INCL LV)	SERVICE TIME REMAINING	SERVICE TIME REMAINING AFTER OVERSEAS LONG TOUR OF:			
					18 MO	20 MO	24 MO	30 MO
05D	EW/SIGINT EMITTER IDENT/LOC	36	10	26	8 US	6 O/S	2 O/S	O/S
05G	SIGSEC ANALYST	36	8	28	10 US	8 US	4 O/S	O/S
05H	EW/SIGINT MORSE INTCP	36	9	27	9 US	7 US	3 O/S	O/S
05K	EW/SIGINT NM INTCP	36	8	28	10 US	8 US	4 O/S	O/S
33S	EW/INTCP EQUIP RPR	48	12-14	36-34	18-16 US	16-14 US	12-10 US	6-4 O/S
74D	COMPUTER/HACH OPR	36	4.5	31.5	13.5 US	11.5 US	7.5 US	1.5 O/S
74F	PROGRAMMER/ANALYST	36	6	30	12 US	10 US	6 O/S	O/S
96B	INTEL ANALYST	36	4	32	14 US	12 US	8 US	2 O/S
96C (3yr)	INTERROGATOR	36	12-16	24-20	6-2 O/S	4-0 O/S	O/S	O/S
96C (4yr)	INTERROGATOR	48	12-16	36-32	18-14 US	16-12 US	12-8 US	6-2 O/S
96D	IMAGE INTERPRETER	36	7	29	11 US	9 US	5 O/S	O/S
97B	CI AGENT	CAREERIST						
97C	AREA INTEL SPEC	CAREERIST						
98C	EW/SIGINT ANALYST	36	6-10	30-26	12-8 US	10-6 US	6-2 O/S	O/S
98C L(3yr)	EW/SIGINT ANALYST W/LANGUAGE	36	14-18	22-18	4-0 O/S	2-0 O/S	O/S	O/S
98C L(4yr)	EW/SIGINT ANALYST W/LANGUAGE	48	14-18	34-30	16-12 US	14-10 US	10-6 US	4-0 O/S
98C (3yr)	EW/SIGINT VOICE INTCP	36	15-19	21-17	3-0 O/S	1-0 O/S	O/S	O/S
98C (4yr)	EW/SIGINT VOICE INTCP	48	15-19	33-29	15-11 US	13-9 US	9-5 US	3-0 O/S
98J	EW/SIGINT NC INTCP	36	6	30	12 US	10 US	6 O/S	O/S

Estimated First Term Authorizations by Unit/MOS

UNIT	OSD	OSC	OSH	OSK	33S	74D	74F	96B	96C	96D	98C	98C L	98C	98J
<b>EUROPE</b>														
FS Augsburg	60		129	206	80	23	7				76	81	140	
FS Berlin	16		26	57	30	4	3				20	25	88	12
66th MI Gp HQ		4						2						
18th MI Bn								3	27					
430th MI Det														
165th MI Bn HHC														
511th MI Bn HHC														
527th MI Co								1						
5th MI Co								2	4					
766th MI Det														
TOTAL EUROPE	76	4	155	263	110	27	10	8	31	96	106	228	12	

**PACIFIC**

FS MISAWA											17	5	9	
500th MI Gp								1		1				
FS Okinawa														
TOTAL PACIFIC								1		1	17	5	9	

**PANAMA**

470th MI Gp														

SUMMARY

OVERSEA'S TOUR LENGTH (MONTHS)

NOS	18	20	24	30	36
05D	▲	●	Ø	Ø	Ø
05G	●	●	Ø	Ø	Ø
05H	▲	▲	Ø	Ø	Ø
05K	▲	▲	Ø	Ø	Ø
33S	▲	▲	▲	●	Ø
74D	▲	▲	▲	Ø	Ø
74F	▲	▲	●	Ø	Ø
96B	●	●	●	Ø	Ø
*96C(3)	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
*96C(4)	▲	▲	▲	●	Ø
96D	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
97B	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
97C	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
98C	▲	▲	●	Ø	Ø
*98C-L(3)	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
*98C-L(4)	▲	▲	▲	Ø	Ø
*98G(3)	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
*98G(4)	▲	▲	▲	Ø	Ø
98J	●	●	●	Ø	Ø

IMPACT

Severe    ▲

Minimal    ●

None    Ø

\*First Term enlistees for languages have a 3 or 4 year option of enlistment.

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UNCLAS E F T O FOUO  
PERS FOR BG GRANGER FA BG KENNEDY  
SDDJ: OVERSEAS TOUR LENGTH  
4. YOUR 151735Z DEC 78 (E)  
1. THIS COMD CONCURS WITH RECM 18 MONTH CS TOUR FOR ALL  
FIRST TERM ENL PERS WHO SERVE IN A LONG TOUR AREA AND  
WHO DO NOT HAVE COMD SPONSORED DEPN ACMP THE4.  
2. THE FINANCIAL HARSHIP BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE  
DEVALUATION OF US CURRENCY MAKES IT EXIGENT THAT FIRST  
TERM PERSONNEL SERVE THE SHORTENED TOUR.  
3. THE PROPOSED CHANGE IN TOUR LENGTH IN ADDITION TO THE  
RECENT IMPL OF THE JUNIOR ENLISTED TRAVEL (JET) PROG  
AFFORDS THE FIRST TERM SOLDIER OPTIONS THAT COULD  
FAVORABLY EFFECT AND BE KEEPING WITH THE ALL VOL FORCE  
CONCEPT.  
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TO DIR TLTW WASH DC//DAPE-MPE-DRS//  
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UNCLAS E F T O  
PERSONAL FOR BG GRANGER FROM BG JENES  
SUBJ: OVERSEAS TOUR LENGTH

1. WHILE THIS COMMAND ENCOURAGES EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SOLDIER SATISFACTION, ESPECIALLY AMONG FIRST-TERMERS, IT OPPOSES THE PROPOSED 18-MONTH TOUR LENGTH CHANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. MORALE AMONG FIRST-TERMERS MAY BE INCREASED, BUT IMPLEMENTATION COULD HAVE A CORRESPONDINGLY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CAREER SOLDIERS DOING SIMILAR JOBS IN THE SAME ENVIRONMENT. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACCOMPANIED VERSUS "ALL OTHERS" TOUR LENGTHS IS READILY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED. UNLESS ALL CAREER PERSONNEL INTELLECTUALIZE AND ACCEPT DA'S UNDERLYING RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED POLICY, ADOPTION COULD FOSTER RESENTMENT AT ITS PERCEIVED INEQUITY. ADDRESSING THE LOCAL SITUATION, THIS POLICY COULD BE PARTICULARLY AGGRAVATING TO SOLDIERS AT FORT WAINWRIGHT, WHERE THE CURRENT 18 MONTH "ALL OTHERS" TOUR IS VIEWED AS SOME MEASURE OF COMPENSATION/RECOGNITION FOR ENDURING MORE SEVERE WEATHER CONDITIONS AND CULTURAL DEPRIVATION THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS AT FORT RICHARDSON WHO SERVE 24 MONTHS. IT IS ASSUMED THAT FORT GREELY'S CURRENT 12-MONTH "ALL OTHERS" TOUR WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO 18 MONTHS, AS THIS WOULD SEVERELY CONTRADICT THE POLICY'S INTENDED PURPOSE. THE "ALL OTHERS" TOUR LENGTH FOR FORT GREELY WAS REDUCED FROM 18 TO 12 MONTHS AT THE REQUEST OF THIS COMMAND IN JANUARY 1977.

B. ASIDE FROM THE MORALE ISSUE, THE MOST PROFOUND IMPACT WOULD BE IN THE AREA OF UNIT READINESS. IN ALASKA WHERE SEASONAL CHANGES DICTATE UNIQUE AND DIFFERENT TACTICAL TECHNIQUES, AND INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER DOESN'T REALIZE HIS FULL POTENTIAL IN EITHER SUMMER OR WINTER OPERATIONS UNTIL HE'S EXPERIENCED EACH. IF ALL FIRST-TERMERS ROTATED AFTER 18 MONTHS, THEY COULD MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNIT OPERATION BASED ON EXPERIENCE IN ONLY ONE PHASE. THIS FACT, COMBINED WITH THE GENERAL DISRUPTION OF ADDED TURBULENCE, WOULD INCREASE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, HAMPER EFFORTS TO

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BUILD UNIT INTEGRITY AND ESPRIT DE CORPS, AND REDUCE UNIT EFFECTIVENESS - I.E. READINESS. EVEN HARDER WORKING CONDITIONS WOULD RESULT FOR SUPERVISORS, WITH THE EXPECTED DROP IN THEIR MORALE AGAIN OFFSETTING THE HOPED-FOR UPLIFT IN THAT OF THE FIRST-TERMERS.

C. ALASKA, OPERATING UNDER A "ON INSTALLATION" CONCEPT WITH THREE SEPARATE POST, ALREADY HAS MULTI-TOUR LENGTHS, UNLIKE EUROPE. FROM A STRICTLY ADMINISTRATIVE STANDPOINT, ADOPTION OF THIS POLICY WOULD ADD A SEVENTH DEROS STATUS FOR THE ALASKAN COMMAND, FURTHER COMPLICATING THE PROBLEM OF PRO- RATING TOURS FOR INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED BETWEEN THE THREE POSTS. STATISTICS COMPILED FOR CY78 SHOW A WIDE DISPARITY IN THE PERSONNEL TURNOVER RATES IN LIKE UNITS AT FORTS RICHARDSON AND WAINWRIGHT. THE TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS AT FORT RICHARDSON, WHICH HAVE 24 MONTH "ALL OTHERS" TOURS, EXPERIENCED AN AVERAGE TURNOVER RATE OF 13PERCENT AND 8.8 PERCENT . RESPECTIVELY. THEIR SISTER BATTALION AT FORT WAINWRIGHT WITH A 18-MONTH "ALL OTHERS" TOUR LENGTH, EXPERIENCED A 16.4 PERCENT TURNOVER RATE. ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED 18-MONTH TOUR LENGTH FOR ALL UNACCOMPA NIED FIRST-TERMERS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY INCREASE THE AVERAGE TURNOVER RATE FOR THE FORT RICHARDSON BATTALIONS. FORT RICHARDSON WOULD LOSE A "HIDDEN" SOURCE OF SUPPLEMENTAL MANPOWER IN THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOW INVOLUNTARILY EXTENDED WHEN THEIR ETS IS LESS THE 6 MONTHS GREATER THENA THEIR DERGS. THE VOLUME OF REQUISITIONING CYCLES WOULD INCREASE WITH A CINCOMMITANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL NECESSARY TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE DISTRIBUTION. WITH 10-MONTH REQUISITIONING CYCLES, IT IS ALREADY DIFFICULT ENOUGH FOR THIS COMMAND TO ACCURATELY ANTICIPATE, MANAGE, AND EXECUTE REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITH THE MULTI-TOUR LENGTHS AND SEPARATE POST.

D. PCS AND OHA BASOPS COSTS WOULD OBVIOUSLY INCREASE, MERELY BY THE ADDED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL BEING MOVED. BECAUSE THE COST OF LIVING IS HIGH IN ALASKA, ANY INCREASES IN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, LOCAL SERVICES, ETC. NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INCREASED VOLUME IN THESE AREAS WOULD BE MAGNIFIED MORE THAN WHAT ONE MIGHT SUSPECT.

E. THE MEDICAL AND DENTAL ACTIVITIES AT FORT RICHARDSON WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE INCREASED TURNOVER OF PATIENTS OF THE AGE GROUP MOST OFTEN TREATED BY THOSE FACILITIES.

2. WHILE THE PROPOSED TOUR LENGTH CHANGE MAY HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR EUROPE, THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD OFFSET ANY PONTEN-

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TIAL ADVANTAGE FOR THIS COMMAND. IF SUCH A PLAN IS ADOPTED  
ARMY-WIDE, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT ALASKA BE EXCEPTED.

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TO DIR TLTF WASH DC//DAPE-MPE-DRS//  
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INCLAS

PERSONAL FOR BG GRANGER FROM BG ANSON

4. YOUR MSG 151735Z DEC 78, SUBJECT OVERSEAS TOUR LENGTH.  
3. MSG DAPE-MRC-T, 231823Z OCT 78, SUBJECT IMPLEMENTATION OF JUNIOR  
ENLISTED

TRAVEL (JET) OVERSEAS.

1. THE 18 MONTH TOUR PROPOSED IN REF A IS CONSIDERED UNNECESSARY  
AND UNDESIRABLE.  
2. THIS BRIGADE HAS 1393 FIRST TERM ENLISTED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED  
(OF A TOTAL ENLISTED STRENGTH OF 5167.) HOWEVER, THIS FIGURE DOES  
NOT REPRESENT A REALISTIC BASIS FOR ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF A  
SHORTENED TOUR SINCE REF A QUALIFIES THOSE ELIGIBLE FOR THE 18 MONTH  
TOUR AS THOSE "WHO DO NOT HAVE COMMAND SPONSORED DEPENDENTS ACCOM-  
PANYING THEM." BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF REF B (JET-OVERSEAS)  
THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONNEL COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.  
THERE ARE NO FIGURES AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ON THE NUMBER OF  
JUNIOR ENLISTED WHO WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JET. A SHORTER TOUR IS  
NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER TO RAISE THE MORALE IN THIS COMMAND.  
IN FACT, THE INCREASE IN PERSONNEL TURBULENCE MIGHT HAVE THE  
OPPOSITE EFFECT. THE PERSONNEL TURNOVER RATE FOR 1978 WAS  
39.60PCT. IF THE 18 MONTH TOUR WERE IMPLEMENTED, THIS FIGURE  
WOULD INCREASE; THE AMOUNT OF INCREASE CANNOT BE ACCURATELY  
ESTIMATED BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT OF JET DISCUSSED ABOVE. PCS  
COSTS WOULD RISE IN PROPORTION TO THE INCREASED TURBULENCE.  
ENLISTED STRENGTHS WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED. WE  
MUST ASSUME THAT DA WILL INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF ENLISTED  
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SHORTER TOUR. THIS  
WILL, OF COURSE, INCREASE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE, BUT END  
STRENGTH IS AN ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY FROM TOUR  
LENGTH. TRAINING LOAD WOULD BE AFFECTED. WHILE THE NUMBER  
OF PEOPLE ASSIGNED AT ANY ONE TIME SHOULD REMAIN THE SAME  
THE INCREASED TURNOVER RATE WOULD INCREASE TRAINING RE-  
QUIREMENTS. THE IMPACT OF A REDUCED TOUR ON READINESS IS

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DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. IF THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS WHOSE TOUR  
 CHANGES FROM 24 TO 18 MONTHS IS SIGNIFICANT, THE AVERAGE TRAINING  
 LEVEL OF THE BRIGADE MIGHT BE SLIGHTLY AFFECTED. UT IF THE NUMBER  
 AFFECTED IS SMALL, AND IF THERE IS NO DECREASE IN TOTAL PERSONNEL  
 ASSIGNED, READINESS SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED.

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TO CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA //AFPR-PR//

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UNCLAS

SUBJ: OVERSEAS TOUR LENGTH

A. YOUR 161709Z JAN 79 (U)

1 THIS COMMAND RECOMMENDS THAT THE TOUR LENGTH OF FIRST-TERM ENLISTED PERSONNEL NOT BE CHANGED TO A SHORTER TOUR IN AN OS LONG TOUR AREA. IF ANY OF OUR SOLDIERS IN TODAY'S ARMY ARE LEAST LIKELY AFFECTED BY CURR TOUR LENGHTS, IT WOULD BE THE FIRST-TERM SOLDIERS. NORMALLY, THEY ARE NOT YET BURDENED WITH THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH HAVING DEPENDENTS NOR ARE THEY FORCED TO LIVE ON THE LOCAL ECONOMY. ADDITIONALLY, MORALE-WELFARE FUNDS AND ACTIVITIES ARE READILY AVAL TO THESE SOLDIERS TO PROVIDE OFF-DUTY ENTERTAINMENT.

2 TOUR LENGTH SOULD REMAIN THE SAME FOR THE FOL REASONS:

A. LIVING CONDITIONS ARE GOOD IN HAWAII REQUIRING NO MAJOR ADAPTATION.

B. TEAM BUILDING (UNIT INTEGRITY) TAKES TIME, PARTICULARLY WITH THESE SOLDIERS FRESH OUT OF AIT. SOLDIERS BEGIN TO MAKE VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND BEGIN TO FEEL LIKE VALUABLE TEAM MEMBERS GENERALLY ABOUT ONE YEAR INTO THEIR TOURS OF DUTY. THE REMAINDER OF THESE SOLDIER TOURS ARE SPENT IN ENHANCING COMBAT READINESS.

3 THE FOL COMMENTS ARE FEYED TO PARA 2 OF REF MSC:

A. PERSONNEL TURBULENCE: SIGNIFICANT INCREASE WITH INHERENT ADVERSE EFFECTS ON TRAINING. LACK OF CONTINUITY DESTROYS/DISRUPTS UNIT TRAINING. NOT ONLY IS THIS TRUE FOR THE OS COMMAND, BUT ALSO

WOULD APPLY FOR THE SUSTAINING BASE. ADDITIONAL LEVIES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE SHORTER TOUR.

B. STABILIZATION: THE LONGER THE TOUR THE BETTER THE STABILIZATION IN THE UNITS AND, THEREFORE, INCREASED PERSONNEL, LOGISTICS AND TRAINING READINESS. FIRST-TERM SOLDIERS ARRIVE IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING FORMAL TRAINING AND THEIR TENURE IN THE COMMAND IS SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW UNIT COMMANDERS THE TIME TO DEVELOP SKILLS THROUGH OJE. ADDITIONALLY, IT GIVES THE COMMANDERS THE TIME TO REALIZE THE BENEFITS OF TRAINED/QUALIFIED SOLDIERS.

C. TROOP MORALE: PRESENTLY MORALE IN HAWAII IS GOOD. FOR EXAMPLE, RETENTION OF OUR FIRST-TERM SOLDIERS IN THE 25TH INF DIV IS INCREASING. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT FIRST-TERM SOLDIERS OFTEN MUST OVERCOME A MATURITY PROBLEM AND THAT THE FIRST TIME AWAY FROM HOME CAN BE A LONELY PERIOD OF ADJUSTMENT. HOWEVER, THIS IS A PROBLEM EXPERIENCED BY MANY YOUNG SOLDIERS REGARDLESS OF THEIR ASSIGNMENTS. WITH THE CURR TOUR LENGTH FIRST-TERM SOLDIERS ARE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REENLIST UPON ETS FOR CONUS ASSIGNMENTS OF THEIR PREFERENCE. SHORTENING TOURS WOULD NEGATE THIS OPTION AND COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE MORALE IMPACT.

D. END STRENGTHS: NO SEVERE IMPACT.

E. TRAINING LOADS: SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS DUE TO THE NECESSITY FOR INCREASED CYCLES.

G. READINESS. STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT READINESS WILL SUFFER FROM BOTH AN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT LEVEL PROFICIENCY VIEWPOINT.

4 RECOMMEND THE IMPACTS OF THE RECENTLY APPROVED TWO-YEAR ENLISTMENT PROGRAM (TEST) (VEAP) BE CONSIDERED DURING THIS STUDY. THE EXPENSE AND PERSONNEL TURBULENCE CAUSED BY THIS PROGRAM MAY MITIGATE AGAINST SHORTENED TOUR LENGTHS.

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